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CHAPTER 1, THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
A need for greater understanding of the antecedents of 
cooperation and conflict in interorganizational relations 
exists because the increasing complexity of contemporary 
society demands that human service organizations recognize 
and develop ties with other organizations in order to achieve 
mutual goals. The effective use of organizations' resources 
is the essence of meaningful interorganizational relations. 
The concept of interorganizational relations has been 
influenced by several emergent theories, including exchange 
and power. This dissertation will compare and contrast 
exchange and power in their capacity for predicting coopera­
tion and conflict in dyadic relationships of organizations. 
Relatively little attention has been directed to the dyad as 
a unit of analysis for the study of the processes of coopera­
tion and conflict. Each of the processes has received atten­
tion in relation to the single organization. However, the 
dyad is the smallest, most basic unit in interorganizational 
relations, and for this reason appears to have promise as 
an intermediate step from the study of the single organiza­
tion to the network of organizations. 
This dissertation may have both applied and theoretical 
implications for those concerned with interorganizational 
relations. For the practitioner, who must interact with 
2 
other organizations, an understanding of the implications 
of each theory may help in the decision of strategy for 
various situations which the organization may face. For the 
theoretician, the consideration of the two theories may 
reveal a more general approach that may include elements 
of exchange and power. 
This chapter includes a discussion of the dyad as the 
unit of analysis in interorganizational relations study; 
the process of cooperation; the process of conflict; the 
simultaneous existence of cooperation and conflict in inter­
organizational relations, and a summary of the objectives 
and organization of effort in this dissertation. 
The Dyad as a Unit of Analysis 
in the Study of Interorganizational Relations 
There are three basic approaches available for analyzing 
the interaction among organizations : (1) from the viewpoint 
of the single organization interacting with other organiza­
tions; (2) focusing upon dyads of organizations interacting 
with each other, and (3) focusing on networks of organiza­
tions interacting in a common field. Among these approaches 
the dyad has received relatively little attention as a unit 
of analysis. This dissertation focuses on the dyad as the 
unit of analysis because it appears to have promise as an 
intermediate step from the study of the single organization 
to the network of organizations. 
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Halpert (1974) was among the first to use the dyad as 
the unit of analysis in an empirical study of the relation­
ship between power, conflict, and cooperation on the inter-
organizational level. The theoretical framework of his study 
was based upon dyadic analysis. It was his contention that 
organizational theory cannot be fully developed unless one 
takes into consideration not only the organization per se, 
but also the linkage of the organization to other organiza­
tions. Halpert suggested that organizational sociologists 
should have initiated their research of interorganizational 
relationships at the dyadic level rather than at the more 
complex levels of system or network analysis. He suggested 
that the problems which are experienced in network research 
include (1) what constitutes a network? (2) are there dis­
cernible boundaries which will facilitate the inclusion 
or exclusion of organizations? (3) what kind of methodologies 
are needed to do network analysis? (4) how does one derive 
a network score on a variable? He suggested that the major 
reason for these problems is that organizational sociologists 
have jumped directly from intraorganizational research to 
network research without preparing the theoretical and 
methodological groundwork for a gradual transition. 
Halpert studied the ongoing activities of seven public 
organizations, located in a large midwestern city and 
concerned with problem youth. These organizations had ., 
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contact with each other because of their common client, 
either on a voluntary basis or because of legal requirements. 
The organizations included Juvenile Court, Juvenile Center, 
County Welfare Department, County Mental Health Center, 
County Court Services, City Police Department, and Public 
School. However, the focus of his study was not on the net­
work, but upon the interaction of the organizations in each 
dyad as they attempted to accomplish their objectives. 
For his research, he included five objectives for each of 
the seven focal organizations, which gave an "N" of 210 
dyads, or 30 dyads per focal organization. 
Halpert developed two empirical propositions: (1) If 
Organization B perceives that its line or lines of action 
toward achieving its objectives are being restricted by 
Organization A, it will respond or react by either conflict­
ing with, cooperating with, withdrawing from, or circumventing 
Organization A and (2) The perceived bases of power of 
alter-organization will determine how ego-organization will 
respond or react to the restrictive activity of alter organi­
zations. The findings in relation to the specific hypothesis 
developed from his empirical propositions supported the 
theoretical framework. 
Halpert concluded that his most important finding was 
that the theoretical framework which had been created, 
namely, the use of the dyad for the study of power and 
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conflict, was viable for interorganizational analysis. He 
recommended changes in the use of the framework, which had 
the potential for increasing its explanatory power. On the 
theoretical level, he proposed that the framework be expanded 
to include selected structural, contextual, technological, 
and interactive variables from both the intraorganizational 
and interorganizational levels. He mentioned the following 
variables: formalization, standardization, centralization, 
size, history of origin, and others. 
Paulson (1976) has also been interested in the dyadic 
relations of organizations as a potentially useful link 
between studies of the single organization and the full 
systemic approaches to the study of organizations. He 
stated that dyadic analysis was the most elemental systemic 
unit because it focuses on organizational relationships 
taking two organizations at a time. He considered organiza­
tional, dyadic, and systemic properties as developmental 
stages for the building of a general theory of interorganiza­
tional relationships. Paulson noted that the linking stage, 
focusing on the dyad as the unit of analysis, was the least 
developed of the three and that therefore full exploration 
of interorganizational relationships was restricted. He 
argued that the forces which bring an organization to inter­
act are not the same as those which determine with whom the 
organization will interact. In Paulson's own research he 
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dealt with the "with whom" question, both empirically and 
theoretically. He developed five propositions which formed 
the basis for a theory of properties of organizational 
dyads. The independent variables were the comparative dif­
ferences of certain organizational characteristics: goal 
difference, resources difference, and social status of 
administrators. The dependent variables were perceived 
competition between the organizations ; perceived domain 
consensus, and perceived cooperative interaction in the form 
of joint projects. His sample consisted of 18 organizations 
drawn purposively from the population of state level, health-
related, non-profit federations of a midwestern state. The 
federations included: Cancer, United Cerebral Palsy, Easter 
Seal, Heart Association, T.B. and Respiratory Disease, 
Community Health Service, Division of Rehabilitation, Social 
Services, Extension Division, Dental Association, Farm 
Bureau, National Farmers' Organization, Hospital Association, 
Medical Society, Nurses Association, Osteopathic Society, 
Pharmaceutical Association, and Health Planning Council. 
The number of possible dyadic relationships or pairs 
of organizations, in Paulson's study was 153, which included 
all possible combinations of 18 organizations, taking two 
at at time. As a result of his research, Paulson was able 
to find support for his model, which represents at least 
a partial explanation for the decision concerning with whom 
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an organization decides to have joint programs and with 
whom the organization competes. 
Paulson's comparative dyadic analysis took both per­
ceptual and structural dimensions into consideration. 
Paulson's example of the perceptual reasons involved in the 
establishment of a joint program is as follows: at the outset, 
Organization A needs funds and voluntary personnel, while 
Organization B has a plentiful supply of both resources. In 
this case the dyad is characterized by resource difference. 
Assume that the specific goals of A and B are similar and 
that the principal administrators of A and B have similar 
social status. The effect of the similarity of statuses 
is to produce a high degree of perceived domain consensus, 
which in turn opens the way for the establishment of joint 
programs. Because the administrators would be working with 
social status equals and because they feel the organization's 
domain is legitimate, they are willing to establish a joint 
program. 
Paulson's example of the structural reasons involved 
in the establishment of a joint program is as follows: 
Organization A needs resources while Organization B has a 
plentiful supply. Both organizations have similar goals. 
However, because there is a difference in resource level, 
B has little reason to feel threatened by A. In this case, 
although the competition is perceived, it is not threatening 
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to B, and a joint program will be established. It is the 
case of a prosperous organization giving assistance to a 
non-threatening, less prosperous in order to gain influence 
over the competitor and to obtain credit for future needs. 
The results of Paulson's research supported his contention 
that the study of dyadic relationships made possible the 
answer to the question of "with whom" the organization 
interacts, a subject of equal importance as that of the 
forces that bring organizations to interact. 
Molnar (1976) in another study of dyadic relations of 
organizations noted three advantages for the study of the 
interorganizational dyad rather than individual organizations. 
He stated that (1) dyadic analysis permitted the direct 
observation of cooperation and conflict among organizations 
because resource flows and communication occur in elemental 
form between individual organizations, two at a time; (2) 
dyadic analysis permits the examination of emergent properties 
of the group ; and (3) dyadic analysis permits the analysis 
of purely relational properties of organizations in conjunc­
tion with comparative properties of dyad components. Molnar 
(1976) addressed the third of these, by focusing on proper­
ties derived from comparisons of the characteristics of 
interacting groups and their consequences for ongoing 
relationships. He studied twelve agencies on various levels, 
resulting in a set of organizations which included 147 dyads, 
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which represented all possible relationships in the set. The 
organizations in his sample included Agricultural Stabiliza­
tion and Conservation Service; Farmer's Homes Administration; 
Soil Conservation Service; County Extension Service; Fish 
and Game Enforcement; District Forester Unit; State Park 
Ranger; State Forest Administrative Unit; Fish Management 
Biologist Unit, and Wildlife Biologist Unit. 
Molnar (1976) studied four comparative organizational 
characteristics: Organizational output similarity (the kinds 
of clients that receive its output); organizational decision 
making structure (formalization, autonomy), and the charac­
teristics of the boundary person (professional activity, 
age). He found that similarities and differences were 
important for explaining interdependence. He considered his 
examination of the comparative properties of dyads important 
in developing theory about the level and kind of linkage 
between organizations. 
Mulford and Mulford (1977) considered it crucial that 
specific propositions regarding dyads be developed because 
the dyad is the simplest unit of interorganizational relar 
tions. Because there is a paucity of available data concern­
ing interorganizational relations, they reexamined available 
but unanalyzed data that had been collected in 1960 from 
informants in three communities in a midwest county and which 
dealt with cooperation and conflict between organizations 
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in which the informants were involved. In the reexamination 
of the data, Mulford and Mulford undertook a comparative 
analysis of the structural properties of organizations in 
dyads and the relevance of those properties for interorganiza­
tional relations. They selected the variables of organiza-
size and variables indicative of input and output domains 
for the comparative analysis. The basis of their analysis 
consisted of 231 dyads based upon conflict, cooperation, or 
mixed interorganizational relations. Their findings for 
dyadic relations were as follows : (1) cooperation may occur 
between organizations of either the same or dissimilar size, 
but conflict or mixed interorganizational relations is more 
likely to occur between organizations of the same size 
(2) cooperation, conflict, and mixed interorganizational 
relations may be present when organizations try to recruit 
members from the same age categories. Conflict and mixed 
interorganizational relations may be absent when organizations 
try to recruit members from different age categories. Their 
third finding was that cooperation may occur between organi­
zations providing either the same or dissimilar number of 
activities. Conflict or mixed interorganizational relations 
is more likely to occur between organizations providing 
a similar number of activities. In their summary the 
Mulfords stated that the available data provided support 
for the propositions regarding dyadic relations. They 
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recommended that more needs to be done in developing inter-
organizational relations theory at the dyad levels. They 
said (Mulford and Mulford, 1977:570) "Methodologically, 
interorganizational relations research will not fully develop 
until dyads of organizations replace single organizations 
as the unit of analysis." 
In this dissertation, an empirical analysis will be made 
of the ongoing processes of cooperation and conflict in dyads 
in a network of seventeen youth serving organizations which 
are located in one community. These organizations form a 
network because of their concern for their common clients. 
The sample consists of 136 dyads, which includes all possible 
combinations of seventeen organizations, taken two at a 
time. The organizations include: Group Youth House, County 
Probation Office, County Attorney's Office, County Board 
of Supervisors, Church Group Home, Central Mental Health 
Center, Regional Alcoholism Center, County Community Action, 
Senior High School, two junior high schools. Community 
School, State Employment Service, and the City Council. 
The processes of cooperation and conflict are key 
processes for understanding dyadic relations in networks of 
organizations. The two processes have been discussed in the 
following ways: (1) conflict can occur within a larger 
framework of cooperation (Warren et al., 1965); (2) organiza­
tions may be cooperating with respect to one goal and may 
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be competing with respect to another (Deutsch, 1949); (3) both 
processes can be incorporated into the same model of inter­
dependence (Guetzkow, 1966; Aiken and Hage, 1968) and (4):;both 
can coexist at the same time within a dyad (Hall and Clark, 
1975). In addition it has been noted that both processes 
occur with nearly the same relative frequency in some 
communities (Mulford and Mulford, 1977). 
The Process of Cooperation 
Historically, cooperation between organizations has 
been viewed as a desirable state by social planners who have 
been trying to provide for the health and welfare of citizens 
through the work of community organizations. Emphasis by 
the planners was on cooperation, a term that has been used 
interchangeably with "coordination" or thought to be included 
in coordination (Reid, 1964; Baker and O'Brien, 1971). For 
example, Reid (1964) has discussed the problem of delinquency 
prevention and control from the point of view of the com­
munity organizer. He noted that the low level of coordina­
tion of services was a problem in terms of duplication of 
services, overlapping services, and fragmentary services. 
He mentioned bringing agencies together, developing channels 
of communication, or providing mediation as being functional 
for the community, but argued that these approaches are 
useful and sufficient only when agencies want to cooperate. 
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Baker and O'Brien (1971) studied interagency cooperation 
in the coordination of all parts of a community health 
care delivery system and the necessity of including all 
community human services in plans for comprehensive community 
based delivery of human services. Cooperation was viewed 
as a positive factor in the achievement of coordination. 
Deutsch (1949) described a cooperative social situation 
as one in which each of the subunits can achieve its re­
spective goals to some degree. Guetzkow (1966) observed that 
interdependency often takes the form of cooperation. In 
such cases, the organizations involved perform one or more 
of their activities through interactions with each other. 
Warren et al. (1965:173) clarified the definition of 
cooperation, and was among the first to use the concepts 
of cooperation and contest as major dependent variables. 
In his study of community decision organizations he defined 
"cooperation" as an interaction process under which the actors 
seek to achieve a similar issue outcome, and contest as an 
interaction process under which the actors seek to achieve 
different issue outcomes. He used the broad term "contest" 
to include different types of opposition (Warren et al., 
1965:173). Warren et al. stated that the study assumed 
that all of the community decision organizations faced great 
uncertainties, both from the input of federal funds and 
programs on the one hand and from citizen residents of 
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disadvantaged neighborhoods on the other. It was anticipated 
that there would be a high rate of interaction, and because 
of the combination of uncertainty, threats, and opportunities, 
it was assumed that the interaction would be for comparatively 
high stakes and hence be intense. Competition was expected 
to generate innovation and innovation, in turn, was expected 
to feed back into contest. Warren et al. found that innova­
tions had been very minor and did not seem to make much 
difference, nor did leadership style nor many of the other 
variables. Mild cooperation was the modal form of inter­
action. Warren et al. found the interorganizational field 
characterized by a high degree of consensus and by a process 
of competitive mutual adjustment (Warren et al. 1965: 180-81). 
Howard Aldrich (1971) was critical of the social 
planner's emphasis on achieving cooperation as a "subjective 
state." He argued that cooperation may follow from the 
achievement of a satisfactory transaction, but found no 
evidence that cooperation is a resource that could be relied 
on in future transactions. White (1974) found in his study 
of two national voluntary organizations that perceptions 
which organizations had of each other were the bases of 
their behavior, even when they were based on unfounded 
beliefs. 
Schermerhorn (1975) summarized the factors which may 
motivate organizations to involve themselves in cooperative 
15 
activities with other organizations and the factors which 
organizations associate with costs for entering into coopera­
tive activities. He found three conditions which acted 
as motivators for cooperation: (1) resource scarcity; (2) 
demand from an extra-organizational force, and (3) the 
positive value of cooperation per se. The factors mitigating 
against cooperation include (1) a loss of decision making 
autonomy, (2) unfavorable ramifications for prestige or 
identity, and (3) the direct expenditure of scarce organiza­
tional resources. Paulson (1976), in his study of inter-
organizational dyads of health-related organizations, used 
as a major dependent variable, "perceived cooperative inter­
action." It is interesting to note that a hint about the 
usefulness of the perception of cooperation as an indicator 
of cooperation was suggested as early as 1962 when Kenneth 
Boulding wrote that the reaction of a party depended not on 
the objective situation but on the party's images of itself 
and the other. 
In this dissertation I will use the Warren et al. (1965) 
definition: cooperation is an interaction process under which 
the actors seek to achieve a similar issue outcome, because 
of the definition's generality to a wide variety of settings, 
and because of Warren's reputation as an authority on rela­
tions among organizations. The concept of resource exchanges, 
which will be discussed in a later section, is conceptualized 
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as a subtype of cooperation in this dissertation. 
The Process of Conflict 
The idea of "conflict" has several meanings in the 
social sciences. In one sense, conflict may mean feelings 
of hostility on the part of one person or group toward 
another or others. In another sense, conflict may mean 
intentional activity on the part of one person or group 
from attaining the latter's desires or achieving their 
goals. Conceptualization of the process of conflict in 
organizations generally uses as a basis the work of 
Dahrendorf (1958) and of Coser (1966). Both Dahrendorf 
and Coser emphasized the importance of studying the process 
of conflict as an alternative to the functionalist view of 
society. Dahrendorf emphasized conflict as providing a more 
realistic view of how the social order changes. The social 
order was conceived by Dahrendorf to be maintained by 
processes creating authority relations in "imperatively 
coordinated associations (ICA's)" existing throughout all 
layers of social systems. An ICA, in Dahrendorfs terms 
may be any social unit, from a small group or formal organiza-
tiontion to a community or entire society, if an organization 
of roles displaying power differentials exists. These power 
relations in ICA's tend to become legitimated and have 
authority relations in which some positions have the right 
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to dominate others. Although Dahrendorf does not deal with 
the way in which the authority relations are created, once 
they are created, the subgroups within the ICA's compete 
for scarce resources. This competition is the major source 
of conflict. Conflict ushers in a new pattern of social 
organization. 
Coser described the way that conflict leads to change 
in the pattern of social organization, and emphasized the 
positive functions of conflict. Coser, like Dahrendorf, 
viewed the causes of conflict as ultimately residing in the 
conditions generating the withdrawal of legitimacy from the 
existing system of distribution and intensification of the 
deprivations. He stated that conflict is a variable and a 
process that can function to maintain society. Coser 
suggested that the intensity of conflict depends on the 
interrelationship of such variables as the emotional involve­
ment of participants; the degree to which there are institu­
tionalized means of dealing with the problem; the degree 
of realism of the conflict; the extent to which conflict 
occurs over core values and issues, and the degree to which 
it can be objectified beyond self-interest. In short, the 
intensity of conflict relations in a system can be accounted 
for by looking at the interrelationships among variables, 
particularly the rigidity of the social structure and the 
degree of emotional involvement. Coser emphasized primarily 
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the integrative and adaptability functions of conflict; 
with conflict under certain conditions maintaining the 
vitality and flexibility of institutionalized patterns of 
social organization; by shoring up of group boundaries; 
centralization of decision making; ideological solidarity, 
and increased social control (Coser, 1956: 22-23; 37-38). 
Definitions of conflict in organizational literature 
generally include some operationalization of the Coser (1956) 
or Dahrendorf (1958) concepts. Warren et al. (1965) have 
defined conflict as an interaction process under which the 
actors seek to achieve different issue outcomes. Fink 
(1968) defined conflict as a process in which two or more 
social entities are linked by at least one form of antago­
nistic interaction, including disagreements, negotia­
tions, and open, hostile, adversary activity. White (1974) 
viewed conflict as the process of joint allocation of 
resources by A and B in the absence of agreement. Halpert 
(1974) defined conflict as any reactive oppositional activity 
between two entities. As I decided in choosing my preferred 
perspective on cooperation, I will use the Warren et al. 
definition, namely that conflict is an interaction process 
under which the actors seek to achieve different issue out­
comes. I do this because of the definitions' generality 
to a wide variety of settings, and because of Warren's 
reputation as an authority on relations among organizations. 
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In addition to the definitions of conflict, another way 
of describing conflict has been in terms of properties, 
Goldman (1966) has identified and characterized conflict 
as follows: (1) conflict requires at least two parties, 
such as organizations; (2) conflict arises from scarcity, 
which may be scarcity of position or of resources; (3) con­
flict behaviors are those designed to destroy, injure, thwart, 
or otherwise control another party; (4) conflict requires 
interaction among parties in which actions and counter­
actions are mutually opposed; (5) conflict relations always 
involve gaining control of scarce resources or influencing 
behavior in certain directions, and (6) conflict relations 
do not represent a breakdown in a regulated conduct, but 
rather a shift in the governing norms and expectations. 
Coser (1966) has studied conflict within large organiza­
tions such as military complexes, government bureaus, or 
industrial corporations which are composed of more than 
two hundred people and which produce a product or service. 
He found these organizations characterized by multi-level 
goals and multi-level specific interests. He found a maze 
of crisscross pluralistic values, points of view, and objec­
tives. These differences continued upward over many links 
in a chain of command. For these reasons, Coser concluded 
that conflict should not be regarded as necessarily 
pathological. He said the very concept of large scale 
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organizational hierarchy emphasizes intra-level and multi­
level specializations, differences, pluralities, and con­
trarieties. These spell disagreements, competition, dissent, 
and conflict. Conflict should therefore not be considered 
intrinsically evil or as a disease. It becomes such only 
at the point where divergence becomes strife which threatens 
annihilation. He concluded that conflict in the complex 
organization, rather than being disruptive, might be viewed 
as the very cohesive force that stabilizes an organization 
and provides it with resources for change and growth. 
Pondy (1969) has sought to develop propositions relating 
size and complexity to organizational conflict. He and 
others have attempted to explain the causes and consequences 
of conflict in the single organization. Since the concern 
with the behavior of the single organization preceded con­
sideration of interorganizational relations, it is not sur­
prising that a number of the concepts examined in the single 
organization have then been used in the study of interor­
ganizational conflict. For example, Assael (1969) examined 
the scarcity of resources and functional interdependence, 
which had been used in the study of the single organization, 
as potential causes of conflict between organizations. In 
his report of the results of a two-year study of the rela­
tionship between General Motors and its dealers he noted that 
there was a high level of functional interdependence between 
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manufacturers and dealers. During periods of short demand, 
manufacturers typically accuse dealers of poor performance 
and failure to comply with their directives about retail 
management, promotion, and price policies; and dealers 
accuse manufacturers of unwarranted pressures in the main­
tenance of inventories. 
Assael (1969) differentiated between constructive 
conflict and destructive conflict. Conflict is constructive 
when it brings about an equitable allocation of political 
power and economic resources by the formation of new counter­
vailing forces, a greater balance and stability within the 
system. Conflict is destructive when a lack of recognition 
of mutual objectives results. He identified five basic 
requirements for constructive conflict: (1) a critical review 
of past actions; (2) more frequent and effective communica­
tions between disputants, and the establishment of outlets 
to express grievances; (3) a more equitable distribution 
of system resources; (4) standardization of modes of conflict 
resolution, and (5) creation of a balance of power within 
the system. He stated that constructive conflict results 
in improved communications between organizations, allowing 
for legitimate differences of interests and beliefs to 
emerge. Formal means of communication may act as outlets 
to relieve accumulated hostility and redress grievances. 
Constructive conflict results in (1) a more equitable 
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allocation of system power and resources. Destructive con­
flict is likely to arise when the most powerful member of 
the system denies the legitimacy of any reallocation of 
its power. Constructive conflict also results in a standardi­
zation of procedures for conflict resolution. Such routinized 
interaction will facilitate resolution of future conflicts. 
The third result is that constructive conflict creates 
countervailing power. The establishment of countervailing 
power is beneficial to the distribution system in restraining 
the indiscriminate use of power, assuring greater equity 
in resource allocation, and counteracting the complacency 
of the managing organization. 
Earth has concluded that there are positive functions 
of intergroup conflict, based on his experience in the role 
of board member and participant in the programs of four 
local community agencies over a period of five years. 
Shortly after he arrived in the community studied, he 
became aware of a great amount of antagonism there, centered 
around the executives of three different intergroup agencies. 
A coalition of executives and board members from several 
agencies fostered a movement to remove one agency director 
from his job and even to force the dissolution of the agency 
represented by that director. In another case, a strong 
pressure group succeeded in forcing an executive to resign 
because they insisted they needed a more vigorous person. 
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Earth noted that the conflict was usually attributed 
to personality clashes and that it was assumed that things 
would be better if they could remove a particular executive. 
He argued that this interpretation underestimated the non-
personal or social system sources of conflict. He noted 
that when a particular executive was removed and replaced 
by another, the conflict among the organizations was not 
reduced. Earth (1961) linked conflict to interagency com­
petition for financial and public support. In addition, 
Earth identified three other conditions which were character­
istic of the agency structure and which generated pressure 
toward interagency conflict. These conditions included 
(1) the existence of two or more relatively autonomous 
agencies working in the same general sphere; (2) differentia­
tion between agencies on the basis of philosophy, goals, 
and special skills of agency personnel, and (3) the existence 
of a paid staff, a charter with rules, and other indicators 
of bureaucratic structure. Earth (1961) stated three posi­
tive functions for conflict among social organizations: 
(1) conflict tends to keep agency personnel on the alert, 
increasing the motivation to produce results and to keep 
in touch with the changing needs of the community; (2) con­
flict tends to promote a constant reanalysis of community 
needs and to adapt the resources of the organizations to 
those needs, and (3) resources might be maximized under 
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conditions of aaencv competition, 
Aldrich has pointed out that there is an unstated 
assumption that conflict is bad and cooperative relations 
are good in and of themselves, because performance is thought 
to be higher and resources used more efficiently with coopera­
tion. However, he argued that clients and recipients of 
services might view this cooperation between agencies as 
coercion and efforts to further the control over them. He 
suggested the possibility of clients being served better 
when agencies compete for them. Another usually unstated 
assumption noted by Aldrich is that resources will be maxi­
mized and innovations developed when organizations cooperate; 
however, the maximation of resources vis-a-vis other organiza­
tions may be a source of dominance. Finally, Aldrich sug­
gested that more consideration be given to the ways in which 
conflict functions to promote interdependence and that 
conflict can be seen as another way of linking organizations 
(Aldrich; 1971:288). 
Schick (1973) has also noted the potential positive 
influence of conflict in his discussion of a situation in 
which the abhorrence of conflict between agencies was one 
of the factors that led to the demise of a federal program, 
known as PPB (Program Planning and Budgeting). The goal 
of the program was to direct planning through cost-
effectiveness studies and other informational channels. 
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Where there were ample resources, such as in the Defense 
Department in the early I960's, PPB succeeded because it 
was possible to satisfy new claims without contesting past 
decisions. But as the situation changed, the available 
funds were consumed by escalation of the Vietnam War, the 
Great Society programs, inflation, tax cuts, and a flagging 
economy. The initiation of new programs when all funds were 
encumbered would have required that the budgeters be willing 
to engage in conflict. Schick argued that more conflict 
would have been a good thing and that the costs of settling 
the budget quietly were too high, since that resulted in 
the suppression of urgent new claims, overprotection of the 
budget base, and the retardation of change. The organizations 
that were involved in the budgetary process for PPB included 
both government departments, such as the Department of 
Defense, and private agencies who would have had to conform 
to PPB requirements in order to initiate programs. Because 
the PPB program was quietly permitted to die, Schick (1973) 
felt that needed changes, that might have occurred because 
of agency conflict, were not made. 
The two examples described above have partially speci­
fied the bases of conflict situations and the parties engaged 
in them. In this author's view, Hall et al. (1977), who 
stated that he used as his framework the work of Boulding 
(1962), provide a more complete view of the conflict process. 
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Hall et al. include four components in their analysis of 
the conflict process: (1) the parties involved; conflict 
must involve at least two parties, which may be organizations; 
(2) the field of conflict: there must be alternative condi­
tions toward which a conflict could move; (3) the dynamics 
of the conflict situation: each party in a conflict will 
adjust its own position to one that it feels is congruent 
with that of its opponent, and (4) the management, control, 
or resolution of conflict: conflict situations are not 
usually discrete situations with a clear beginning and end. 
Hall et al. (1977) point out that conflicts emerge out 
of preexisting conditions and do not end forever with a 
particular outcome, such as the settlement of a strike. 
They discuss a number of methods that have been devised 
to permit the resolution or control of conflict between 
organizations. One form of such resolution is for each 
party to "back off" such as may occur in labor-management 
disputes. Another technique is to placate both parties 
by offering both sides some inducement to stop the conflict. 
In still other cases, conflict and cooperation may coexist, 
as may be seen in the brief discussion which follows. 
The Simultaneous Existence of Cooperation and 
Conflict in Interorganizational Relations 
The literature has shown that the processes of coopera­
tion and conflict occur in interorganizational relations 
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and are related to each other in the following ways: (1) they 
may occur at the same time in relation to different goals; 
(2) they may occur at different times in relation to the 
same goals, and (3) they may coexist in ongoing relationships. 
Guetzkow (1966) found in his review of organizational inter­
action that organizations may selectively cooperate in some 
areas with specific organizations, while continuing con-
flictual relations with the same organizations in other 
areas. Aiken and Hage (1968) explored some of the causes 
and consequencs of organizational interdependence among 
health and welfare organizations. They used intraorganiza-
tional characteristics, such as the degree of complexity, 
degree of organizational innovation, internal communication, 
degree of centralization, and degree of formalization as 
the independent variables in their study of the frequency 
of joint programs. They concluded that the study of inter-
organizational relationships appears to be one area which can 
appropriately incorporate the processes of both conflict 
and cooperation. Hall et al. (1977) in a study of organiza­
tions dealing with problem youth found that conflictual and 
cooperative relationships coexist in interorganizational 
relations. He found that frequency and intensity of inter­
actions can lead to good communication, high cooperation, 
and conflict at the same time. 
Schermerhorn (1975) found that the need for scarce 
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resources has been used as a reason for both cooperation 
and conflict. He suggested that conflict may be necessary 
to offset some of the costs of cooperation, such as unfavor­
able ramifications for organizational identity, expenditure 
of resources, and loss of autonomy. Warren et al. (1965) 
suggested that interdependence can lead to conflict as well 
as cooperation. Van de Ven et al. (1975) found that similar­
ity of goals was viewed as a reason for both cooperation 
and for conflict. Mulford and Mulford (1977), in a study 
of dyadic relations of organizations, which was discussed 
in an earlier section of this chapter, tested and found 
support for the propositions that (1) voluntary organizations 
will report that interorganizational relations characterized 
by conflict or by both conflict and cooperation will occur 
as frequently as cooperation; (2) that the more activities 
sponsored by a voluntary organization, the greater the like­
lihood of all three types of interorganizational relations : 
cooperation, conflict, and mixed, and (3) that larger organi­
zations are more likely than smaller ones to report all three 
types of interorganizational relations. 
Because there appears to be strong support in the 
literature for the coexistence of cooperation and conflict 
in interorganizational relations, it is necessary to consider 
both processes in attempting to gain a complete understanding 
of dyadic relations in networks of organizations. As stated 
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earlier, the definition of cooperation which will be used 
here is that of Warren et al. (1965:173): cooperation is 
an interaction process under which the actors seek to achieve 
a similar issue-outcome. And as stated earlier, the defini­
tion of conflict that will be used here is that of Warren 
et al. (1965:173): conflict is an interaction process under 
which the actors seek to achieve different issue outcomes. 
Summary 
This chapter has included the discussion of the dyad 
as a unit of analysis in the study of interorganizational 
relations; the process of cooperation in interorganizational 
relations; the process of conflict in interorganizational 
relations; and the simultaneous existence of cooperation 
and conflict in dyadic relations of organizations. The 
objectives of this dissertation are (1) to review and 
integrate the literature regarding cooperation and conflict 
and the relationship between the processes; the theories 
of exchange and power ; and the theoretical support for the 
measurement of the concepts; (2) to focus on dyadic relations 
of organizations, a unit of analysis to which relatively 
little attention has been paid; (3) to provide at least a 
limited evaluation of the relative utility of exchange and 
power theories, and (4) to a limited extent, to discuss 
applications for practitioners. 
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The next chapter, Chapter 2, will review the explanatory 
theories of exchange and power in the study of cooperation 
and conflict in interorganizational dyads. Hypotheses will 
be stated which have been derived from the literature and 
which will be tested in this study. Chapter 2 will be 
followed by chapters on methodology, data analysis, summary, 
conclusion, and recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSITIONS 
Two conceptual frameworks have been used as explanatory 
theories in the study of cooperation and conflict in organiza­
tional dyads: exchange, and power. In this chapter, each 
of the frameworks will be reviewed, research results will be 
discussed, and hypotheses will be developed for this study. 
Exchange 
The use of the exchange framework for the study of 
interorganizational relations began with the landmark study 
of Levine and White, in which they explored patterns of 
relationship among twenty-two health and social welfare 
organizations in one community. The range of organizations 
included a full time health department, a welfare department, 
autonomous local agencies, local chapters of major voluntary 
health and social welfare organizations, and major community 
hospitals. They assumed that in order for any agency to 
achieve its specific objectives, it had to control or possess 
certain resources, such as clients, equipment, specialized 
knowledge, funds, and the services of people. If all these 
resources were in infinite supply, there would be no need 
to subscribe to cooperation as an ideal. Under actual con­
ditions, however, few if any organizations have enough access 
to all the resources, and therefore must cooperate if they 
are to attain their objectives fully. 
3/2 
In this study I am looking at two types of cooperation: 
resource exchange and the frequency of joint programs. 
Resource exchange is a form of cooperation in which an agency 
gives or transfers to another agency something that lies 
ready for use or that can be drawn on to take care of a 
need. A joint program is an interorganizational relationship 
in which two organizations share in some common purpose. It 
is an important type of interorganizational cooperation 
because it is a relatively enduring relationship compared 
to simple exchanges. 
Levine and White (1961:588) have defined exchange as: 
any voluntary activity between two organizations 
which has consequences, actual or anticipated, 
for the realization of their respective goals 
or objectives. 
The three advantages they noted for this definition are 
(1) that it refers to activity in general and not exclusively 
to reciprocal activity; (2) the definition widens the concept 
of exchange beyond the immediate present, and (3) the 
definition excludes relationships involving coercion or 
domination, but is limited to voluntary relationships. 
Levine and White (1961:583) viewed the health and social 
welfare organizations studied as an exchange system, with 
the interdependence of the parts determined by (1) the 
accessibility of each organization to necessary elements from 
sources outside the health system; (2) the objectives of 
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the organization and particular functions to which it allo­
cates the elements it controls, and (3) the degree to which 
domain consensus exists among the various organizations. 
These three determinants have been investigated in studies 
by other scholars of organizational interaction and will 
be examined in this dissertation as one framework for under­
standing cooperation and conflict in dyads. Each of the three 
determinants will be discussed below. 
The accessibility of each organization to necessary elements, 
or the need for resources 
Following Levine and White (1961), another study, con­
ducted by Levine, White, and Paul (1963) explored the access 
of agencies to resources, using a larger sample. The sample 
included all the health and welfare agencies in four north­
eastern communities. They found that these agencies had to 
obtain resources from other organizations because they did 
not have access to enough of the resources to achieve their 
objectives. Black and Kase (1963) investigated a rehabilita­
tion program in services to the chronically ill provided by 
two rehabilitation organizations. Both agencies had the 
problem of how to make resources stretch to meet increasing 
needs and found that interagency cooperation made it possible 
to make the best use of available men, money, and materials. 
In that study, although two organizations were examined. 
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the unit of analysis was the single organization rather than 
the dyad. 
Aiken and Hage (1968) have discussed how organizations 
are pushed into "interdependencies" (which may include 
cooperation and conflict) because of the need for resources 
to pay for program innovations. The mechanism for gaining 
resources is the establishment of a joint program, which they 
viewed as a type of organizational exchange. The data upon 
which their study was based were gathered in sixteen social 
welfare and health organizations located in a large midwestern 
metropolis. Ten organizations were private; six were either 
public or branches of public agencies. The unit of analysis, 
however, was the single organization, rather than the dyad. 
Molner (1976) studied the exchange of resources in dyads 
as a determinant of integration among agencies that manage 
natural resources. He found that one motivating condition 
for interorganizational relations was the need to secure 
and maintain reliable resources. Organizations sharing a 
common task environment became interdependent in order to 
extend their existing allocations and to obtain resources 
otherwise unavailable to them. Exchange relations created 
ties of commitment and investment; failure to participate 
or fulfill exchange relationships at one point in time pre­
cluded similar relationships in the future. Molnar found 
that a limited structure of exchange insured that 
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relationships could be activated when needed and that there 
would be order in the ongoing pattern of relationships. 
Exchanges of resources were associated with higher levels 
of commitment to relationships and the establishment of 
stable linkages among the elements. 
Paulson (1976) has also studied the need for resources 
as a determinant of exchange in dyads. Paulson tested and 
found support for the proposition that the greater the dif­
ference between the resources of two organizations the 
greater the perceived cooperation and the less the perceived 
competition. His data were collected from a sample of eight­
een state-level, health-related, non-profit federations of 
a midwestern state. He stated that his measurement of 
resource need was suggested by the findings of Levine et al. 
(1963) that lack of funds and personnel are the two main 
problem most often cited by agency personnel. To measure 
this dimension of resource-need, Paulson asked respondents 
to rank on a four point scale their funds and voluntary 
personnel in terms of the adequacy for carrying out the 
activities which they were trying to perform. The absolute 
difference between the dyad members' total score for the 
items was assigned to the dyad as an indicator of resource 
difference. 
Schmidt and Kochan (1977) have noted that in the 
exchange approach, relations form when members of two or 
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more organizations perceive mutual benefits from interacting. 
The leadership of each organization is internally motivated 
to form the relationship because each perceives that it will 
be better able to attain its goals by interacting than by 
remaining autonomous. The nature of the interaction between 
these participants is characterized by a high degree of 
cooperation and problem solving as opposed to high levels 
of conflict and bargaining. 
Cook (1977) has explained that exchange between organiza­
tions takes place primarily for two interrelated reasons : 
(1) specialization, and (2) scarcity. Most organizations 
perform specialized functions and therefore must exchange 
with other organizations to obtain necessary resources and 
to market their output. She noted that in the exchange 
formulation, the scarcity of resources impels organizations 
to restrict activity to limited specific functions. To 
fulfill even these limited functions, the organizations must 
enter into exchanges with other organizations to get the 
elements they need (Cook, 1977:64). The literature clearly 
indicates that resource scarcity and accessibility to 
resources are important as possible determinants of exchange 
as conceptualized by Levine and White. 
Most studies of interorganizational relations have 
actually studied single organizations and the importance 
of intraorganizational properties has been stressed. 
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Marrett (1971:80-82) has called for an analysis of compara­
tive properties, formal contextual properties, and non­
organized contextual properties in order to understand better 
the interorganizational relations. Comparative properties 
will be used in this study. The literature indicates that 
three comparative properties may be very important for the 
analysis of behavior in dyads. Because of their central 
importance in organizational literature and because they have 
been studied in one or more pilot empirical studies of dyads, 
these comparative properties will be analyzed in this study, 
namely, comparative formalization, social status, and 
professionalism. 
Marrett (1971:89) has defined formalization as the 
extent to which there is official agreement between organiza­
tions. Formalization refers to the degree to which inter-
dependency is given official sanction by the parties involved, 
rather than the existence of specific details. Marrett found 
that formal agreements were not common among health and 
welfare organizations, but rather that most of their inter­
action was on the basis of tacit, informal arrangements. 
She attributed this to a reluctance to specify the commitment 
of agency resources. 
Price (1972) defined formalization as the degree to 
which the norms of an organization are made explicit. Using 
Price's definition as a basis, the definition of 
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formalization that is being used in this dissertation is 
formalization is the degree to which the policies of the 
organization are made explicit, through the existence of 
written policies, the specificity of written policies, and 
the frequency of referral to written policies. 
Ogle (1972) studied the factors which encourage inter­
agency cooperation among federal agencies responsible for 
management of natural resources. All of the agencies were 
faced with the same type of land management. There was 
competition among the U.S. National Park Service, Bureau 
of Land Management, Bureau of Reclamation, and others for 
land areas, which resulted in a lack of cooperation in other 
areas. There were two important reasons for wanting to 
institutionalize situations (1) to encourage communication 
regardless of the competition between agencies, and (2) to 
counteract the effects of frequent personnel changes. Unless 
some means could be found for institutionalizing cooperation, 
communication was dependent upon the compatibility of the 
individuals concerned. Also, as competition became acute, 
cooperation decreased unless some positive force insured 
its continuation. Formalization appeared to help the con­
tinuation of relationships among the organizations in the 
study. 
Aldrich (197 6) in a study of manpower agencies saw 
formalization of relations between organizations as reducing 
39 
the likelihood that interaction between organizations would 
be on a case-by-case basis, and would have a major impact 
on frequency of interaction. 
Hall et al. (1977) examined the dyadic relationships 
among organizations that dealt with problem youth, in order 
to identify differences in patterns of interorganizational 
relations that were based on different reasons for inter­
action. The eight organizations in the study were specifi­
cally charged with dealing with youth, and included the county 
juvenile court, the county juvenile probation office, the 
county juvenile detention office, the city police, city 
schools, county welfare department, county mental health 
department, and Y.M.C.A. A total of seventy-six organiza­
tions was involved with a range of size from three to 209 
members. In some cases there was a formal agreement between 
organizations, such as an agreement between the schools and 
the police whereby a juvenile police officer was housed 
in a specific school to work with youths and school staff. 
The court and the mental health agency also had a formal 
agreement in which the mental health agency agreed to do all 
of the psychological diagnostic work for the court. 
Hall et al. (1977) considered as the most striking 
aspect of his findings that coordination was achieved through 
different means, depending upon whether relationships were 
mandated by law, were based on a formal agreement, or were 
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voluntary. Although under each condition there can be strong 
relationships with coordination, the strongest prediction 
was found when there was a formal agreement. This suggested 
that reaching a formal agreement was in itself a step toward 
coordination. In summary, the literature above suggests 
that there is a positive relationship between formalization 
and the exchange of resources. 
Comparative formalization, status, and professionalism 
The studies cited above clearly show the importance of 
formalization for interorganizational relations but they do 
not speak to the role of comparative formalization. Levine 
and White (1961) suggest that the comparative analysis of 
the organization's functions and objectives are important 
determinants of exchange. It is logical to conclude that 
the comparative structural variables may also make exchange 
more likely. Comparative formalization, status, and profes­
sionalism have been singled out for analysis in two empirical 
analyses of dyads. 
Molnar (1976) measured formalization in dyads by a 
three-item scale that indicated the degree to which rules 
and procedures are used in decision making. He found 
(1976:178) that differences in formalization were not 
significantly correlated with measures of cooperation. 
Despite Molnar's findings, reference to comparative . 
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structural properties such as formalization (Levine and 
White, 1961) makes it appropriate to test the proposition 
that differences in formalization will be positively associ­
ated with conflict and negatively associated with cooperation. 
That is, organizations that are alike in the degree to which 
they are formal are more likely to cooperate and less likely 
to conflict. 
Two aspects of conflict are being used in this study, 
namely disagreements and conflict in operating philosophy. 
Lack of cooperation between two organizations has been 
noted as resulting from different views of the world held 
by professionals and non-professionals. Professionalism 
is defined (Aiken and Hage, 1968:925) as the identification 
with a broader community of individuals who share similar 
occupational orientation. Haas and Drabek (1973:244) refer 
to intersystem interpersonal imbalances, and Kriesberg (1973) 
found that professional status subordination hindered organi­
zational cooperation. Levine, White, and Paul (1963:1193) 
found that lack of cooperation between two agencies in 
the health field was closely related to relative profes­
sionalism. 
Molnar (1976:178) measured professionalism in dyads 
by the number of professional association memberships and 
found that differences in professionalism were negatively 
related to measures of cooperation. These results support 
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the proposition that the more they are like each other in 
professionalism, the more organizations would cooperate, 
and the less they are alike, the more there will be conflict 
in dyads. Molnar (1976:54) used the concept "decision maker 
characteristic," one of which was differences in formal educa­
tion. He found that differences were not significantly 
correlated with cooperation (1976:178). 
Paulson (1976:319) looked at social status differences, 
with his measure of social status weighted to include annual 
income and level of education. He considered it useful to 
characterize the organization by a personal characteristic 
of extra-organizational origin. He argued that at some time 
in the organizational interaction process, individuals in 
positions that are crucial to decision-making about interac­
tion, affect the nature of their interaction, based on their 
personal career orientation. Paulson found that status 
differences were significantly related to perceived coopera-i 
tion in a negative manner but not related to perceived 
competition. In other words, Paulson found that organiza­
tions that are comparable in status are more likely to 
cooperate. Because the results of the two studies are mixed, 
it is appropriate to examine this relationship again. The 
propositions to be tested are the same as those developed 
by Paulàon, namely, that social status differences will be 
negatively related to cooperation and positively related to 
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conflict. 
The two factors of social-status difference and dif­
ference in professional outlook between members of different 
organizations appear to have a negative impact on the exchange 
of resources between organizations. In summary, the factors 
associated with the accessibility of each organization to 
necessary elements, or the need for resources include 
(1) scarcity of resources; (2) availability of alternative 
sources of resources; (3) difference in the supply of re­
sources available for exchange, and (4) disparity between 
the amount of resources received and the amount provided. 
In addition, resource exchange can be impeded by comparative 
social status of personnel and by professionalism. 
Clearly, if one organization has resources that it can 
make available for another organization, cooperation is 
more likely. Hunt and Hunt (1971) looked at the need for 
resources as it affected the relations between fourteen 
of the top twenty-five industrial organizations from whom 
NASA and the Department of Defense procured supplies. The 
typical member of this group was doing the bulk of its busi­
ness with NASA or the Department of Defense or with both, 
and all of them received a substantial fraction of their 
sales from these sources. But on the whole, the organiza­
tions were disposed to reduce their dependence on those 
markets because they tended to avoid, if possible, dependence 
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on a single customer, no matter how reliable. Hunt and 
Hunt observed two opposing tendencies : (1) they noted a 
disposition for organizations to maintain close and lasting 
relations with organizations they relied on for valued 
resources and (2) a tendency for organizations to seek and 
maximize alternative suppliers to avoid dependency. 
Earth (1961) observed that conflict occurred when 
agencies competed for financial and public support or sought 
resources from the same source. Guetzkow (1966) noted that 
if an older organization perceived a newer organization as 
threatening with regard to available resources, there would 
be reluctance on its part to interact with the newer organiza­
tion. Assael (1969) viewed conflict as an attempt to achieve 
a reallocation of system resources and as an inevitable 
outgrowth of functional interdependence. The conclusion 
reached here based on the literature is that conflict is 
likely to result and cooperation decrease when organizations 
seek resources from the same source. 
The need for resources as a determinant for exchange 
has been used in the studies of cooperation and conflict 
in single organizations and in dyads. The present disserta­
tion will use the need for resources and related concepts 
as determinants of exchange in dyads, in order to further 
our understanding of cooperation and conflict in dyadic 
relations of organizations. 
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The goals and functions of the organization as a determinant 
of exchange 
The second determinant of exchange identified by Levine 
and White (1961:348-350) was the objectives of the organiza­
tion and particular functions to which it allocates the 
elements it controls. Following Etzioni (1964:6), goals 
are regarded as desirable states of affairs which organiza­
tions attempt to realize. Goals and functions are used 
synonymously in this analysis. Levine and White specified 
the functions of an organization as representing the means 
by which it allocates its elements and the degree of depenii 
dence which it has on other organizations for specific kinds 
of elements. They explained the flow of elements between 
organizations largely in terms of the respective functions 
performed by the participating agencies. In analyzing the 
data from their pilot community, they classified agencies 
on the basis of their primary health functions: namely, 
resource, education, prevention, treatment, or rehabilitation. 
Resource organizations attempt to achieve their objectives 
by providing other agencies with means to carry out their 
functions. The four other agency types were conceived as 
representing respective steps in the control of disease. 
They found that treatment organizations rated highest on 
number of referrals and amount of resources received, and 
educational organizations, whose efforts are directed toward 
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the general public, rate low on the number of referrals. 
For example, an educational organization offering services to 
the general public will probably not be able to lend or give 
space or equipment or the kind of instruction that the treat­
ment organization would seek for its staff. They concluded 
that the organization's function establishes the range of 
possibilities for exchange. 
Others, who completed early studies of functions included 
Evan (1966) who found that the greater the complementarity 
of functions, the greater the likelihood of cooperative 
interaction, and Guetzkow (1966) who found that organizations 
with largely identical activities are largely cooperative. 
Paulson (1976: 317-318), in his study of dyads, tested 
the proposition that the greater the difference between 
two organizations' goals, the greater the perceived coopera­
tive interaction. The rationale for the proposition was 
that organizations with different goals are less likely 
to be in competition and thus more likely to interact, since 
different goals are more likely to be complementary. His 
expectation was that cooperative interaction comes as a 
result of facilitative interdependence, allowing both organi­
zations to maximize gains. Because all the organizations 
in his study had the service of health needs of individuals 
as an ultimate goal, he used a more specific classification, 
in terms of the particular category of social unit immediately 
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and directly served as an indicator of goal. Paulson included 
three categories in his spectrum of health agencies: (1) pro­
fessional groups, such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, 
and non-health professionals, such as farmers; (2) public 
health groups, such as community health service and (3) pri­
vate, such as cancer society. If the members of a pair 
were found in different categories, the dyad was characterized 
as having goal difference; if the members of the dyad were 
in the same category, the dyad was characterized as having 
goal similarity. He hypothesized a positive relationship 
between goal differences and perceived cooperation in terms 
of joint programs. The results of his study showed a negative 
relation between goal differences and both perceived coopera­
tion and perceived competition, i.e. the more the goal 
differences, the less the cooperation and the less the 
competition. The implication of his study was that when 
organization administrators consider establishing a joint 
program to secure needed resources, it is advisable to look 
for an organization which has similar goals. Some of the 
inconsistencies with regard to the role of goal differences 
may be due to the fact that most previous studies used only 
bivariate analysis of data, while Paulson's was a multivariate 
analysis. In his analysis of differences in output and output 
constituencies, Molnar (1976:178) reported mixed results. 
Most of the zero order correlations between differences in 
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output and output constituencies were not significantly 
correlated with joint programs or resource exchanges. In 
addition, Molnar found that the differences in output and 
output constituencies were generally not significantly 
correlated to domain consensus. In summary, we have seen 
in the literature discussed above, that goal similarity and 
goal differences may have important consequences for coopera­
tion and conflict. The hypotheses to be tested here are that 
goal differences will be negatively related to cooperation 
and to conflict. 
Domain consensus as a determinant of exchange 
The third determinant of exchange identified by Levine 
and White (1961: 352-354) was the degree to which domain 
consensus exists among the various organizations. The domain 
of an organization consists of the specific goals it wishes 
to pursue and the functions it undertakes in order to imple­
ment its goals. For example, intense competition may occur 
between two agencies offering the same services, especially 
when other agencies have no specific criteria for referring 
patients to one rather than the other. If both services are 
operating near capacity, competition between the two tends to 
be less keen. Finally, it is thought that if the services 
are being operated at less than capacity, competition and 
conflict often occur. Levine and White set forth the idea 
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that exchange agreement rests upon prior consensus regarding 
domain; therefore, within the system, delineation of organiza­
tional domain is highly desired. 
Domain consensus following Molnar (1976:35) refers to the 
existence of congruent expectations regarding mutual roles 
and responsibilities between the members in a dyad. Achieving 
domain consensus may involve negotiation, orientation, or 
legitimation. When the functions of the interacting organiza­
tions are diffuse, achieving domain consensus becomes a matter 
of constant readjustment and compromise. In short, Levine 
and White hypothesized that domain consensus is a prerequisite 
to exchange. Once an organization's goals are accepted, 
domain consensus continues as long as the organization fuir 
fills the functions considered appropriate to its goals and 
adheres to certain standards of quality. 
Levine, White, and Paul (1963) utilized domain consensus 
in their study of the relationships among health and welfare 
agencies in four northeastern communities. They became 
aware of an array of diverse health and welfare organizations 
in the community, each of which had a separate locus of 
authority. For example, there were different levels of 
official government, such as a local health department, a 
district or regional health office, a state rehabilitation 
agency, and a U.S. Veteran's Administration clinic. As a 
result of the pluralistic or divergent sources of authority, 
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the health organizations might have varying goals which 
were in conflict with the goals of other organizations. Most 
of the relationships among the organizations centered around 
the flow of elements, which were not centrally coordinated, 
but rested upon voluntary agreements and understandings. 
The research findings based upon interviews with executives 
of all the agencies, showed that there could be little ex­
change of elements without at least some implicit agreement 
or understanding about the organizations' respective domains. 
Levine, White, and Paul (1963) came to see domain consensus 
as the degree to which two agencies agree and accept each 
other's claims with regard to problems or diseases covered, 
services offered, and population served. 
Braito et al. (1972) and Carter (1974) have also conducted 
empirical research to examine the role of domain consensus 
for exchange and cooperation. The problem studied by Braito 
et al. was the willingness of an organization to participate 
in a new program for smoking and health, using a sample of 
thirty-three state-level health organizations. Focusing 
on single organizations as the unit of analysis, they inves­
tigated the relationship between domain consensus and eleven 
independent variables including an organization's domain, 
endorsements given, resource allocation, organizational 
activities, board composition, organizational prerogatives, 
resource allocation, board composition, activities, domain, 
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age, and formalization. Braito et al. concluded from this 
research that cooperation between organizations at least 
implicitly presupposes some degree of agreement on the organ­
izations' domains. That is, cooperation is thought to imply 
the sharing of domains, agreements about the extension of 
domain or the control of domains. 
Carter (1974) has made an empirical study of the effect 
of domain consensus on exchange rates and goal attainment. 
He found that high domain consensus led to the appropriate 
level of exchange in resources for maximum goal attainment, 
with appropriate level not referring to the ^ highest level 
of resources exchanged. For example, if a new agency was 
created to provide employment opportunities for persons on 
welfare, an organisation which challenged that agency's 
right to undertake that function, might refer a great many 
persons to the employment agency so that the agency was not 
able to establish a good record of placements. He found 
therefore that an excessive amount of exchange was character­
istic of low domain consensus, in contrast to an appropriate 
amount of exchange in situations of high domain consensus. 
Warren et al. (1965:180-81)'s study of community decision 
organizations and their interactions found a positive relation 
between domain consensus and cooperation and a negative rela­
tion between domain consensus and contest. 
Molnar (1976) has studied the role of domain consensus 
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in dyads. He defined domain consensus as the existence of 
congruent expectations regarding mutual roles and responsibil­
ities between the elements of the dyad. He hypothesized 
that domain consensus is related to interdependence. He 
actually found a negative relationship between domain 
consensus and interdependence, which he noted to be contrary 
to most previous theory and research on this relationship. 
As an explanation, he suggested that the more intensive the 
interdependence in a dyad, the greater the discrepancies in 
mutual expectations regarding domain. Molnar then interpreted 
the negative relationship between domain consensus and inter­
dependence in the dyad as follows: (1) while a common defini­
tion of mutual activities may be important for initial inter­
action, more intensive relationships may generate differences 
based on each organization's own interests and perspectives, 
and (2) that domain consensus and interdependence may be 
negatively coextensive, that is, that changes in one may 
produce concomitant changes in the other. 
Paulson (1976:320-322) in the study of dyads referred 
to in an earlier section tested the following propositions : 
(1) the greater the perceived domain consensus between two 
organizations, the greater the perceived cooperative inter­
action; (2) the greater the domain consensus, the less 
the competition; (3) the greater the difference between two 
organizations' goals, the greater the perceived domain 
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consensus, and (4) the less the difference between social 
statuses of two organizations' administrators, the greater 
the perceived domain consensus. He found that a direct 
negative effect of status difference (similarity of statuses) 
is to produce a h degree of perceived domain consensus. 
In such cases, administrators are willing to legitimize the 
desired activity of the other organization. The high domain 
consensus in turn, opens the way for the establishment of 
cooperation in terms of joint programs. That is, domain 
consensus had significant positive effects on cooperation. 
In short, because the administrators would be working with 
social status equals and because they feel the other organiza­
tion' s domain is legitimate, they are willing to establish a 
joint program. For example, a school and a health organiza­
tion might establish a joint program of a series of presenta­
tions in schools about health-related occupations. 
Paulson (1976) found that a lack of domain consensus 
was not related significantly to perceived competition when 
the effects of other variables were controlled. Paulson's 
work is especially vital in that he used multivariate tech­
niques; that is, the direct effects of the independent var­
iables were determined through multiple regression analysis 
while holding constant the effects of other variables. 
Although the empirical results are mixed, there is precedent 
for the use of domain consensus as a determinant of exchange. 
54 
In developing the following hypotheses, the general 
theoretical concept of cooperation has been expressed in three 
empirical measures of cooperation; resource exchange, joint 
programs, and written agreements. In the following statements , 
the general hypothesis states the theoretical concept of 
cooperation. The sub-hypotheses which are derived from the 
general hypothesis are expressed by the use of the empirical 
indicators of cooperation. Similarly, the general hypothesis 
states the theoretical concept of conflict while the sub-
hypotheses state the empirical indicators of conflict: 
disagreement and difference in operating philosophy. 
General hypothesis I: Exchange is associated with coop­
eration and conflict in dyadic relations of organizations. 
S.H. 1: The greater the scarcity of resources, the greater 
the resource exchange, joint programs, and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 2; The more the availability of alternative sources, 
the less likely the organizations in the dyad will enter 
into resource exchange, joint programs, and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 3 : The greater the difference in supply of resources 
available for exchange by members of the dyad, the more 
likely that the organizations in the dyad will enter into 
resource exchange, j oint programs , and/br written agreements. 
S.H. 4: The greater the social status similarity the more 
there will be resource exchange and/br written agreemenrs. 
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S.H. 5: The greater the similarity of formalization 
of the organization, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 6; The greater the similarity of professionalism 
of the organizations, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or written agreements . 
S.H. 7: The greater the difference of goals of the 
organizations in the dyad, the more likely there will 
be resource exchange, joint programs and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 8 ; The greater the domain consensus, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint programs 
and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 9: The more the organizations perceive a disparity 
between the amount of resources they provide and the 
resources they get in return, the more likely there will 
be disagreements and/or difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 10: The more the organizations view their resources 
as coming from the same source,, the more likely there will 
be disagreements and/or difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 11; The greater the difference of social status of 
the personnel of the organizations, the more likely there 
will be disagreements andybr difference in operating philoso­
phy. 
S.H. 12; The greater the difference of formalization 
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of the organization, the more likely there will be 
disagreement and/br difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 13: The greater the difference of professionalism 
of the organizations, the more likely there will be 
disagreement and/or difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 14: The greater the similarity of goals of the 
organizations, the more likely there will be dis­
agreement and/or difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 15: The less the domain consensus, the more 
likely there will be disagreement and/or difference in 
operating philosophy. 
The hypotheses enumerated above are all based on the 
original formulation of exchange as conceptualized by Levine 
and White (1961) and extended by other scholars. However, 
Aldrich (1976) raised questions about the relationship be­
tween exchange and power, and stated that resource exchange 
was a very limited theoretical framework. An extension of 
the framework, namely power, will be discussed in the fol­
lowing section. 
Power 
The process of power is generally considered by sociol­
ogists to be an integral part of social organization, 
existing in every social relationship. In attempting to 
apply the process of power to the understanding of inter-
organizational relationships, one does not find a distinct 
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starting point, as one finds for the application of exchange 
theory. Instead, three factors become evident very quickly. 
The first is that the exchange theory of Levine and White 
(1961) dominated the thinking about•interorganizational 
relations from 1961 until the mid 1970's, so there is a 
much greater quantity of research about exchange than about 
power. The second point is that among the relatively few 
studies dealing with power in interorganizational relations, 
theory is just beginning to emerge, and at the present time 
attempts at theory building are scattered among a number of 
different approaches. The third factor is that the process 
of power has been conceptualized by scholars in the areas 
of social psychology, psychology, and economics, with 
relatively little empirical study by organizational scholars. 
An early theorist who provided a starting point for some 
of the thinking about power in interorganizational relations 
is Robert Bierstadt (1950), who analyzed power in society 
as being determined by three sources: numbers, organization, 
and resources. Using an example of political groups, he 
noted that where there are two groups of equal or nearly 
equal numbers and comparable organization, the one with access 
to greater resources will have superior power. Resources 
included money, property, prestige, knowledge, competence, 
and other items, generally described as "natural resources." 
He also noted that power is always potential; it is a latent 
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force that has its incidence only when there is social 
opposition of some kind. 
Robert Dahl (1957) arrived at a similar view of power 
from the study of psychology of individuals. He considered 
the base of an actor's power to be all the resources that 
an actor can exploit in order to affect the behavior of 
another. The base is inert unless or until there is a 
connection between the actors. He defined power by an 
example: A has power over B to the extent that he can get 
B to do something that B would not do otherwise. 
Abramson et al. (1958) noted three elements of power: 
(1) there must be an actor capable of social action; (2) there 
must be an objective, and (3) there must be an action sequence 
for translating an actor's aspirations into realizations. 
These action sequences were called "lines of action." A 
power relationship was defined as any situation in which 
one actor recognized or perceived that his line of action 
toward achieving an objective was restricted by another 
actor. The recognized or perceived act of restricting 
was called power exertion. 
French and Raven (1959) examined the phenomenon of power 
between members within groups. They identified five bases 
of power: (1) reward power; (2) coercive power; (3) legitimate 
power; (4) referent power, and (5) expert power. 
Emerson (1962) has constructed a theory of the power 
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aspects of social relations in which he emphasized the mutual 
dependence between the parties. Mutual dependence according 
to Emerson, implies that each party is in a position to 
grant or deny, facilitate or hinder, the other's gratifica­
tion. A depends upon B if he aspires to goals whose achieve­
ment depends upon B. For example, A may need clients if he 
is to operate a shelter for delinquent children, and would 
then be dependent upon the court for referrals. At the same 
time B, the court, may be dependent on A as a place to which 
it can send children for shelter. In Emerson's terms, 
this power relationship would be equal. This does not imply 
that power is inoperative in either or both directions, 
because each party may exert profound control over the 
other. Where the power relationship is unequal, the power 
advantage of A over B is defined as the power of A over B 
minus the power of B over A. For example, as in the case 
above, if A, instead of operating a shelter for delinquents, 
had the option of using the facility for other purposes, 
while B, the court had no other place to send its delinquent 
children, A would have a power advantage over B and there 
would be an asymmetrical situation. The two variables that 
appear to function jointly in fixing the dependence of one 
actor on another are (1) the importance of the goal to each 
actor and (2) whether the goal can be achieved in another 
way. 
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Olson (1968) has listed the kinds of resources that may 
be important for the exercise of power between organizations, 
with these kinds of resources being comparable to the bases 
of power of French and Raven (1959) bases of power. The 
resources may include (1) goods, money, or knowledge; (2) oc­
cupancy of vital organizational roles and positions; (3) 
grants of legitimacy to the organization by others; (4) the 
size and quality of its population; (5) the strength of its 
integration; (6) the degree of stability and flexibility of 
the organization, and (7) the operational effectiveness of 
an organization. By using or threatening to use its re­
sources, an organization may gain power in the social rela­
tionship . 
Lehman (1969) has summarized six attributes of all 
power, as follows (1) power is relational: it is not the 
property of an individual; (2) power is intentional: the use 
of the term is restricted to the power-wielder's chance of 
obtaining a desired outcome; (3) power is impositional: the 
potential wielder of power must be prepared to deal with 
the resistance of others and gain acquiescence in the 
pursuit of his intended goals; (4) power is potential: it 
derives from A as he controls sufficient resources to 
impose his will, and from B insofar as he attributes to A 
the ability or right to impose his will; (5) power is ongo­
ing: it is a process, and (6) power is dynamic: the one 
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who has power in one situation may not have power in another 
situation. 
Halpert (1974) has analyzed the process of power between 
organizations in dyadic relations, focusing upon the activity 
involved in power rather than on the consequences of power. 
The activity is asymmetrical in nature, and involves two 
actors, the restrictor and the restricted. The act of power 
is meaningful only if attention is directed to the objectives 
of the actors in the social relationship. Thus, any situa­
tion where one organization recognizes or perceives that 
its lines of action toward achieving an objective are being 
restricted by another organization is a power relationship. 
Halpert's definition of power activity is "an asymmetrical 
activity or power activity between two organizations exists 
when one organization perceives that its line or lines of 
action toward an objective is (are) being restricted by a 
second organization" (1974:19). For an actor to be able to 
restrict another actor, he must have resources upon which to 
draw. The resources are the bases of power. Based upon 
French and Raven (1959)'s analysis of bases of power, the 
following bases of power were defined by Halpert (1974:20) 
for analyzing interorganizational relations : 
Reward power: Organization B is dependent upon Organiza­
tion A for needed resources in order to accomplish its 
objectives. Examples of resources include money, personnel, 
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facilities, information, and clients. 
Coercive power: Organization B is afraid of or is 
actually being punished or negatively sanctioned by Organiza­
tion A. Negative sanctions include the withholding of needed 
resources and the castigating or defaming of Organization B 
in public. 
Legal power: Organization A has a legal right as author­
ized by statute to command or control Organization B within 
specified fields of activity. 
Expert power: The recognition by Organization B of 
Organization A's competence and excellence in interrelated 
areas of endeavor. 
Referent power ; The desire or actual modeling or imita­
tion by Organization B of Organization A in areas such as 
philosophy, administration, training of personnel, hiring 
of similar types of competent personnel, types of programs, 
and effectiveness. 
Community power; Organization B recognizes that Organi­
zation A has a strong community reputation. 
Using these bases of power to analyze dyads composed 
of organizations, Halpert (1974:114-5) found that three 
of the bases of power were positively related to cooperation 
and negatively related to conflict, as follows (1) power 
activity, having as its perceived base, expert power, is 
related positively to cooperation and related negatively to 
63 
conflict; (2) power activity, having as its perceived base, 
referent power, is related positively to cooperation and 
related negatively to conflict, and (3) power activity, having 
as its perceived base, reward power, is related positively 
to cooperation and related negatively to conflict (1974:114-=5) . 
He also found that two other bases of power were related 
positively to both cooperation and conflict, as follows: 
(1) power activity, having as its perceived base, coercive 
power is related positively to both cooperation and conflict 
and (2) power activity having as its perceived base, community 
power, is related positively to both cooperation and conflict. 
In addition, he found that power activity, having as its 
perceived base, legal power, is related positively to coopera­
tion. On the other hand, Aldrich (1976) has found that 
legally mandated relationships are often imbalanced in favor 
of one of the organizations studied and is associated with 
lower perceived cooperation. So, based on these mixed 
results it might be hypothesized that legal power will be 
positively related to both cooperation and conflict. 
The perception of power activity, as conceptualized by 
Halpert, deals with power that exists in the dyad, or with 
total power. The study by Halpert (1974) is one of the 
few studies of organizations in dyads that analyzed power 
relations, but the study did not consider differences in 
power within the dyad nor the total amount of power within 
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the dyads. The literature suggests that a consideration of 
both aspects of power are essential. 
Let us turn first to an analysis of total power in dyads 
upon the likelihood of cooperation and conflict. There is 
almost no direct discussion in interorganizational relations' 
literature to build upon. Smith and Ari (1964) looked at 
the impact of total power in an industrial work situation. 
Their review of the literature that included studies of 
participation in labor unions led them to develop the hypo­
thesis that the consensus between hierarchical levels and 
organizational effectiveness would be related to the amount 
of total power. They found that high total power facilitated 
consensus formation and effectiveness was significantly 
correlated with conflict. Total power facilitates the 
influence of all ranks on the operations. Joint control 
facilitates the integration of interests and promotes a 
shared, acceptable system of norms. 
Total power, following Smith and Ari (1964:623) means 
that both members of the dyad have social power. High total 
power may be associated with conflict as the units seek 
to express their views and preferences, and also may be 
associated with cooperation after the units have each had 
a chance to express their views. 
Rubin and Brown (1975) have analyzed the social psy­
chology literature that has looked at the impact of total 
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power in dyads. They reviewed seventeen studies in experi­
mental social psychology which found that the higher the 
total power, the less effective the bargaining in terms of 
ratio of costs to benefits, or the greater the likelihood 
of conflict. They found six studies which showed that when 
the bargainers possess power that is both high and relatively 
equal, they are most likely to function effectively, or to 
cooperate. Rubin and Brown (1975) concluded that compara­
bility of power may be at issue with different findings. 
If the power bases are comparable, high total power leads to 
conflict because intangibles such as loss of face and self 
esteem emerge. When power is not comparable, seeing each 
other's relative strengths and weaknesses may lead to coopera­
tion. They also found that the interpersonal orientation of 
bargainers may determine whether total power leads to conflict 
or cooperation. 
This review of the literature and analysis of results 
whose the continued importance of exchange theory for inter-
organizational relations. As propositions are developed for 
the use of exchange and power theories to explain coopera­
tion and conflict, it should be remembered that the litera­
ture finds support for the simultaneous existence of coopera­
tion and conflict. This has occurred in three ways: they may 
occur at the same time in relation to different goals ; they 
may occur at different times in relation to the same goals; 
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and the may coexist in ongoing relationships. This is in 
contrast to a common notion that cooperation and conflict can 
not both be present in the same relationship. 
The findings in the literature related to total power 
are inconclusive. One option would be to not develop hypoth­
eses and just to look at the empirical results during the 
study. Another option might be to use hypotheses only about 
cooperation or conflict. However for the reasons that follow 
it was decided to utilize hypotheses about both kinds of 
dependent variables: 
(1) The conceptual definitions utilized do not 
emphasize conflict with regard to the destruc­
tion or annhilation of the other party in the 
dyad. Given the nature of the organizations 
this is not appropriate. 
(2) Organizations in the dyad interact with each 
other about a number of different issues. 
The literature shows that both cooperation 
and conflict can exist within a dyad at any one 
point in time, even with regard to the same 
issue. It is interesting to note in Appendix B 
that joint programs and disagreements are 
positively correlated. 
Because of the state of the literature and the 
fact that there is so little research to evaluate I regard 
66 
the propositions about total power and power differences 
as tentative. Hopefully the results of this research will 
add to the body of literature. 
Another way to look at power in dyads is to look at the 
differences in power between members of the dyad. Smith and 
Ari (1964) found that power inequality negatively related to 
consensus across different hierarchical levels. They found 
that conflict was less associated with power differences 
than with total power. 
Hall and Clark (1975) studied differences between 
organizations in a study of organizations which deal with 
problem youth. These organizations included the juvenile 
court, juvenile probation office, detention facility, school-
pupil services, and other programs designed to divert youth 
from the juvenile justice system in a large city. They found 
a negative relation between the difference in power of the 
organizations and the extent to which disagreements or dis­
putes characterized the relationships between the organiza­
tions. Newman (1973:133-35) has hypothesized a negative 
relation between power disparity and the frequency of con­
flict. He noted that conflict is one way of expending 
scarce resources. Paulson (1976:324-35) in a study of 
interorganizational dyads found support for the proposition, 
the greater the difference between two organizations' 
resources, the less the perceived competition. He found 
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that resource differences are positively associated with 
perceived cooperation and negatively associated with competi­
tion in dyads. If one recalls that resource differences 
are correlated to power differences, Paulson's findings 
suggest that power differences will be negatively associated 
with conflict and positively associated with cooperation. 
Mulford and Mulford (1977:575) in a discussion of 
the comparative analysis of the structural properties of 
organizations in dyads, noted the importance of size. They 
expected that since large organizations were likely to have 
more resources, smaller organizations might cooperate with 
large ones to obtain resources for activities. They found 
less conflict between voluntary organizations of unequal 
size (power) and much cooperation between voluntary organiza­
tions of unequal size. Their findings were consistent with 
Newman's proposition (1973), if one equates size with power. 
Rubin and Brown (1975:214-228) have assessed the 
results of experimental studies of unequal power on bargain­
ing effectiveness. In 28 studies relating to the behavior 
of the bargainers they found that the less the relative 
power, the more submissive. That is, they may cooperate 
even if they do not wish to and that conflict is less likely 
from them. The more powerful unit acts dominantly and 
perhaps exploitatively. The more powerful unit may act 
cooperatively if it fears the development of coalitions of 
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weaker ones. 
Rubin and Brown (1975:227) also found that in the 
absence of real monetary incentives, one might expect in­
creasing power discrepancy to act not as the source of con­
flict but as the source of information about the manner in 
which resources should be allocated. In such organizations, 
which are comparable to the organizations in the present 
dissertation in that these organizations are "not for profit" 
organizations, power differences may lead to cooperation. 
This supports the impressive arguments of Levine and White 
(1961) that resource differences, which may be seen as 
differences in power, lead to cooperation. 
Based on the literature and analysis of results of 
studies, a consideration of power as it affects interorganiza-
tional relations is emerging as an important process for 
interorganizational relations study. In summarizing this 
section, a general hypothesis is offered, with subhypotheses 
under the general hypothesis. 
General Hypothesis II Power is associated with 
cooperation and conflict in dyadic relations of organizations. 
A. Subhypotheses based on total power 
S.H. 1: Total expert power is positively associated 
with resource exchange and/or joint programs as a 
form of cooperation. 
S.H. 2 :  Total referrent power is positively 
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associated with resource exchange, joint programs, 
and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 3: Total legal power is positively associated 
with resource exchange, joint programs, and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 4: Total reward power is positively associated 
with resource exchange, joint:programs, and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 5: Total community power is positively associated 
with resource exchange, joint programs, and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 6; Total expert power is positively associated 
with disagreement and/br difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 7 ; Total referent power is positively asso­
ciated with disagreement and/or difference in operating 
philosophy. 
S.H. 8; Total legal power is positively associated 
with disagreement and/for difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 9: Total reward power is positively associated 
with disagreement andybr difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 10: Total community power is positively associated 
with disagreement andybr difference in operating philosophy. 
B. Subhypotheses based on differences in power 
S.H. 1; The greater the difference of legal power 
as a basis for power activity, the more likely there 
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will be resource exchange, joint programs, and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 2: The greater the difference in referent 
power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint 
programs, and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 3 ; The greater the difference in expert power 
as a basis for power activity, the more likely there 
will be resource exchange, joint programs, and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 4: The greater the difference in community 
power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint 
programs, and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 5: The greater the difference of legal power 
as a basis for power activity, the less likely there 
will be disagreement and/or difference in operating 
philosophy. 
S.H. 6; The greater the difference in referent power 
as a basis for power activity, the less likely there 
will be disagreement and/or difference in operating 
philosophy. 
S.H. 7; The greater the difference in expert power as 
a basis for power activity, the less likely there will 
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be disagreement and/or difference in operating 
philosophy. 
S.H. 8 : The greater the difference in community 
power as a basis for power activity, the less 
likely there will be disagreement and/or dif­
ference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 9 ; The greater the difference in reward power 
as a basis for power activity, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange, joint programs, 
and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 10: The greater the difference in reward power 
as a basis for power activity, the less likely 
there will be disagreement or difference in 
operating philosophy. 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the theoretical orientation 
for this dissertation. It included the review of two 
conceptual frameworks which have been used in the study of 
cooperation and conflict in dyads. The first section dis­
cussed exchange theory, and the second, the process of power. 
Propositions to be tested in the dissertation have been 
included. Cook (1977) has pointed out that no single 
theoretical perspective will enable us to explain everything 
about organizational interaction. It is the purpose of 
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this dissertation to try to better understand two of the maj 
approaches to interorganizational interaction in relation 
to the dyad. 
The next chapter will describe the methodology to be 
used in this dissertation. It will include: the setting of 
the study, the formation of dyads, and the methods used for 
collecting and analyzing the data. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research 
procedures for collecting and analyzing the data and to test 
the propositions developed in the previous chapter. The 
chapter will include discussion of the following topics: 
sample and data collection procedures ; formation of dyads ; 
and variable measures and statistical procedures. 
Sample and Data Collection Procedures 
There has been a limited number of studies of inter-
organizational relations of dyads, among them the sampling 
method generally used has been purposive sampling, which 
Paulson (1976) noted was not unusual in organization studies. 
Halpert (1974) selected seven organizations which formed a 
network because of their concern with diagnosis, treatment, 
protection, socialization, and control of delinquent and pre­
delinquent youth. He identified the organizations on the 
basis of his previous contact and knowledge of the agencies. 
Paulson (1976) drew his sample of eighteen organizations 
purposively from the population of state-level, health-
related, non-profit federations in a midwestern state. 
Molnar (1976) selected thirty-nine public agencies involved 
in natural resources management about which data had been 
collected within the framework of a larger research project; 
the agencies were related to the specified study counties 
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because the base office was located in the county or the 
jurisdiction was in that county or the base office included 
that county. In the present dissertation, seventeen organiza­
tions were selected on the recommendation of the director of 
Group Youth House, one of the organizations in the community 
which dealt exclusively with delinquent and pre-delinquent 
youth and whose director had knowledge of all the organiza­
tions in the community. These organizations were considered 
a network of organizations in the community which is related 
by the members' concern for problem youth. The community 
is located in a midwestern county, and includes the largest 
city in the county, a small suburban city adjacent to the 
largest city, and the county seat, located about ten miles 
from the major city. The county seat is the physical loca­
tion for the county board of supervisors' and the county 
attorney's office. The county probation office has offices 
in both the largest city and the county seat. 
The organizations in this group include those which 
have been legitimized by society to deal with children who 
have or may have problems which may lead to delinquent 
behavior. These organizations include the following publicly 
owned agencies: the educational system, the social welfare 
system, and the legal-correctional system; also included in 
the set is the cluster of agencies operated under religious 
or other auspices that supplements the public owned 
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institutions. The agencies in the set are the focal points 
of most of the action concerning this group of children. 
The schools in the education system 
Concern of the schools with behaviorally deviant children 
came as the result of the passage of compulsory school attend­
ance laws, which was present in nearly all states by 1918. 
However, the attitude of many school systems toward these 
children showed a reluctance to include them in school; this 
was reflected in many policies, the most serious of which 
was expulsion for those whose behavior was disturbing to the 
functioning of the regular classroom. In the I960's legisla­
tion was passed which required that more attention be given 
to initiating programs which would enable children with many 
types of problems to receive the education which was legally 
mandated. 
In the community schools in which this study was con­
ducted, the department which has responsibility for over­
seeing the education for this group of children is the 
Guidance Service. This department accepts for service all 
school age pupils currently enrolled (elementary, junior, 
or senior high school) and also those who have terminated 
attendance prior to graduation? Referrals may be made by 
social agencies, other professionals, parents, friends, or 
the children themselves. Counselors are available at all 
the schools in the organization set, including senior high 
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school, two junior high schools, and one community school 
which includes both senior and junior high school students. 
The services offered are (1) counselling: the opportunity 
for students to share concerns and alternative plans with 
a counselor; (2) consultation: assistance to parents, 
teachers, and others involved in helping students; (3) orien­
tation and information: the opportunity to learn about educa­
tional and vocational opportunities; (4) evaluation: aptitude 
and achievement testing and other appraisal aides to assist 
educational and vocational planning, and (5) placement: 
assistance to students desiring further educational or occupa­
tional experiences. 
The legal-correctional system 
The identification of children who were delinquent or 
in danger of becoming delinquent as a separate group from 
adults was formalized in 1899 with the creation of the Juve­
nile Court. Children were removed from adult criminal law 
process and were placed in the jurisdiction of the Juvenile 
Court, which defined most juvenile offenses as civil rather 
than criminal actions, and provided for probation officers, 
social workers, and special resources. Among the disposi­
tional modes open to the judge are a warning, probation, 
placement in a group home or training school, a private 
placement, or placement in an institution. At the present 
time, the legal-correctional system is in a state of 
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transition because of a movement which began in the I960's. 
That movement emphasized constitutional safeguards for the 
child's legal rights. That will involve changes in the 
Juvenile Court at a minimum, and the elimination of the 
Juvenile Court as a most serious change. 
At the time of this dissertation, the organizations 
in the legal-correctional system in the community studied 
include: County Juvenile Probation Office, Juvenile Magistrate 
Court, Police Department, and County Attorney's Office. 
County Juvenile Probation Office 
The County Juvenile Probation Office deals with direct 
referrals from county law enforcement officers, parents, 
schools, and youth. The staff includes a chief probation 
officer and a deputy probation officer, as well as a psychiat­
ric consultant. They have two offices, one in the county 
seat and the other in the largest city in the county. Their 
stated purpose is to provide for each child coming within 
the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court the care, guidance, 
and control that will be conducive to his welfare and to the 
best interests of the state. This care should be given 
preferably in the child's own home. VJhen he is removed from 
the control of his parents, the Juvenile Court should secure 
for him care as nearly as possible equivalent to the care 
which he should have received in his own home. 
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Judicial Magistrate Court 
In this community, the Juvenile Court is known as the 
Judicial Magistrate Court. It was established as part of 
the District Court under the State Code. It is constituted 
of the judges of the District Court and the District Associate 
Judges who have been designated by the chief judge of the 
District. The chief judge of the District is required by 
law to designate one or more of the District judges or 
District Associate Judges to serve as the Judicial Magistrate 
and to act as the judge of the juvenile court. The Juvenile 
Court is a court of record and the orders, findings, and 
decisions of the court are designated as the Juvenile Court 
Records. Hearings are held at the time and place that the 
Juvenile Court Judge designates. 
Police Department 
The Police Department is one of the services provided 
by the cities. The headquarters are in the city hall. The 
staff in the largest city in the community includes forty-
nine members. The Police Chief is administrator of the police 
force. His duties include (1) to execute all processes of 
the City Council; (2) to suppress riots; (3) to suppress all 
disturbances and breaches of the peace; (4) to pursue and 
arrest any fugitive; (5) to secure evidence; (6) to keep 
records of all actions; (7) to serve official papers, and 
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(8) to cooperate with federal, state, county, and other city 
police agencies in affording protection of persons and 
property with the apprehension and conviction of criminals. 
County Attorney's Office 
The County Attorney's Office works in close cooperation 
with the county sheriff and other local police, investigates 
crimes occurring within the county, collects evidence, insti­
tutes formal proceedings against suspected persons, and 
represents the state at trials. Since there are no statutes 
to direct the way in which the county attorney's investigative 
powers are to be exercised, they are left wholly to his 
discretion. The County Attorney's Office delegates certain 
activities to the County Probation Office, which is respon­
sible to the County Attorney. 
The Social Welfare System 
The social welfare system in the community includes a 
variety of services under public and non-public auspices. 
In this dissertation the public organizations include: the 
Department of Social Services, the County Board of Supervi­
sors, the Employment Service, and the City Council, The 
non-public organizations include: Church Group Home, Central 
Mental Health Center, Alcoholism Center, and County Community 
Action. 
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The Department of Social Services The County Depart­
ment of Social Services is the local office of the State 
Department of Social Services, which administers the social 
welfare program mandated by the Secretary of Health, Educa­
tion, and Welfare in the federal government. Both the county 
and local offices serve as the contact point between the 
administrative social welfare system and the client popula­
tion. The County Department of Social Services has offices 
in the largest city in the county and in the county seat. In 
addition to financial assistance to all persons who are eligi­
ble, the Department of Social Services has responsibility for 
protective services to abused, neglected and dependent 
children, foster care services for children, day care for 
children, and residential treatment for children and adults. 
Many of their services are provided through purchase of : 
service agreements with non-public agencies who provide 
specialized services. 
County Board of Supervisors The County Board of 
Supervisors is the governing body of the county. It is 
made up of three members, elected for four year terms, who 
are responsible to the county and to any state agency under 
whose jurisdiction the county may lie. The County Board 
of Supervisors is important in any programs for problem 
youth because it is authorized to levy taxes to raise revenue 
for county purposes subject to various restrictions fixed by 
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the state legislature. Programs dealing with problem youth 
apply to the County Board of Supervisors for funds with 
which to undertake special programs. 
City Council The City Council formulates policy for 
the city, enacts local laws, adopts the city budget, author­
izes all city contracts, makes assessments for public improve­
ments, and acts as a Board of Health. The City Council is 
a resource for funds for special programs for youth and must 
sanction programs which take place within the city if they 
are to exist. The Council is composed of six members who 
are elected for four year terms. 
State Employment Service The State Employment Service 
is a statewide organization which has a local office in the 
community studied. The Employment Service operates and 
participates with other agencies to assist employees and 
employers to obtain mutual employment, It further assists 
persons, including juveniles, in preparing themselves for 
employment. 
Church Group Home Church Group Home is an agency 
which is part of a major religious organization. It is a 
residential treatment facility which provides a twenty-four 
hour therapeutic milieu with individually planned treatment 
program for emotionally disturbed children and adolescents. 
It provides psychiatric and psychosocial evaluations and 
individual and family counseling in the areas of parent-child 
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conflicts, children's adjustment problems, and marital 
disharmony. Activity group therapy and physical education 
therapy are also offered. Consultation services are offered 
by the Church Group Home staff for community agencies, 
schools, and others. Families and children of all racial 
and religious groups are eligible. Fees vary in accordance 
with the type of service and the ability to pay. 
Central Mental Health Association 
The Central Mental Health Association offers a wide 
variety of mental health treatment and consultation services 
to children and adults residing in the community. Its 
services are made available especially to those who cannot 
afford the cost of private treatment. Its services include 
(1) outpatient diagnostic and treatment services for persons 
with emotional, marital, family, or social relationship 
problems; (2) inpatient treatment for persons requiring 
short term acute care; (3) consultation and education services 
for individuals or agencies who are concerned about or 
involved with mental health problems, and (4) emergency 
service available 24 hours a day. 
Regional Alcoholism Center 
This is a private agency which provides the following 
types of service: (1) emergency services for detoxification 
on a 24 hour a day basis; (2) consultation with problem 
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drinkers, their families, friends or employers; (3) thirteen 
week group outpatient treatment for chemically dependent 
persons (alcohol/drug abusers); (4) follow-up and aftercare 
programs; (5) industrial alcoholism programs for area 
employers; (6) alcohol education programs for area schools; 
and (7) information for press, radio, and television. Every­
one is eligible; the families of problem youth are seen in 
this facility. 
County Community Action 
This organization provides information and referral 
services, a limited amount of emergency transportation, an 
emergency food and clothing shelf, and other services to 
adults and children who meet the criteria for eligibility, 
based on federal guidelines for the definition of poverty. 
It has one building, located in the largest city in the 
county from which it reaches out to persons with low income 
in the entire county. 
Youth Group Home 
Youth Group Home is a community-based juvenile correction 
and prevention agency. It attempts to divert the flow of 
young persons from the juvenile justice system. Any juvenile 
between the ages of ten and seventeen and his/her family is 
eligible for the services. Youth Group Home provides 
emergency shelter care to children referred by parents. 
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probation officers, and the Department of Social Services. 
The agency is licensed to accommodate up to seven boys and 
girls, who may stay for a maximum period of thirty days. 
Youth Group Home is licensed for both outclient and residen­
tial drug treatment. They also operate a foster home program, 
with six temporary homes available. 
The description of the seventeen agencies which are 
included in this set show areas in which there may be coopera­
tion and/or conflict based on exchange of resources, over­
lapping services, and the dependence of one organization on 
another for funds and other resources. 
The Formation of Dyads 
The total number of organizations in the study includes 
seventeen different agencies. Each organization was combina-
torially arranged with every other organization to form all 
possible organizational dyads. For example, the first organi­
zation would be combined with sixteen other organizations; 
the second, fifteen; the third, fourteen, and so on for a 
total of 136 dyads derived from the interaction of each 
organization with every other organization. The following 
diagram shows the dyadic relationship between one of the 
organizations. Youth Group Homes, and every other organiza­
tion: 
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Youth Group Home 
^County Probation Office 
Judicial Magistrate Court 
,Police Department 
,Department of Social Services 
.County Attorney's Office 
.County Board of Supervisors 
-Church Group Home 
-Central Mental Health Center 
•Alcoholism Regional Center 
Community Action 
Senior High School 
Town Junior High School 
"West Junior High School 
Community School 
Employment Service 
City Council 
The following figure shows the distribution of all the 
dyad types. The lower triangular matrix of relationships 
is that of all organizational dyads. 
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YGH CPO JMC PD DSS CAO CBS CGH CMHC ARC CA SKS TJ WJ CS ES 
YGH -
CPO X -
JMC X X -
PD X X X -
DSS X X X X -
CAO X X X X X -
CBS X X X X X X -
CGH X X X X X X X -
CMHC X X X X X X X X -
ARC X X X X X X X X X -
CA X X X X X X X X X X -
SHS X X X X X X X X X X X -
TJHS X X X X X X X X X X X X -
WJHS X X X X X X X X X X X X X -
CS X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
ES X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
CC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
The unit of analysis or case in this study is the dyad. For 
example, construction of the first dyad comes from combining 
the data from YGH and CPO, 
Figure 1. Distributions of organizational dyads in sample 
The data for the study were drawn from structured 
interviews with representatives of the seventeen organizations 
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in the population. Two respondents were interviewed in 
each organization, the executive and the "boundary person." 
The boundary person was defined as the person who had the 
most frequent contact with the other organizations. It was 
assumed that the executive would have a broad view of policy 
and structure of the organization and that the boundary 
person would have knowledge of the day to day interaction 
between the two organizations in the dyad. Information from 
both respondents was combined in a single interview schedule, 
with the separate parts being derived from the person who 
had knowledge of that item. This resulted in 136 schedules 
of dyadic relations for the total population. Precedent 
for the use of two respondents in each agency to cover dif­
ferent areas was found in Halpert's (1974) study, in which 
he used the executive and one or two other persons in the 
agency who had knowledge of part of the day to day inter­
action between the two organizations. 
Variable Measures 
This section will explain how dyadic scores are derived 
and the procedures for measuring specific variables. A 
rationale for the measurement of each v'nrlable will be 
presented in the context of interorganizational research. 
The operational measures and scoring system for each variable 
will be discussed using as a precedent the work of Molnar 
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(1976) and Paulson (1976) whenever possible. In addition, 
the range and mean for each variable will be presented. 
Dyadic scoring procedures 
Dyadic scores have been arrived at in three ways in this 
study: (1) by summing the scores of the organizations in the 
dyad, (2) by taking the difference between the scores of the 
organizations in the dyad, and (3) by assigning a numerical 
value to each combination of scores as shown below. 
Summing the scores A dyadic score may be achieved 
by summing the scores of the organizations comprising the 
dyad. For example, the following question has been used to 
tap the dimension of expert power: 
"How'would you evaluate Organization B in competence 
and expertise in the work with problem youth?" 
The theoretical range of scores for each organization 
was 1 to 5, with "1" meaning low in competence and expertise 
and "5" meaning high in competence and expertise. The 
highest possible dyadic score is 10, meaning that there is 
great expert power in the dyad. 
Taking the difference between scores A dyadic score 
may be achieved by taking the difference between the scores 
for each organization. For example, the variable of profes­
sionalism was measured by a question in which a respondent 
in each organization was asked to state the education level 
of the majority of paid professional workers. Five ranks 
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were listed from "high school graduation" to "education 
beyond college," which were assigned scores of 1 at the high 
school graduation level to 5 at the education beyond college 
level. The greatest possible difference between scores for 
any combination of two organizations was 4, which would 
mean that the dyad is characterized by a great difference in 
profess ionalism. 
Assigning a numerical value to each combination of 
scores A third method for assigning dyadic scores is to 
assign numerical values to combinations of scores. For 
example, one question was used to find out the availability 
of alternative resources. The question was: "I'That is the 
primary source of funds?" Five choices were available: 
(1) federal, (2) state, (3) county, (4) city, and (5) organi­
zational campaign in local areas. This question was used 
following Levine and White's (1961) study in which money 
was one of the elements for which agencies sometimes had to 
turn to other agencies. It is thought that when the source 
of money was other agencies in the community, the agency 
would be more likely to engage in exchanges with those 
agencies. If money came primarily from federal or state 
sources, the organization may be less likely to engage in 
exchanges with local agencies. 
In scoring this question, the three answers "county," 
"city," and "organizational campaigns" were combined into 
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one, and given the score of 1. A score of 2 was given to 
"state," and a score of 3 was given to "federal." The range 
of scores for the dyad was 2 to 6, with a low score meaning 
that alternative sources of funds were not available. 
By using the three methods of developing dyadic scores 
it is possible to provide scores that reflect the nature of 
the concepts being considered. 
Reliability and validity 
Reliability has been defined by Zetterberg (1965:123) as 
the extent to which an indicator renders unambiguous readings. 
This definition underscores the accuracy aspect of reliability. 
If composite measures are used, reliability can be discussed 
in terms of internal consistency and an analysis of measure­
ment error. Composite measures and single item measures 
can be discussed in terms of test-retest stability. A 
highly reliable composite measure would be one with a high 
proportion of true score variance and a low proportion of 
measurement error variance. An F test can be used to evaluate 
the extent to which a composite measure is characterized by 
measurement error variance (Faisal, 1978). A statistically 
significant F value means that one can reject the null 
hypothesis and report that a piece of evidence exists to 
support the alternate hypothesis. Hence, a significant F 
value indicates a reliable composite measure. In the sections 
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that follow I will point out that it was not considered wise 
to utilize composite measures. Therefore all of the dependent 
and independent variables are based upon single items measured 
at one point in time. Reliability in the sense that it is 
discussed by Zetterberg (1965) and Faisal (1978) is not 
relevant for this study. 
The term validity means that there is consensus that an 
empirical indicator measures values on a stated unit (Dubin, 
1969:20). The consensus is a conventional agreement among 
scholars in a given field that the empirical indicator and 
the theoretical unit whose values it measures are homologous. 
The acceptance of a theory by a scientific community gives 
meaning to its indicators (Zetterberg, 1965: 114). The 
issue of validity is relevant in this study because of the 
relative newness of the consideration of dyadic relations 
of organizations. In the present study I have attempted 
to achieve validity by using measures that have been used 
in other studies wherever possible and have tried to achieve 
face validity for all the measures. 
Indicators of the dependent variables 
Cooperation The conceptualization of cooperation 
and two subtypes of cooperation, resource exchange and joint 
programs, have been discussed earlier. Cooperation has 
been defined as an interaction process under which the actors 
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seek to achieve a similar issue outcome (Warren et al., 
1965). Levine and White (1961) have defined exchange as any 
voluntary activity between two organizations which has conse­
quences for the realization of their respective goals. Dis­
cussion of the measurement of resource exchange may be found 
in the work of Finley (1969), Rogers (1974), and Molnar 
(1976). Finley (1969) used resource exchange as a measure 
of interorganizational relations, Rogers (1974) included re­
source exchange as one step in a scale of intensity of rela­
tions between groups, and Molnar (1976) summed the mutual 
reports of Organization A extending resources to B and B to 
A to form an index of total resource interdependence. In 
this dissertation, the following question was used to measure 
resource exchange : 
"How would you describe the extent to which Organi­
zation B provides needed resources, such as meeting 
rooms, personnel, equipment, or funds to your 
organization as you try to accomplish your objectives 
in relation to the juvenile offender?" 
The range of possible scores for each organization was 1 to 5, 
with "1" meaning provision of resources to a low extent, and 
"5" meaning a high extent. In order to increase the total 
amount of resource exchange for the dyad, the scores for the 
two organizations were summed. The theoretical range of the 
sum of scores for the dyad is 2 to 10 and the actual range 
is 2 to 7 with a mean of 3,096 and a standard deviation of 
1 .282 .  
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The following two questions were used to tap the question 
of joint programs: 
"Within the last three years has your organiza­
tion worked jointly with Organization B in planning 
and implementing any specific service or activity?" 
"Does your organization have any written agreements 
with Organization B pertaining to specific programs 
or activities, personnel commitments, client 
referrals, procedures for working together or any 
other joint activity?" 
In scoring the questions, if either of the organizations 
gave a "yes" response, a score of 2 was given for the dyad, 
and if each gave a "no" response, a score of 0. This follows 
Paulson (1976:320) who scored contradictory responses about 
recollections of joint programs by using the positive 
response, assuming that one of the respondents had failed to 
recall all that occurred. If both organizations said "no," 
the score for the dyad is 0, The scores for the two questions 
were summed, A score of 4 for the dyad means that at least 
one joint program accompanied by at least one formal agree­
ment was present. A score of 2 means that at least one joint 
program or one formal agreement was present, and a score of 
0 means that neither was present. The theoretical range for 
the sum of scores for the dyad is 0 to 4. The actual range 
on the first question is 0 to 2 with a mean of 1.632 and a 
standard deviation of 0.778. The actual range on the second 
question, written agreements, is 0 to 2 with a mean of 0.735 
and a standard deviation of 0.968, The actual range on the 
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two questions taken together is 0 to 4 with a mean of 2.368 
and a standard deviation of 1.360, 
Correlation between the two questions is .204, which is 
significant at the .05 level and approaches significance at 
the .01 level (.218 needed for significance at .01). Although 
the correlations are significant I concluded that they were 
not high enough to be used in a composite score. Therefore, 
each one will be analyzed separately as a dependent variable 
in this research. 
Conflict The definition of conflict, which has been 
discussed earlier is: conflict is an interaction process 
under which the actors seek to achieve different issue out­
comes. Based on the work of Warren et al. (1965), Hall 
(1972), White (197 4), and Halpert (1974) the following two 
questions are used as the indicators of conflict: 
"To what extent do disagreements or disputes 
characterize the relations between your organi­
zation and Organization B?" 
"How compatible is your organization's operating 
philosophy in relation to the juvenile offender 
with Organization B?" 
In the first of the two questions, the range of responses is 
1 to 5, with "1" meaning a small amount of disagreement and 
"5" meaning a large amount of disagreement. In the second 
question the order was reversed, with "1" meaning a large 
amount of disagreement and "5" meaning very little disagree­
ment. Therefore, in order to use the two questions together. 
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the scoring on the second question was reversed, e.g. "1" 
was given the score of 5, answer "2" the score of 4 and so on. 
By making this change, the scores for the two questions could 
be summed, with a total theoretical range for each organiza­
tion of 2 to 10. The actual range of scores on the first ' 
question, the extent of disagreement is 2 to 9 with a mean 
of 3.728 and a standard deviation of 1.710. The actual 
range of scores on the second question, the difference in 
operating philosophy is 2 to 10 with a mean of 6.029 and a 
standard deviation of 2.224. The actual scores for the sum 
of the two questions are 4 to 17 with a mean of 9.772 and a 
standard deviation of 2.743. The correlation between the 
2 questions was not significant (-.07) and therefore I 
concluded that the two items should not be used in a com­
posite, but rather, each measure of conflict will be analyzed 
separately as a dependent variable. 
Indicators of the independent variables 
Scarcity of resources Scarcity of resources has 
been noted by Levine and White (1961) as a reason for estab­
lishing relationships between organizations. An initial 
effect of the realistic conditions of element scarcity is 
that organizations may limit their functions. However, 
even with the limited functions, some organizations can 
seldom carry out their objectives without relating to other 
organizations in order to procure the necessary elements. 
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Money, equipment, or special personnel are among the resources 
which are conditionally lent or given. Theoretically if 
all the essential elements were in infinite supply, there 
would be little need for organizational subscription to 
cooperation as an ideal. Under actual conditions of scarcity, 
however, the interorganizational exchanges are essential 
to goal attainment. 
Based on the findings of Levine and White (1961) three 
questions were used in this dissertation to discover the 
scarcity of resources. These were: the adequacy of physical 
facilities, the adequacy of the number of paid professional 
personnel, and the adequacy of the number of volunteers. 
For each of these questions respondents were asked whether 
they had "more than enough," "enough," or "less than enough." 
Where the answer was "less than enough" the score given was 
3, "enough," a score of 2, and "more than enough," a score 
of 1. The two composite scores for single organizations 
were summed to form dyadic scores with a theoretical range 
on each question of 2 to 6 for the dyad. 
The actual range of scores for the scarcity of physical 
space is 2 to 6 with a mean of 5.051 and a standard deviation 
of 0.953. The actual range of scores for the scarcity of 
personnel is 3 to 6 with a mean of 4.888 and a standard devia­
tion of 0.818. The actual range of scores for the scarcity 
of volunteers is 2 to 6 with a mean of 4.684 and a standard 
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deviation of 1.146. 
The correlation coefficient between scarcity of physical 
space and scarcity of volunteers is -.220, the correltaion 
between scarcity of physical space and scarcity of personnel 
is .132, the scarcity of personnel and scarcity of volunteers 
is -.055, none of which is significant. With an n of 17 
the correlation needed for significance at the .05 level 
is .482 or higher. Because of these results the three items 
will be analyzed separately as independent variables. 
The hypothesis that will be tested with data from these 
questions is: 
"S.H. 1; The greater the scarcity of resources, 
the greater the resource exchange, joint programs, 
and/or written agreements. 
Availability of alternative sources of resources Close­
ly related to the scarcity of resources is the question of 
the source of the supply of resources. As Levine and White 
(1961) point out, sometimes agencies are unable to obtain 
all the elements they need from the community or through 
efforts with state and federal sources, and accordingly 
have to turn to other agencies in the community to obtain 
additional resources. One of the determinants of exchange 
mentioned by Levine and White (1961) is the accessibility 
of each organization to necessary elements from sources 
outside the system. Levine and White (1961) have also noted 
that an organization's relative independence from the rest 
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of the local health agency system and greater dependence upon 
a system outside the community may produce specific types 
of disagreements with the other agencies within the local 
system that render cooperation less likely. 
Since money is one of the major elements which an 
organization may seek from outside sources, the following 
question was asked: 
"T-Jhat is your organization's primary source of funds?" 
The choice of answers was: federal, state, county, city, or 
organizational campaign in local areas. The three sources 
"county, city, and organizational campaign in local areas" 
were combined into a single category and was given a score 
of 1. This answer means that there is relatively little 
availability of alternative sources of funds from outside 
the county. The response "state" was given a score of 2, 
and "federal," the score of 3, meaning that alternative 
sources of funds were available from these levels. The scores 
for the two organizations were summed in order to reflect 
the degree to which the organizations have access to alterna­
tive sources of funds. The theoretical range of scores for 
this question is 2 to 6, arrived at by summing the scores 
for each organization. The actual scores range from 2 to 6 
with a mean of 4.007 and a standard deviation of 1.151. 
The hypothesis that will be tested with data from this 
question is: 
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"S.H. 2: The more the availability of alterna-
tive sources of resources, the less likely the 
organizations in the dyad will enter into resource 
exchange, joint programs, and/or written 
agreements. 
Resource difference The measurement of resource 
difference follows Paulson (1976) who found support for the 
proposition that the greater the difference between two 
organizations' resources, the greater the perceived coopera­
tive interaction. Paulson assumed that organizations must 
have, relative to their own needs, more or less than adequate 
amounts of resources in order for interaction to take place. 
He argued that if two organizations had voluntary personnel 
and funds as required resources, but one had an excess of 
funds and insufficient voluntary personnel while the other 
had an excess of voluntary personnel but insufficient funds, 
both organizations could gain from an exchange, even though 
their basic resource requirements are identical. His point 
was that in order for interaction to occur, the need for 
required resources must be different, even if types of 
required resources are identical. 
To measure the dimension of resource need Paulson (1976) 
asked respondents to rank on a four point scale their funds 
and voluntary personnel in terms of the degree of adequacy 
for carrying out the activities which they were trying to 
perform. The absolute difference between the dyad members' 
total scores for the items was assigned to the dyad as an 
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indicator of resource difference. Paulson's measure was con­
sistent with Levine and White's perspective on resource 
difference. 
In this dissertation I argue that the number of paid 
professional workers is the key resource in terms of the 
people processing organizations studied because these organi­
zations are labor intensive and could not continue with all 
volunteers. Therefore, it is argued that differences in the 
number of paid personnel are relatively more important in 
their impact on dyadic interaction than are other differences. 
Resource difference was measured by the difference in the 
number of paid professional workers. Five categories were 
listed, from "fewer than 3" to "more than 20." The dif­
ference between the dyad members' scores for the item was 
assigned to the dyad as an indicator of resource difference. 
The theoretical range of scores is 0 to 4. The actual scores 
range from 0 to 3 with a mean of 1,566 and a standard devia­
tion of 1.269. The hypothesis that will be tested with data 
from this question is; 
"S.H. 3; The greater the difference in the 
supply of resources available for exchange by 
members of the dyad, the more likely that the 
organizations in the dyad will enter into 
resource exchange , joint programs and/or 
writtèn agreements. 
Social status Social status was considered by Paulson 
(1976) to be crucial to decision making about interaction; 
he found that organizations whose administrators 
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are comparable in status are more likely to cooperate. 
Paulson (1976) used the administrator's annual gross income 
and level of education as a measure of administrator's social 
status. In this study, however, the measure of education 
is used as an indicator of professionalism. The measure 
of income was extended from the income of the administrator 
to the income of the majority of paid professional employees, 
which includes the administrator as well as other professional 
employees. Four categories were available for respondents to 
choose, from "less than $10,000" to "over $18,000." If there 
is no difference in the salary category of the majority of 
professional employees, the dyadic score is 3; a difference 
of 1 is given a score of 2; a difference of 2 is given a 
score of 1; and a difference of 3 is given a score of 0. The 
difference between the dyad members' scores for the item 
was assigned to the dyad as an indicator of social status 
difference. The theoretical range of scores is 0 to 3. The 
actual scores range from 0 to 3 with a mean of 2.250 and a 
standard deviation of 0.786. The hypotheses that will be 
tested using data from this question are: 
"S.H. 4: The greater the similarity of social 
status of the personnel within the organizations, 
the more likely there will be resource exchange^ 
joint programs, and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 11; The greater the difference of social 
status of the personnel of the organizations, 
the more likely there will be disagreement and/or 
conflict in operating philosophy. 
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Formalization Comparative formalization has been 
used as a structural variable that makes exchange more likely 
(Aiken and Hage 1968; Molnar 1976). Aiken and Hage (1968) 
measured formalization in terms of job codification and 
the variability permitted in classifications within the 
organization. 'Molnar (1976) measured comparative formaliza­
tion in dyads by the extent to which written policies were 
detailed. The items included written job descriptions, 
written personnel policies, and written operating policies 
and guidelines. Scores were derived for each dyad by summing 
the differences of individual items. A high score indicated 
a high difference in formalization; a low score, low dif­
ferences in formalization. 
In the present dissertation two questions will be used 
as the measures of formalization; 
"Specificity of written policies: 1. very 
general, 2. somewhat general, 3. somewhat 
detailed, and 4. very detailed." 
"Frequency of referral to written policy: 
1. always, 2. usually, 3. occasionally, 
4. never." 
In order to use the scores for the two questions consistently, 
the scoring on the second question was changed so that answer 
"1" was given a score of 4, answer "2" a score of 3, answer 
"3" a score of 2, and answer "4" a score of 1. By making 
this change, the scores for the two questions could be summed 
for each organization. The correlation between the two 
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scores was . 007. Differences in the scores for the organiza­
tions was obtained, with the theoretical range of 0 to 6. 
A high score indicates a high difference in formalization; 
a low score, low difference in formalization. The actual 
scores on the first question, specificity of written policies 
range from 0 to 2 with a mean of 0.868 and a standard devia­
tion of 0.686. The actual range of scores on the second 
question, frequency of referral to written policies is 0 to 3 
with a mean of 0.794 and a standard deviation of 0.761, 
ÏVhen the two questions are taken together, the actual range 
of scores is 0 to 4 with a mean of 1.647 and a standard 
deviation of 1.037. The two questions are not correlated 
significantly (.113) and it may be assumed they address 
different aspects of formalization. The scores from each 
question will be analyzed separately as independent variables. 
"S.H. 5: The greater the similarity of formali­
zation of the organizations, the more likely there 
will be resource exchange, joint programs and/or 
written agreements." 
"S.H. 12: The greater the difference of formali-
zation of the organizations, the more likely there 
will be disagreement and/or conflict in operating 
philosophy." 
Professionalism Precedent for the use of the level 
of education as an indicator of professionalism may be found 
in Levine et al. (1963), Molnar (1976) and Paulson (1976). 
Levine et al. (1963) found that lack of cooperation between 
two agencies in the health world was often a reflection of 
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different views of the world held by professionals and non­
professionals. They found instances of conflict between 
social work agencies whose personnel had graduate training 
in social work, and welfare departments whose staff workers 
were called social workers but many of whom had no training 
in social work. Paulson (1976) used the comparative level of 
education of administrators in his study of dyads, using ten 
categories, and found a positive relationship between compara­
tive education and perceived cooperation. 
In the present dissertation, the education level of 
the majority of paid professional workers was used as the 
indicator of professionalism. The possible responses fell 
into five categories ranging from "high school graduation" 
to "education beyond college." "High school graduation" 
was given a score of 1, and "education beyond college," a 
score of 5. The dyadic score was arrived at by taking the 
difference between the scores for each organization. The 
greatest possible difference between scores was 4, meaning 
that the dyad is characterized by a great difference in 
professionalism. The smallest difference between scores that 
could result is 0, meaning that the dyad is characterized 
by great similarity of professionalism. The actual scores 
range from 0 to 4 with a mean of 0.816 and a standard devia­
tion of 0.983. The following hypotheses will be tested by 
the use of data from this question: 
104 
"S.H. 6: The greater the similarity of profes-
sionaiism of the organizations, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange,- joint programs, 
and/or written agreements. 
"S.H. 13 : The greater the difference of profes-
sionalism of the organizations, the more likely 
there will be disagreement and/or conflict in 
operating philosophy. 
Goal difference Both Molnar (1976) and Paulson (1976) 
discuss the interdependencies that occur among agencies that 
offer similar services or serve similar client groups. Molnar 
(1976) found that generalized exchange processes as well 
as public service norms encourage interdependence among 
agencies sharing common service concerns. Paulson (1976) 
hypothesized that the greater the difference between two 
organizations' goals, the greater the perceived cooperation 
interaction. Since all the organizations in Paulson's set 
had a similar ultimate goal, Paulson (1976) developed a more 
specific classification in terms of the particular category 
of social unit immediately and directly served as the indica­
tor of goal. 
As in the Paulson study, the present dissertation also 
makes use of a more specific classification of goal, since 
all the organizations had as the ultimate goal the service 
to problem youth. Respondents were asked to select the 
major service provided by their organization from among 
the following; counseling, education, recreation, formal 
education, informal education, and other. These responses 
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were recoded into three groups: social services, education, 
and legal-correctional. If members of a dyad were found in 
different categories, the dyad was characterized as having 
"goal difference" and a score of 1 was given. "Goal similar­
ity" resulted when the goals were in the same category, and 
a score of 2 was assigned. The theoretical range of scores 
was 1 to 2. The actual scores range from 1 to 2 with a mean 
of 1.324 and a standard deviation of 0.470. The hypotheses 
which will be tested with data from this question were: 
"S.H. 7: The greater the similarity of goals of 
the organizations in the dyad, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange, joint programs, 
and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 14: The greater the similarity of goals of 
the organizations in the dvad, the more likely 
there will be disagreement and/or conflict in 
operating philosophy." 
Domain consensus Domain consensus has been discussed 
earlier as the third determinant of exchange identified by 
Levine and White (1961). Braito et al. (1972:184) developed 
a single question to measure domain consensus. They gave 
respondents a list of 33 organizations, which included their 
own, and asked respondents to check the name of each organiza­
tion that should be involved if a new program to reduce 
cigarette smoking would be instigated in the state. A domain 
consensus score was obtained by giving an organization one 
point every time it was selected, with the highest possible 
score being 32. The unit of analysis in the Braito et al. 
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study was the single organization, however, and no dyadic 
scores were developed, 
Molnar (1976) and Paulson (1976) have applied the concept 
of domain consensus to the study of dyads. Molnar (1976) 
found that the relational property of domain consensus was 
related positively to the relational property of interdepen­
dence. Paulson (1976) asked two types of questions related 
to domain in order to obtain an indicator of domain consensus 
within the dyad. The first question asked the administrator 
to report the extent to which he believed his organization 
should become involved in anti-cigarette smoking health 
activities; the second asked him to report the extent to 
which he believed each of the other 17 organizations should 
become so involved. There were three choices for each ques­
tion. In a dyad containing Organization A and Organization 
B there were two indicators of domain consensus, the similar­
ity of perceptions about A held by A and B and the similarity 
of perceptions about B held by A and B. If perceptions about 
A were identical, a score of 2 was recorded; if they were 
one level apart, a score of 1 was recorded, and if perceptions 
were opposite, a zero was recorded. The dyad was assigned 
the sum of both sets of perceptions. 
In the present dissertation, the following question was 
adapted from the Braito et al. (1972) study: 
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• "If a new interorganizational program designed 
to work with problem youth was to be started in 
County, do you think Organization B should be 
involved in it?" 
Since Braito et al. (1972) scored the question in terms of 
the single organization, scoring for the dyad was taken from 
Paulson (1976). In the present dissertation, the possible 
answers to the question were "yes" and "no." If the question 
was answered with a "yes," a score of 1 was given. If the 
answer was "no," a score of 0 was given. For the total dyad, 
the sum of the "1" responses was the score. If each organiza­
tion received a score of 1, the score was 2; if only one 
received a score of 1, the score is 1. If neither received 
a score of 1, the score is 0. The theoretical range of scores 
for this question is 0 to 2. The actual scores range from 
1 to 2 with a mean of 1.713 and a standard deviation of 0.454. 
The hypotheses which will be tested with data from this 
question were: 
"S.H. 8; The greater the domain consensus of 
the organizations in the dyad, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange, joint programs 
and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 15: The less the domain consensus of the 
organizations in the dyad, the more likely there 
will be disagreement and/or conflict in operating 
philosophy." 
Disparity of resources exchanged The concept of 
distributive justice was applied to the behavior of organiza­
tions in dyads by Molnar (1976). The concept of distributive 
justice states (Deutsch and Krauss, 1965:112): 
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A man in an exchange relation with another will 
expect the rewards of each man to be proportional 
to his costs--the greater the rewards, the greater 
the costs--and that the net rewards, or profits, of 
each man be proportional to his investments--the 
greater the investments, the greater the profit. 
Molnar (1976) found that organizations sharing a common task 
environment became interdependent in order to extend their 
existing allocations and to obtain resources otherwise un­
available to them. However, failure to participate or fulfill 
exchange relationships at one point in time precluded similar 
relationships in the future. 
In the present dissertation the following question was 
asked to determine perceived disparity: 
"How would you compare your organization with 
Organization B in providing such resources as 
meeting rooms, personnel, equipment, or funds 
to your organization as you both try to accomplish 
your objectives in relation to the juvenile 
offender?" 
The range of possible scores was 1 to 5, with "1" meaning 
the focal organization was low in the comparison, and "5" 
meaning it was high. The dyad score was achieved by taking 
the difference between the scores for each organization, 
with a high score meaning that a high disparity was present. 
The theoretical range of scores is 0 to 4. The actual scores 
range from 0 to 4 with a mean of 1.544 and a standard devia­
tion of 1.376. The data from the question are being used to 
test the hypothesis: 
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"S.H. 9; The more the organizations perceive 
a disparity between the amount of resources they 
provide and the resources they get in return, the 
more likely there will be disagreement and/or 
conflict in philosophy. 
Similarity of resource source In the discussion of 
conflict in the previous chapter, Earth (1961) found that 
intergroup relations agencies whose funds are derived from 
a central funding agency and whose support is under constant 
review by agents of such an organization find themselves 
in competition. Agency representatives feel that it is 
necessary for them to prove that they are doing the important 
job as compared with the job done by others. Because funds 
are limited, intergroup relations agencies compete for finan­
cial resources in their attempts to survive. Levine and T«Jhite 
(1961) also noted that under some conditions, mere survival 
may become a goal because agencies may not be bargaining 
or interacting on equal terms, with funding agencies applying 
sanctions or pressures by granting or withholding needed 
elements. 
In order to study the possibility of conflict based on 
difference in primary source of funds, the following question 
was asked: 
"What is the primary source of funds?" 
Five possibilities were offered, from federal to local. 
Scoring on this question was limited to whether the source 
of funds was the same or different. If the primary source 
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of funds is the same, the dyad score is 2. If the primary 
sources are different, regardless of the nature of the source, 
the score is one. The theoretical range of scores is 1 to 2. 
The actual scores range from 1 to 2 with a mean of 1.221 and 
a standard deviation of 0.416. The following hypothesis will 
be tested with data from this question: 
"S.H. 10: The more the organizations receive 
their resources from the same source, the more 
likely there will be disagreement and/or conflict 
in operating philosophy." 
Indicators of the independent variables associated with power 
The discussion of power in the last chapter showed the 
application of the five bases of power identified by French 
and Raven (1959) to dyadic relations of organizations (Halpert, 
1974). Halpert (1974) related measures of expert power, 
reward power, legal power, and referent power to cooperation 
and conflict in dyads. The questions below have been used 
to measure the types of total power that are found in the 
dyads studied in this dissertation. 
Expert power "How would you evaluate 
Organization B in competence and expertise in 
relation to the accomplishment of your objective 
with the juvenile offender?" 
This question has a theoretical range of scores from 1 to 
5 for each organization, with "1" representing low competence 
and expertise, and "5" representing high competence and 
expertise. The theoretical range for the dyad is 2 to 10. 
The actual scores ranged from 2 to 10 with a mean of 6.435 
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and a standard deviation of 1.525. Data from this question 
will be used to test the following hypotheses: 
"S.H. 1: Total expert power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, joint pro­
grams , and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 6: Total expert power is positively 
associated with disagreement and/or conflict 
in operating philosophy." 
Referent power "To what degree does your 
organization use Organization B as a model in 
terms of accomplishing your objective in 
relation to the juvenile offender?" 
This question has a theoretical range of scores from 1 to 5 
for each organization, with "1" representing little referent 
power and "5" representing much referent power. The theoret­
ical score for the dyad is 2 to 10. The actual scores range 
from 2 to 9 with a mean of 2,493 and a standard deviation 
of 1.300. Data from this question will be used to test the 
following hypotheses : 
"S.H. 2; Total referent power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, joint prb-
•grams and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 7: Total referent power is positively 
associated with disagreement and/or difference 
in operating philosophy." 
Legal power "To what degree does Organization 
B have a legal right to intervene as your 
organization attempts to accomplish your objec­
tive in relation to the juvenile offender?" 
This question has a theoretical range of scores from 1 to 5 
for each organization, with "1" representing low legal power 
and "5" representing high legal power. The theoretical 
range of scores for the dyad is 2 to 10. The actual range 
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of scoirss is 2 to 7 with, a itiGan of 2.706 and a standard 
deviation of 1.300. Data from this question will be used 
to test the following hypotheses: 
"S.H. 3: Total legal power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, joint 
programs and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 8: Total legal power is positively 
associated with disagreement and/or conflict 
in operating philosophy." 
Reward power "As far as you know, have 
there been any times when Organization B has 
been asked to evaluate your organization in 
terms of competence?" 
The possible responses to this question are "yes" and "no." 
The response "yes" is given a score of 1; the response "no" 
is given a score of 0. If both respond "yes," the total 
score is 2. The theoretical range of scores for the dyad 
is 0 to 2. The actual scores range from 0 to 2 with a mean 
of 0.184 and a standard deviation of 0,407. Data from this 
question will be used to test the following hypotheses: 
"S.H. 4; Total reward power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, joint 
programs and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 9; "Total reward power is positively 
associated with disagreement and or difference 
in operating philosophy." 
Community power "How do you evaluate the 
reputation in the community of Organization B 
in relation to the accomplishment of your 
objectives with the juvenile offender?" 
This question has a theoretical range of scores from 1 to 5 
for each organization, with "1" representing little community 
power and "5" representing much community power. The 
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theoretical range of scores for the dyad is 2 to 10, The 
actual range of scores is 2 to 10 with a mean of 6.331 and 
a standard deviation of 1.722. Data from this question will 
be used to test the following hypotheses: 
"S.H. 5: Total community power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, joint programs 
and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 10; Total community power is positively 
associated with disagreement and/or conflict in 
operating philosophy." 
Indicators of the independent variables associated with 
differences in power 
Difference in power has been discussed earlier in this 
dissertation based on the work of Newman (1973), Hall and 
Clark (1975), and Paulson (1976), The method of measuring 
differences in power follows Paulson (1976) who related 
comparative resource differences to cooperation and to 
perceived competition of dyads of organizations. Differences 
have been studied in legal power, expert power, and referent 
power by the use of the questions below. The possible scores 
for the responses of individual organizations range from 
1 to 5, with "1" representing relatively little power relative 
to the other organization and "5" relatively high power. 
The dyadic score was arrived at by taking the difference 
between the scores. The theoretical range of scores for the 
dyad is 0 to 4. The higher the dyadic score, the greater 
the power difference. Because the informants knew that 
informants in each of the other organizations would also be 
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asked about relative power, it was assumed that their 
responses would be realistic. 
Legal power Data from the following question will 
be used to measure the difference in legal power: 
"How would you compare your organization with 
Organization B on the legal right to intervene 
in your work with the juvenile offender?" 
The actual legal power difference score ranged from 0 to 4 
with a mean of 2.029 and a standard deviation of 1.068. Data 
from this question were used to test the following hypotheses: 
"S.H. 1 : The greater the difference of legal 
power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint 
programs and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 5: The greater the difference of legal 
power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be disagreement and/or conflict 
in operating philosophy." 
Referent power Data from the following question 
will be used to measure the difference in referent power 
"To what degree does your organization use Organiza­
tion B as a model in terms of accomplishing your 
objectives in relation to the juvenile offender?" 
The actual referent power difference score ranged from 0 to 
4 with a mean of 0.375 and a standard deviation of 0.981. 
Data from this question were used to test the following 
hypotheses : 
"S.H. 2: The greater the difference in referent 
power as a basis for power activity, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange,•joint programs and/or 
written agreements." 
"S.H. 6: The greater the difference in referent 
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Îower as a basis for power activity, the ess likely there will be disagreements and/or 
conflict.in philosophy. 
Expert power Data from the following question will 
used to measure the difference in expert power: 
"How would you compare your organization with 
Organization B in competence and expertise in 
relation to the accomplishment of your objectives 
with juvenile offender?" 
The actual expert power difference score ranged from 0 to 4 
with a mean of 1.640 and a standard deviation of 1.263. Data 
from this question were used to test the following hypotheses: 
"S.H. 3: The greater the difference in expert 
power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint 
programs and/or written agreements." 
"S.H. 7: The greater the difference in expert 
power as a basis for power activity, the less 
likely there will be disagreements and/or conflict 
in philosophy." 
Reward power Data from the following question will 
be used to measure the difference in reward power : 
"As far as you know, have there been any times when 
Organization B has been asked to evaluate your 
organization in terms of competence?" 
The actual reward power difference scores ranged from 0 to 1 
with a mean of .184 and a standard deviation of 0.389. Data 
from this question will be used to test the following hypothe­
ses ; 
"S.H. 9: The greater the difference in reward 
power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint 
programs and/or written agreements." 
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"S.H. 10: The greater the difference in reward 
power as a basis for power activity, the less likely 
there will be disagreement and/or conflict in 
philosophy." 
Community power Data from the following question 
will be used to measure the difference in community power: 
"How do you evaluate the reputation in the 
community of Organization B in relation to the 
accomplishment of your objectives with the 
juvenile offender? 
The actual community power difference score ranged from 0 to 
4 with a mean of 0.926 and a standard deviation of 0.849. 
Data from this question were used to test the following 
hypotheses : 
"S.H. 4: The greater the difference in community 
power as a basis for power activity, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange, joint programs and/or 
written agreements." 
"S.H. 8; The greater the difference in community 
power as a basis for power activity, the less 
likely there will be disagreements and/or conflict 
in philosophy." 
Summary 
This chapter has included three sections: sample and 
data collection procedures, the formation of dyads, and the 
variable measures and statistical procedures. The next 
chapter will cover the data analysis and findings. 
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 
Two general hypotheses have been developed for this study 
in Chapter 2. The hypotheses are: 
Exchange is associated with cooperation and conflict 
in dyadic relations of organizations 
Power is associated with cooperation and conflict 
in dyadic relations of organizations. 
Thirty-five sub-hypotheses derived from the general hypotheses 
will be presented and evaluated in terms of the empirical 
data in this chapter. A discussion will follow interpreting 
the overall pattern of relationships between exchange and 
power as explanatory theoretical frameworks for understanding 
cooperation and conflict in dyads. All the subhypotheses 
associated with the two general hypotheses are listed below: 
Exchange sub-hypotheses 
S.H. 1 : The greater the scarcity of resources, the 
greater the resource exchange, Joint programs and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 2 ; The more the availability of alternative sources, 
the less likely the organizations in the dyad will enter into 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or wtitten agree­
ments . 
S.H. 3: The greater the difference in the supply of 
resources available for exchange by members of the dyad, the 
more likely that the organizations in the dyad will enter into 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or written agree­
ments . 
S.H. 4: The greater the similarity of social status of 
personnel within the organizations, the more likely there 
will be resource exchange, joint programs' and/or written 
agreements. 
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S.H. 5 : The greater the similarity of formalization 
of the organization, the more likely there will be resource 
exchange, joint programs and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 6: The greater the similarity of professionalism 
of the organizations, the more likely there will be resource 
exchange, joint programs and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 7 : The greater the difference of goals of the 
organizations in the dyad, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or written agree­
ments . 
S.H. 8: The greater the domain consensus, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint programs 
and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 9: The more the organizations perceive a disparity 
between the amount of resources they provide and the resources 
they get in return, the more likely there will be disagree­
ments and/or conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 10: The more the organizations view their resources 
as coming from the same source, the more likely there will 
be disagreements and/or conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 11 : The greater the difference of social status of 
the personnel of the organizations, the more likely there 
will be disagreements and/or conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 12: The greater the difference of formalization 
of the organization, the more likely there will be disagree­
ments and/br conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 13: The greater the difference of professionalism 
of the organizations, the more likely there will be disagree­
ments and/or conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 14; The greater the similarity of goals of the 
organizations, the more likely there will be disagreement's 
and/br.conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 15: The less the domain consensus, the more likely 
there will be disagreements and/or conflict in philosophy. 
The reader may wish to refer to the discussion of theory 
in Chapter 2 for the rationale for structure of total power 
propositions. 
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Power sub-hypotheses 
Total power S.H. 1 : Total expert power is positively 
associated with resource exchange,•joint programs and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 2; Total referent power is positively associated 
with resource exchange, joint programs and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 3: Total legal power is positively associated with 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or written agfeer 
ments. 
S.H. 4: Total reward power is positively associated with 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or,written agree­
ments . 
S.H. 5: Total community power is positively associated 
with resource exchange, joint programs and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 6: Total expert power is positively associated with 
disagreement and/or conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H• 7 ; Total referent power is positively associated 
'disagreement and/or conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 8: Total legal power is positively associated with 
disagreement and/or conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 9: Total reward power is positively associated 
with disagreement and/or conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 10: Total community power is positively associated 
with disagreement and/or conflict in operating philosophy. 
Power difference S,H, 1: The greater the difference 
of legal power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, joint programs, and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 2; The greater the difference in referent power 
as a basis for power activity, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange, joint programs, and/or written agreements. 
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S.H. 3: The greater the difference in expert power 
as a basis for power activity, the more likely there will 
be resource exchange, joint programs, and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 4 : The greater the difference in community power 
as a basis for power activity, the more likely there will 
be resource exchange, joint programs, and/or written 
agreements. 
S.H. 5 : The greater the difference of legal power as 
a basis for power activity, the less likely there will be 
disagreement and/or difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 6 : The greater the difference in referent power 
as a basis for power activity, the less likely there will 
be disagreement and/or difference in operating philosophy, 
S.H. 7 : The greater the difference in expert power as 
a basis for power activity, the less likely there will be 
disagreement and/or difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 8 : The greater the difference in community power 
as a basis for power activity, the less likely there will 
be disagreement and/or difference in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 9 : The greater the difference in reward power as 
a basis for power activity, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange, joint programs, and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 10 ; The greater the difference in reward power as 
a basis for power activity, the less likely there will be 
disagreement or difference in operating philosophy. 
Bivariate Relationships to Test Sub-Hypotheses 
To evaluate the data used in conjunction with each 
sub-hypothesis, zero order coefficients of correlation are 
presented in Table 2. Because three different measures of 
scarcity are used, the table shows each measure separately 
and three sets of correlations are presented. Correlations 
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are presented for the relationship between all the variables, 
even when no specific sub-hypothesis was developed earlier. 
The same is true for the multiple measures of comparative 
formalization. A dash (--) indicates that no relationship 
was hypothesized. For those who are interested, the zero 
order correlations between all variables are presented in 
Appendix A. 
It may be seen in Table 1 that there is a significant 
correlation (.01) between five of the independent variables 
and one or more measures of both cooperation and conflict. 
The five independent variables are; scarcity of personnel, 
comparative formalization, total community power, difference 
in referent power, and difference in legal power. Cook 
(1977) has pointed out that one of the reasons for exchange 
is scarcity, and that to fulfill even limited functions, 
organizations must enter into exchanges with other organiza­
tions to get the elements they need. Schermerhorn (1975) has 
found that the need for scarce resources has been used as 
a reason for both cooperation and conflict. 
Comparative formalization has been linked to cooperation 
by Molnar (1976) and by Hall et al. (1977). Although the 
focus was on coordination and not cooperation per se. Hall 
et al. (1977) noted that reaching a formal agreement was in 
itself a step toward coordination. The literature does not 
discuss relationship between formalization and conflict, but 
Table 1. Zero order coefficients of correlation between dependent and independent 
variables^ 
Independent variables Dependent variables 
Resource Joint Written Conflict Conflict 
Exchange pror agree- disagree- in phil-
grams ment s merits osophy 
Exchange variables 
Scarcity of physical space 0. 105 0,086 0. 103 0. 081 -0. 025 
Scarcity of personnel 0, 022 0. 232** -0. 054 0. 243** -0. 062 
Scarcity of volunteers -0. 0146 -0. 082 0. 131 -0. 131 -0. 057 
Alternative sources of 
resources 0. 105 -0. 014 0. 035 -0. 101 -0. 023 
Difference in resources 0. 103 -0. 103 -0. 112 0. 109 0. 180-
Social status 0. 167* -0. 091 0. 068 0. 106 -0. 072 
Formalization-specificity 
of rules -0. 129 0. 019 -0. 075 -0. 044 0. 080 
Formalization-frequency of 
referral to rules -0. 002 0. 247** 0. 046 0. 332** -0. 049 
Professionalism 0. 091 -0. 012 -0. 044 0. 032 -0. 065 
Goal difference 
-0. 064 0. 004 0. 125 0. 073 -0. 201 
Domain concensus 0. 035 0. 077 0. 180* 0. 118 -0. 138 
Disparity of resources 
exchanged 
Similarity of resource 
source 
Power variables 
Total expert power 
Total referent power 
Total legal power 
Total reward power 
Total community power 
Difference in expert power 
Difference in referent 
power 
Difference in legal power 
Difference in reward power 
Difference in community 
power 
* significant at the .05 level 
** significant at the .01 level 
0. 105 0. 188* -0. 036 0. 038 0.019 
0. 054 0. 115 -0. 001 -0. 019 -0.167* 
0. 044 0. 152 0. 078 -0. 134 -0.329** 
0. 163 0. 181 0. 263** 0. 157 -0.143 
0. 154 -0. 064 0. 173* 0. 100 -0.122 
0. 221** 0. 168* 0. 256** -0. 002 -0.161 
0. 155 0. 280** 0. 235** -0. 078 -0.264** 
0. 127 0. 226** 0. 158 0. 054 -0.046 
0. 101 0. 085 0. 285** 0, 145 -0.253** 
0. 278** -0. 076 -0. 107 0. 017 0.230** 
0. 113 0. 078 0. 189* 0. 065 -0.083 
0. 150 0, .049 0. 120 0. ,114 -0.117 
^ith an n of 136 a correlation of .167 is required for significance at .05 
and correlation of .218 is required for significance at the .01 level CSnedecor 1956). 
123 
a significant correlation (.332) has resulted in this study. 
Legal power has been related to cooperation and to formaliza­
tion by Hall et al. (1977) who found the strongest prediction 
of coordination was the existence of a formal agreement, 
and that agreements mandated by law were also predictors 
of coordination. In this study frequency of referral to 
rules is significantly correlated (.247) with joint programs. 
Total community power means that both members of the dyad 
have power in the community. The correlations show that 
there is a positive relationship between total community 
power and cooperation and a negative relationship between 
total community power and conflict. 
Referent power, as used in this study, has 
been defined (Halpert, 1974) as the desire or actual modeling 
or imitation by Organization B of Organization A in areas 
such as philosophy, administration, training of personnel, 
hiring of similar types of competent personnel, types of 
programs, and effectiveness. The finding that difference 
in referent power is positively associated with cooperation 
and negatively associated with conflict was predicted. 
This was based on the inference that organizations that 
would be likely to choose each other as models would be more 
likely to cooperate than to have conflict. 
Among the five variables which are highly correlated 
with cooperation and conflict, two, scarcity of personnel 
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and comparative formalization, are included in the exchange 
framework, and the other three, total community power, 
difference in referent power and difference in legal 
power, are included in the power framework. 
For the following independent variables there is a 
significant correlation with one or more of the dependent 
variables associated with cooperation at the ,05 level: 
comparative social status, domain consensus, disparity of 
resources exchanged, total legal power, and difference 
in reward power. Conflict is significantly correlated 
(at the .05 level) difference in resources correlated in a 
negative direction with similarity of resource source. 
In summary with regard to the zero order correlations 
presented in Table 1, 24 are significant including the 
correlations for some relationships that were not hypothe­
sized. However most of these significant correlations are 
moderate. 
Of the 35 sub-hypotheses developed in Chapter 2, 12 for 
exchange and 4 for power were supported by one or more of 
the correlations in Table 1, It is somewhat surprising to 
note that some of the variables most frequently associated 
with the exchange framework correlate somewhat poorly with 
the dependent variables, namely domain consensus, scarcity 
of resources and alternative source of resources, 
Because the joint effects of the independent variables 
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may be greater than their independent effects which were 
only moderate, multiple regression is utilized. First 
simple multiple regression is used to evaluate the joint 
effects of the independent variables. Then step-wise 
multiple regression is used to analyze the joint effects 
of those variables that make significant contributions. 
Multiple Regression 
Multiple regression analysis is a method of analyzing 
the collective and separate contributions of two or more 
independent variables to explain the variation of a single 
dependent variable. The combined and incremental contribu­
tions of independent variables are major interests in this 
study. 
The multiple regression analyses presented here will 
test four sets of empirical hypotheses. The first set 
refers to the overall combined effect of all exchange 
variables on resource exchange, joint programs, written 
agreements, conflict disagreement, and difference in operating 
philosophy. The second set shows the combined effect of 
all variables measuring total power, and the third, the 
combined effect of all variables measuring difference in 
power on the dependent variables. Finally, all the indepen­
dent variables are utilized to determine the overall combined 
effect of all the variables taken together. For each 
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analysis the standardized partial regression coefficients, 
2 F-values, and R are presented. The standardized partial 
regression coefficients, or beta weights indicate the degree 
to which a unit change in the independent variable will 
produce a unit change in the dependent variable. The analysis 
of standardized partial regression coefficients or beta 
weights, are frequently used when there are two or more 
independent variables measured on different units; standard­
ized coefficients provide a way to compare the relative 
effect on the dependent variable of each independent variable. 
One F test is used as an overall test of the null 
hypothesis that the multiple correlation is zero in the 
population from which the sample was drawn. Expressed in 
another way, the F test indicates whether the assumed 
random sample of observations being analyzed has been drawn 
from a population in which the multiple correlation is equal 
to zero, and that any observed multiple correlation is due 
to sampling fluctuation or measurement error (Nie et al,, 1975:335). 
2 The R value indicates the proportion of variance in the 
independent variable explained by the joint effects of the 
independent variables. It is a measure of association we 
evaluate when our concern is with the strength of relationship 
rather than the direction of relationship. It ranges from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1,0. For example, the R and 
2 R value for all the variables shown in Table 2 is 0.305 
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and 0.093 respectively. The F-value associated with the beta 
weights are used to determine if they are significant. 
Table 2. Standardized partial regression coefficients, F-
values, r2 for exchange variables and resource 
exchange as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable : resource 
exchange as a form of cooperation 
b F-value* 
Scarcity of physical space 0, 054 0 .265 
Scarcity of personnel 0. ,026 0 .060 
Scarcity of volunteers -0. 018 0, 017 
Alternative sources of resources 0. ,101 0, 598 
Difference in resources 0. 101 0, 598 
Social status 0. 175 3, ,149 
Formalization: specificity -0. 103 1. 288 
Formalization: referral to rules -0. 042 0. ,178 
Professionalism 0. 161 1. 434 
Goal difference -0. 064 0. 453 
Domain consensus 0. 051 0. 314 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. 057 0. 358 
Similarity of resource source 
R = .305 
0. 018 0 .032 
R^ = 0.093 
F = .965 with 122 and 13 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3,92 or greater is needed for significance 
at the ,05 level, 
The multiple is ,093 with an F-value of ,965 which is 
not significant. This means that the overall does not explain 
a significant amount of variance. The beta weights and F-
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values on Table 3 indicate that none of the independent 
variables explains a unique and significant amount of 
variance. The one that approaches significance is comparative 
social status. 
Table 3. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, r2 for exchange variables and joint 
programs as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable: resource 
exchange as a form of cooperation 
b F-value* 
Scarcity of physical space 0. 083 0, ,669 
Scarcity of personnel 0. 172 2. 778 
Scarcity of volunteers 0. 105 0. 616 
Alternative sources of resources -0. 188 2. 238 
Difference in resources -0. 076 0. 643 
Social status -0. 037 0. 155 
Formalization: specificity 0. 042 0. 237 
Formalization referral to rules 0. 209 4. 829* 
Professionalism -0. 040 0. 094 
Goal difference -0. 007 0. 005 
Domain consensus 0. 051 0. 335 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. •235 (3. 585* 
Similarity of resource source 
R = .405 
0. 098 1. 019 
= .164 
F = 1.845 with 122 and 13 d.f. 
*F-value of 3.92 or greater needed for significance at 
.05 level. 
In Table 3 it may be seen from the beta weights that 
the relative effect of similarity of frequency of referral 
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to rules, and disparity of resources exchanged are greater 
than any of the others and the F-values indicate that the 
Table 4. Standardized partial regression coefficients, F-
values, R , for exchange variables and written 
agreements, as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable : resource 
exchange as a form of cooperation 
b F-value 
Scarcity of physical space 0, 140 1 .822 
Scarcity of personnel -0, ,055 0 .270 
Scarcity of volunteers 0. 191 1 .958 
Alternative sources of resources -0, ,056 0 .188 
Difference in resources -0. 150 2 .417 
Social status 0. ,124 0 .060 
Formalization: specificity -0. 050 0.315 
Formalization: referral to rules 0. 040 0 .165 
Professionalism 0. 005 0 .001 
Goal difference 0. 161 2 .943 
Domain consensus 0. 213 5, .577* 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. 397 0 .178 
Similarity of resource source 
R = .348 
-0. 092 0, 862 
R^ = 0.121 
F = 1.297 with 122 and 13 d.f. 
*F-value of 3.92 or greater needed for significance at 
.05. 
beta weights are significant. These results indicate that 
joint programs are most likely to occur between organizations 
that have similar degrees of formalization and where there 
is a disparity of resources exchanged. Although some of 
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Table 5. Standardized partial regression coefficients, F-
values, r2, for exchange variables and disagreement 
as a form of conflict 
Independent variable Dependent variable: disagreement 
as a form of conflict 
b F-value* 
Scarcity of physical space 0, .066 0 .469 
Scarcity of personnel 0, ,272 7, 767* 
Scarcity of volunteers -0, ,029 0, 054 
Alternative sources of resources -0. ,343 8, .279* 
Difference in resources 0. ,113 1, ,589 
Social status 0. ,280 9, 781* 
Formalization: specificity 0. 005 0. ,003 
Formalization: referral to rules 0. 245 7. 385* 
Professionalism -0. 126 1. 063 
Goal difference 0. 110 1. 620 
Domain concensus 0. 061 0. 543 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. 092 1. 108 
Similarity of resource source 
R = .498 
-0. 022 0. 057 
= .248 
F = 3.101 with 122 and 13 d.f. 
*F-value of 3.92 or greater needed for significance at 
.05. 
the beta weights appear to be nearly as large as the two 
significant ones, the lower F-values mean that the standard 
error associated with these is relatively large. 
In Table 4. one can see that only the beta weight for 
domain consensus is significant. This indicates that the 
effect of domain consensus is more important than the effect 
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of any other exchange variable on written agreements. The 
is 0.121 with an F-value of 1.297 which is not significant. 
This means that the overall model does not explain a signifi­
cant amount of variance. 
In Table 5. it may be seen from the beta weights that 
the relative effects of having alternative sources of 
resources, comparable social status, scarcity of personnel, 
and formalization in the frequency of referral to rules are 
greater and the F-values indicate that the beta weights are 
significant. These results indicate that disagreement is 
more likely to occur between organizations with a lack of 
alternative sources of resources, comparative social status, 
scarcity of personnel, and comparative formalization in 
2 terms of frequency of referral to rules. The R and R 
values associated with the joint effects of all the exchange 
variables on conflict are .498 and .248 respectively and 
the F value indicates that these are significant. 
From Table 6. it may be seen from the beta weights that 
the relative effects of difference in professionalism, 
goal difference, and difference in resources are greater 
than the effects of the other exchange variables on the 
dependent variable conflict in operating philosophy. In 
addition, the beta weight for domain consensus is almost 
equal to 3.92 which is required for significance at the .05 
level. Conflict in philosophy is more likely in dyads whose 
132 
Table 6. Standardized partial regression coefficients, F-
values, r2, for exchange variables and conflict in 
philosophy as a form of conflict 
Independent variable Dependent variable: conflict in 
philosophy as a form of conflict 
b F-value 
Scarcity of physical space 0 .050 0 .247 
Scarcity of personnel -0, ,161 2 .462 
Scarcity of volunteers -0, ,243 3 .342 
Alternative sources of resources 0, ,139 0 .012 
Difference in resources 0, ,198 4, , 423* 
Social status -0, 080 0, .727 
Formalization: specificity 0. ,075 0, 752 
Formalization: referral to rules 0. 002 0, 000 
Professionalism -0. 327 6, ,456* 
Goal difference -0. 185 4. ,127 
Domain consensus -0. 174 3. 914 
Disparity of resources exchanged -0. 008 0. 007 
Similarity of resource source -0. 095 0. 995 
R = .410 
R^ = .168 
F = 1.895 with 122 and 13 d.f. 
*F-value of 3.92 or greater needed for significance 
at .05. 
organizations differ in their professionalism, share common 
goals and have different amounts of resources. The R and R 
values associated with the joint effects of all the exchange 
variables on conflict on philosophy are .410 and .168 
respectively and are significant. 
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The following five tables discuss the overall combined 
effect of total power on cooperation and conflict as shown 
in the standardized partial regression coefficients, F-values, 
R and R^. The first three tables show the effect of total 
power on each indicator of cooperation: resource exchange, 
joint programs, and written agreements. The last two tables 
show the effect of total power on each indicator of confict: 
disagreement and difference in operating philosophy. The 
Table 7. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, r2 for total power variables and resource 
exchange as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable: resource 
exchange as a form of coop­
eration 
b F-value 
Total expert power -0. 052 0.245 
Total referent power 0. 141 2.772 
Total legal power 0. 099 1.248 
Total reward power 0. 180 4.276* 
Total community power 0. 148 2.006 
R = 0.313 
R^ = 0.098 
F = 2.828 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
^An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at .05 level. 
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section concludes with the support provided for the hypoth­
eses dealing with total power. 
From Table 7 it may be seen that the relative effect of 
total reward power is greater than the effect of other total 
power variables, and the F-value indicates that the beta 
weight is significant. This means that the more the total 
reward power, the more likely there will be resource exchange 
as a form of cooperation. This finding provides support 
for the hypothesis: "Total reward power is positively 
associated with resource exchange and/or joint programs as 
2 
a form of cooperation." The multiple R and R values associ­
ated with the joint effects of all the total power variables 
are .313 and .098 respectively. The F-value (F = 2.828 with 
2 130 and 5 d.f.) indicates that the R value is significant. 
Although some of the other beta weights appear to be nearly 
as large as the beta weight for total reward power, the 
lower F-values mean that the standard error associated with 
them is relatively large. 
From Table 8 it may be seen that the relative effect 
of total reward power and total community power are greater 
than the other total power variables and the F-values 
indicate that the beta weights are significant. This means 
that the more the total reward power and total community 
power in the dyad, the more likely there will be joint 
programs as forms of cooperation. These findings provide 
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Table 8. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, r2 for total power variables and joint 
programs as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable: joint programs 
as a form of cooperation 
b F-values* 
Total expert power -0, 054 0 .274 
Total referent power 0, ,127 2 .339 
Total legal power -0. 126 2 .099 
Total reward power 0. 186 4 . 748* 
Total community power 0. 286 7 .816* 
R = 0.366 
= 0.134 
F = 4.028 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at .05 level. 
support for the hypotheses: "Total reward power is positively 
associated with resource exchange and/or joint programs as a 
form of cooperation," and "Total community power is positively 
associated with resource exchange and/or joint programs as 
2 
a form of cooperation." The multiple R and R values 
associated with the joint effects of all the total power 
variables are .366 and .134 respectively and the F-value 
2 indicates that the R is significant. 
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Table 9. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, r2 for total power variables and written 
agreements as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable : written 
agreements as a form of 
cooperation 
b F-value* 
Total expert power -0, 084 0.695 
Total referent power 0. ,232 8.202* 
Total legal power 0, 108 1.635 
Total reward power 0. 204 6.025* 
Total community power 0. 236 5.604 
R = 0.425 
= 0.181 
F = 5.738 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at .05 level. 
From Table 9 it may be seen that the relative effect of 
total referent power, total reward power, and total community 
power are greater than the other total power variables and 
the F-values indicate that the beta weights are significant. 
This means that the more the total reward power, total 
referent power, and total community power in the dyad, 
the more likely there will be resource exchange as a form 
of cooperation. These findings provide support for the three 
hypotheses: "Total referent power is associated with 
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resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form of 
cooperation;" "Total reward power is associated with resource 
exchange and/or joint programs;" and "Total community power 
is associated with resource exchange and/or joint programs 
2 
as a form of cooperation." The multiple R and R values 
associated with the joint effects of all the total power 
variables are ,425 and .181 respectively and the F-value 
(5.738 with 130 and 5 d. f.) shows that the R^ is significant. 
As one looks at the three tables, Tables 7, 8, and 9, 
which show the effect of total power variables on the 
dependent variable cooperation, it may be seen that total 
reward power was significant consistently and total community 
power was significant in two of the three tables. Five sub-
hypotheses were developed regarding the relationship between 
total power variables and cooperation. In each hypothesis, 
the total power variable was considered to be important if 
any of three outcomes occurred: resource exchange, joint 
programs, or written agreements. This means that any of the 
total power variables that was found to be significant with 
one indicator of cooperation could be considered a predictor 
of cooperation. Since total reward power was found in all 
three tables, there is great support for the conclusion 
that when both members of the dyad have power there is likely 
to be cooperation. The fact that total community power 
appears in two of the tables and total referent power 
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appears in one table indicates that these variables may also 
be used to predict cooperation in dyads. In summary, the 
hypothesized associations between total power, total community 
power, and total referent power- are supported by the data. 
The next two tables show the effect of the total power 
variables on conflict. 
Table 10. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, R'2 for total power variables and conflict 
disagreements 
Independent variable Dependent variable: conflict 
disagreement 
b F-value* 
Total expert power -0, ,131 1.491 
Total referent power 0, 190 4.796* 
Total legal power 0, ,103 1.296 
Total reward power -0. 040 0.203 
Total community power -0. 321 0.091 
R = 0.245 
= 0.060 
F = 1.667 with 130 and 5 d. f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at .05 level. 
From Table 10 it may be seen that the relative effect 
of total referent power is greater than the effect of the 
other total power variables, and the F-value indicates that 
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the beta weight is significant. This means that the more the 
total referent power, the more likely there will be conflict 
in the dyad. This finding provides support for the hypothe­
sis: "Total referent power is positively associated with . 
conflict." It should be noted that total referent power 
was also hypothesized to be positively associated with 
cooperation. In other words, when organizations are using 
each other as models, they may be cooperating and having 
disagreement in the same relationship. For example, they 
may use each other as models for staff training but still 
disagree about specifics within the general area of staff 
training. 
2 The multiple R and R values associated with the joint 
effects of all the total power variables are .245 and .060 
respectively. The F-value (F = 1.667 with 130 and 5 d.f.) 
2 indicates that the R is not significant. This means 
that the combined effect of all the total power variables 
does not have a significant effect on conflict disagreement. 
From Table 11, it may be seen that the relative effect 
of total expert power is greater than the effect of the other 
total power variables, and the F-value indicates that the 
beta weight is significant. This means that the more there 
is total expert power in the dyad, the less likely there 
will be conflict in the form of difference in operating 
philosophy. This finding does not provide support for the 
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Table 11. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, R2 for total power variables and conflict 
in the form of difference in operating philosophy 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Conflict 
in operating philosophy 
b F-value^ 
Total expert power -0. 293 8.330* 
Total referent power -0. 084 1.072 
Total legal power -0. 130 2.312 
Total reward power -0. 118 1.967 
Total community power -0. 069 0.473 
R = 0.402 
= 0.162 
F = 5.019 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at .05 level. 
hypothesis: "Total expert power is positively associated 
with conflict." This means that when both members of the 
dyad perceive each other as having expert power, conflict 
is less likely in relation to operating philosophy. The 
multiple R and R values associated with the joint effects 
of all the total power variables are .402 and .162 respective­
ly. The F-value (5.019 with 130 and 5 d.f.) indicates that 
2 the R is significant. 
As one looks at Tables 10 and 11 which show the effect 
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of total power variables on the dependent variable conflict, 
it may be seen that only one total power variable, total 
referent power, is positively related to conflict, and one, 
total expert power is negatively related. In summary, 
ten sub-hypotheses were developed based on total power in the 
dyad. Of these four were supported by the data. These 
include total reward power, total community power, and total 
referent power, which were postively and significantly 
related to cooperation, and total referent power, which was 
positively and significantly related to conflict. 
Overall combined effect of the power difference variables 
on cooperation and conflict" 
The following five tables discuss the overall combined 
effect of difference in power in cooperation and conflict 
as shown in the standardized partial regression coefficients, 
2 F-values, R and R . The first three tables show the effect 
of difference in power on each indicator of cooperation: 
resource exchange, joint programs, and written agreements. 
The last two tables show the effect of difference in power 
on each indicator of conflict: disagreement and difference 
in operating philosophy. The section concludes with the 
support provided for the hypotheses dealing with difference 
in power. 
From Table 12 it may be seen that the relative effect 
of difference in legal power is greater than the effect of 
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Table 12. Standard partial regression coefficients, F-values, 
r2 for difference in power variables and resource 
exchange as a form of cooperation 
Independent variables Dependent variable: resource 
exchange as a form of coop­
eration 
b F-value* 
Difference in expert power 0, 110 1.820 
Difference in referent power 0, ,114 1.950 
Difference in legal power -0. 300 13.449* 
Difference in reward power 0. ,121 2.158 
Difference in community power 0. 125 2.300 
R = 0.376 
= 0.141 
F = 4.280 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at .05 level. 
the other power difference variables, and the F-value 
indicates that the beta weight is significant. However, 
since the beta weight is negative, this means: that: the 
greater the difference in legal power, the less likely there 
will be resource exchange as a form of cooperation. This 
does not support the hypothesis : "The greater the difference 
in legal power, the more likely there will be resource 
exchange and/or joint programs as a form of cooperation." 
2 The multiple R and R values associated with the joint effects 
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Table 13. Standard partial regression coefficients, F-values 
r2 for difference in power variables and joint 
programs as a form of cooperation 
Independent variables Dependent variable: joint pro­
grams as a form of cooperation 
b F-value* 
Difference in expert power 0, 222 6.813* 
Difference in referent power 0, 081 0.893 
Difference in legal power -0, ,089 1.095 
Difference in reward power 0. ,084 0.969 
Difference in community power 0. 166 0.037 
R = 0.267 
= 0.071 
F = 1.99 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for significance 
at the ,05 level. 
of all the power difference variables are .376 and .141 
respectively. The F-value (4.280 with 130 and 5 d.f.) 
2 indicates that the R values are significant. 
From Table 13 it may be seen that the relative effect 
of difference in expert power is greater than the relative 
effect of the other power difference variables, and the 
F-value indicates that the beta weight is significant. This 
means that when one member of the dyad perceives that the 
other has much more competence and expertise, there is likely 
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to be a joint program. This finding provides support for the 
hypothesis: "The greater the difference in expert power 
as a basis for power activity, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form of coopera-
2 tion." The multiple R and R values associated with the joint 
effects of all the power difference variables are .267 and 
.070 respectively. The F-value (1.99 with 130 and 5 d.f.) 
2 indicates that the R is not significant. This means that 
the combined effect of all the power difference variables does 
Table 14. Standard partial regression coefficients, F-values, 
r2 for difference in power variables and written 
agreements as a form of cooperation 
Independent vaeiables Dependent variable: written agree­
ments as a form of cooperation 
b F-value* 
Difference in expert power 0, ,141 3.041* 
Difference in referent power-. 0, ,283 12.246* 
Difference in legal power -0. 150 3.459 
Difference in reward power 0. 186 5.285* 
Difference in community power 0. ,071 0.774 
R = .403 
R^ = 0.163 
F = 5.056 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An:. value of 3.92 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at the .05 level 
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not have a significant effect on joint programs as a form 
of cooperation. 
From Tablé 14 it may be seen that the relative effects of 
difference in referent power and difference in reward power 
are greater than the relative effect of the other power 
difference variables, and the F-value indicates that the beta 
weights are significant. This means that the more one organi­
zation uses the other as a model and the more one perceives 
the other as providing rewards, the more likely they will 
cooperate. These findings support the hypotheses: "The greater 
the difference in referent power, the more likely there will 
be resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form of coop­
eration;" "The greater the difference in reward power, the 
more likely there will be resource exchange and/or joint 
programs as a form of cooperation." The multiple R and R 
values associated with the joint effects of all the power 
difference variables are .403 and .163 respectively. The 
F-value (5.056 with 130 and 5 d.f.) indicates that the R^ 
values are significant. 
In summary, as one looks at the three tables. Tables 
12, 13, and 14, which show the effect of power difference 
variables on the dependent variable cooperation, it may be 
seen that four of the five power difference variables are 
significantly related to one or more of the variables, e.g. 
resource exchange, joint programs, or written agreements. 
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Three of the four power difference variables support the 
hypotheses as stated. These are: difference in referent: 
power, difference in expert power, and difference in reward 
power. The fourth power difference, difference in legal power 
did not support the hypothesis. 
The next two tables show the effect of the power dif­
ference variables on conflict. 
Table 15. Standard partial regression coefficients, F-values, 
r2 for difference in power variables and conflict 
disagreements 
Independent variables Dependent variable: conflict 
disagreement 
b F-value'^ 
Difference in expert power 0, 040 0.217 
Difference in refer&nt power 0, 135 2.433 
Difference in legal power -0. 003 0.001 
Difference in reward power 0. 051 0.342 
Difference in community power 0. 095 1.199 
R = 0.190 
= 0.036 
F = 0.968 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
From Table 15 it may be seen that none of the power 
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Table 16. Standard partial regression coefficients, F-values, 
r2 for difference in power variables and conflict 
as indicated by difference in operating philowophy 
Independent variables Dependent variables : conflict 
in operating philosophy 
b F-value* 
Difference in expert power -0. ,026 0, ,099 
Difference in referent power . -0. 270 10, , 954* 
Difference in legal power 0. 266 10. , 645* 
Difference in reward power -0. 086 1. ,098 
Difference in community power 00. 091 1. 247 
R = 0.386 
R^ = 0.149 
F - 4.540 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for significance 
at the .05 level 
difference variables was significantly related to conflict 
disagreement, as shown by the F-values and beta weights. The 
multiple R and R values associated with the joint effects 
of all the power difference variables are .190 and .036 
respectively. The F-value (F = .968 with 130 and 5 d.f.) 
2 indicates that the R is not significant. 
From Table 16 it may be seen that the relative effects 
of difference in referent power and the difference in legal 
power are greater than the effects of the other power 
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difference variables, and the F-value indicates that the 
beta weight for each is significant. The result does not 
provide support for the hypothesis, "The greater the differ­
ence in legal power, the less likely there will be conflict 
in operating philosophy of the organizations in the dyad." 
This result means that when one of the members of the dyad 
has more legal power, there is more likely to be difference 
in operating philosophy, since the police would be unlikely 
to place youths in a group home to which they are philosophic­
ally opposed. Difference in referent power was found to be 
negatively associated with conflict in philosophy, which did 
provide support for the hypothesis: "The greater the dif­
ference in referent power, the less likely there will be 
2 
conflict in operating philosophy." The multiple R and R 
values associated with the joint effects of all the power 
difference variables are .386 and ,149 respectively. The 
F-value (F = 4.540 with 130 and 5 d.f.) indicates that the 
2 R value is significant. 
As one looks at the two tables. Tables 15 and 16, which 
show the effect of power difference variables on conflict, 
only one variable, difference in legal power was positively 
related to conflict. In the case of difference in legal 
power, the hypothesis that the greater the difference in 
legal power, the less likely there would be conflict was not 
supported. 
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In summary, hypotheses developed about power dif­
ferences in the dyad, which were supported include: "The 
greater the difference in referent power, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange and/or joint programs as a 
form of cooperation;" "The greater the difference in expert 
power, the more likely there will be resource exchange and/or 
joint programs as a form of cooperation;" "The greater the 
difference in reward power, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form of coopera­
tion. " 
Overall Combined Effect of all the 
Independent Variables on Cooperation and Conflict 
Because there appears to be some merit for each model 
(exchange and power) but because each is not sufficient alone, 
a multiple regression equation was conducted, using all the 
independent variables together. The following five tables 
discuss the overall combined effect of all the independent 
variables taken together on the dependent variables, coopera­
tion and conflict as shown in the standardized partial re-
2 gression coefficients, F-values, R and R . The first three 
tables show the effect of all the independent variables on 
each indicator of cooperation: resource exchange, joint 
programs, and written agreements. The last two tables 
show the effect of all the independent variables on each 
indicator of conflict: disagreement and difference in 
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operating philosophy. The section concludes with the support 
provided for the hypotheses dealing with any of the dependent 
variables. 
Table 17 includes all of the exchange and power varia­
bles. It may be seen that six of the independent variables 
are more powerful in their individual effects than the rela­
tive effect of the other variables. These include: scarcity 
of volunteers, difference in resources, and comparative social 
status, which are exchange variables, and total reward power, 
total community power, and difference in legal power, which 
are power variables. In earlier tables (Tables 7, 8, and 9) 
these three power variables were seen to provide support for 
the hypotheses linking power positively to cooperation. Among 
the three exchange variables, only one, difference in re­
sources was shc'vTn to be linked positively to written agree­
ments in an earlier table and to be significant in Table 17. 
The other two exchange variables do not support the hypotheses 
linking the independent variables to cooperation. For the 
exchange variable "social status," a high positive score 
indicates difference in social status; the hypothesis stated 
that similarity of social status would lead to cooperation 
and the results support this. The exchange variable "scarcity 
of volunteers" is shown in Table 17 to be related negatively 
to cooperation, however, the hypothesis stated that scarcity 
of volunteers would be positively related to cooperation. 
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Table 17. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, R2 for ail independent variables taken 
together and resource exchange as n form of 
cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable : 
b F-value^ 
Scarcity of physical space 
Scarcity of personnel 
Scarcity of volunteers 
Alternative sources of resources 
Difference in resources 
Social status 
Formalization: specificity 
Formalization: referral to rules 
Professionalism. 
Goal difference 
Domain consensus 
Disparity of resources exchanged 
Similarity of resource source 
Total expert power 
Total referent power • 
Total legal power 
Total reward power 
Total community power 
Difference in expert power 
Difference in referent power 
Difference in legal power 
Difference in reward power 
Difference in community power 
R = 0.567 
= 0.322 
F = 2.312 with 112 and 23 d.f. 
-0 .086 0 .676 
-0 .021 0 .038 
-0 .272 4 . 113* 
0 .144 1 .113 
0, .199 4, .334* 
0, 229 5, .808* 
-0, .135 2, .583 
-0, 143 2, 000 
0, 051 0, 154 
-0, 055 0, ,397 
-0, 040 0, ,198 
0. 059 0, ,396 
-0. 002 0, ,000 
-0. 025 0. 056 
0. 117 1. 357 
0. 023 0. 060 
0. 271 5. 801* 
0. 314 7. 715* 
0. 013 0. 022 
0. 059 0. 330 
-0. 294 10. 122* 
-0. 039 0. 139 
0. 062 0. 476 
*An F-value of 1.66 is needed for significance at the 
05 level. 
Therefore, based on the findings in Table 17, two power 
variables and two exchange variables provide support for the 
hypotheses linking the independent variables with resource 
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Table 18. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, R2 for ail the independent variables 
taken together and joint programs as a form of 
cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent a variable: 
b F-value* 
Scarcity of physical space 0. 105 0. 974 
Scarcity of personnel 0. 183 2. 866 
Scarcity of volunteers -0. 052 0. 150 
Alternative sources of resources -0. 227 2. 684 
Difference in resources 0. 006 0. 004 
Social status 0. 0258 0. 072 
Formalization: specificity 0. 0314 0. 136 
Formalization: referral to rules 0. 0691 0. 455 
Professionalism -0. 064 0. 243 
Goal difference 0. 0267 0. 091 
Domain consensus 0. 0142 0. 025 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. 318 11. 217* 
Similarity of resource source 0. 124 1. 678 
Total expert power -0. 060 0. 313 
Total refer:enf power -0. 119 1. 314 
Total legal power -0. 117 1. 509 
Total reward power 0. 271 5. 713* 
Total community power 0. 300 6. 931* 
Difference in expert power 0. 131 2. 102 
Difference in refer:ent. power. -0, 119 1. 314 
Difference in legal power -0. 006 0. 004 
Difference in reward power -0. 070 0. 437 
Difference in community power 0. 065 0. 508 
R = 0.554 
R^ = 0.307 
F = 2.157 with 112 and 23 d.f. 
*An F-value of 1.66 is needed for significance at the 
.05 level. 
2 
exchange. The R and R values associated with the joint 
effects of all the variables together are .567 and ,322 
respectively. The F-value (F = 2.312 with 112 and 23 d.f.) 
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2 indicates that the R value is significant. 
The next table, Table 18, shows all the independent 
variables taken together and joint programs as a form of 
cooperation. 
In Table 18 it may be seen that the relative effects of 
disparity of resources exchanged, total reward power, and 
total community power are greater than the other independent 
variables, and the F-values indicates that the beta weights 
are significant. The power variables: total reward power 
and total community power, as in Table 17, provide support 
for the hypotheses: "Total reward power is positively associ­
ated with resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form 
of cooperation," and "Total community power is positively 
associated with resource exchange and/or joint programs as 
a form of cooperation." The exchange variable, disparity of 
resources exchanged, while showing significance here, was 
not hypothesized to be positively related to cooperation. The 
2 
multiple R and R values associated with the joint effect of 
all the independent variables are .554 and .307 respectively. 
The F-value (F = 2.157 with 112 and 23 d.f.) shows that the 
2 R value is significant. 
The next table. Table 19, shows all the independent 
variables taken together and written agreements as a form 
of cooperation. 
In Table 19 it may be seen that the relative effect of 
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Table 19. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, r2 for ail the independent variables 
taken together and written agreements as a form of 
of cooperation 
Independent variable Dependent variable: 
b F-value* 
Scarcity of physical space 0.000 0 .000 
Scarcity of personnel -0.220 4 .352* 
Scarcity of volunteers 0.069 0 .268 
Alternative sources of resources 0.007 0 .003 
Difference in resources -0.153 2 .637 
Social status -0.044 0 .223 
Formalization: specificity -0.017 0, .044 
Formalization: referral to rules -0.091 0, 820 
Professionalism -0.056 0, .196 
Goal difference 0.129 2, 205 
Domain consensus 0.155 3, 051 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0.082 0, ,781 
Similarity of resource source -0.132 2, 006 
Total expert power -0.084 0, ,647 
Total referent power. 0.143 2, 088 
Total legal power 0.194 4. 291* 
Total community power 0.180 2. 616 
Difference in expert power 0.196 4. 922* 
Difference in referent power- 0.284 7. 826* 
Difference in legal power -0.078 0. 733 
Difference in reward power 0.026 0. 066 
Difference in community power 0.068 0. 581 
R = 0.582 
= 0.339 
F = 2.499 with 112 and 23 d.f. 
*An F-value of 1.66 is needed for significance at the 
.05 level. 
scarcity of personnel, total legal power, difference in expert 
power, and difference in reward power are greater than the 
relative effect of the other independent variables and the 
F-value indicate that the beta weights are significant. This 
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means that the more there is scarcity of personnel, the less 
likely there will be cooperation between the organizations 
in the dyad, which does not support the hypothesis: "The 
greater the scarcity of resources, the more likely there will 
be resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form of 
cooperation." Total legal power, shown to be significant in 
this table, provides support for the hypothesis "Total power 
is positively associated with cooperation." Difference in 
reward power and difference in expert power have been hypoth-
èsized to' be positively related to cooperation. The multi-
2 pie R and R values associated with the joint effect of all 
the independent variables are .582 and .339 respectively. 
The F-value (F = 2.499 with 112 and 23 d.f.) shows that the 
2 R value is significant. 
In summary, the three tables above (Tables 17, 18, and 
19) show the effect of all the variables on the three indica­
tors of cooperations: resource exchange, joint programs, and 
written agreements. A scarcity of volunteers, scarcity of 
personnel and disparity of resources exchanged were signifi­
cantly related to one or more measures of cooperation but in 
the opposite direction from that predicted. Difference in 
resources (paid personnel) and comparable social status were 
significantly related to one or more measures of cooperation. 
The power variables that support the hypotheses concerning 
cooperation are : total reward power, total community power, 
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Table 20a. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, for ail the independent variables 
taken together and conflict disagreement 
Independent variable Dependent variable: 
b F-value^^ 
Scarcity of physical space 0, ,031 0. 085 
Scarcity of personnel 0, ,299 7. 748* 
Scarcity of volunteers 0. 012 0. 008 
Alternative sources of resources -0. 472 11. 762* 
Difference in resources 0. 097 1. 021 
Social status 0. 247 6. 664* 
Formalization: specificity 0. 033 0. 159 
Formalization: referral to rules 0. 300 8. 653* 
Professionalism -0. 221 3. 902 
Goal Difference 0. 112 1. 321 
Domain consensus 0. 082 0. 826 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. 061 0. 412 
Similarity of resource source 0. 023 0. 056 
Total expert power -0. 123 1. 332 
Total referent power 0. 025 0. 061 
Total legal power 0. 130 1. 850 
Total reward power -0. 031 0. 075 
Total community power -0. 138 1. 477 
Difference in expert power 0. 045 0. 247 
Difference in refer.ent power -0. 060 0. 340 
Difference in legal power -0. 093 1. 008 
Difference in reward power 0. 038 0. 132 
Difference in community power 0. 053 0. 338 
R = 0.313 
R^ = 0.313 
F = 3.302 with 112 and 23 d.f. 
*An F-value of 1,66 is needed for significance at the 
.05 level. 
and total legal power. The difference in expert power, and 
difference in refer, ent power provide support for the hypoth­
eses , while difference in legal power was significant but 
in the opposite direction from that predicted. 
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Tables 20a, 20b, and 21 show the effect of all the 
independent variables on conflict, 
Table 20b. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, for all the independent variables 
taken together and conflict disagreement 
Independent variable Dependent variable : 
b F-value* 
Scarcity of physical space 0 .031 0, 085 
Scarcity of personnel 0 .299 7, , 748* 
Scarcity of volunteers 0 .012 0, ,008 
Alternative sources of resources -0 .472 11, , 762* 
Difference in resources 0 .097 1, ,021 
Social status 0, ,247 6 .  , 664* 
Formalization: specificity 0, ,033 0. 159 
Formalization: referral to rules 0, 300 8. , 653* 
Professionalism -0, ,221 2. ,902 
Goal difference 0, ,102 1. 321 
Domain consensus 0, ,082 0. ,826 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. 061 0. 412 
Similarity of resource source 0. 023 0. 056 
Total expert power -0. 123 1. 332 
Total referent power 0. 025 0. 061 
Total legal power 0. 130 1. 850 
Total reward power -0. 031 0. 075 
Total community power -0. 138 1. 477 
Difference in expert power 0. 045 0. 247 
Difference in referent power -0. 060 0. 340 
Difference in legal power 0. 038 0. 132 
Difference in community power 0. 053 0. 338 
R = 0.636 
R^ = 0.313 
F = 3.302 with 112 and 23 d.f. 
*An F-value of 1.66 is needed for significance at the 
.05 level. 
In Table 20 it may be seen that the relative effects of 
scarcity of personnel, lack of alternative sources of 
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resources, comparative social status, and formalization are 
greater in their relative effect on conflict than the other 
independent variables, and the F-values indicate that the 
beta weights are significant. In this dissertation, scarcity 
of personnel and lack of alternative sources of resources 
have been hypothesized to be related to cooperation, following 
Levine and White (1961) rather than to conflict. Difference 
in social status was hypothesized to be related to conflict, 
following Paulson (1976) and his hypothesis was supported 
by the data when all the independent variables were taken 
together. Formalization, meaning the difference in referral 
to rules, was significantly related to conflict and has sup­
ported the hypothesis in this dissertation; "The greater the 
difference in formalization, the more likely there will be 
disagreement within the dyad." A high score indicates dif­
ference in formalization. 
Among the four variables related significantly to con­
flict in this study, it is interesting to note that all are 
2 from the exchange framework. The multiple R and R values 
associated with the joint effects of all the independent 
variables are .636 and .313 respectively. The F-value 
(F = 3.302 with 112 and 23 d.f.) indicates that the R^ value 
is significant. 
The following table shows another aspect of conflict, 
namely, difference in operating philosophy. 
159 
Table 21. Standardized partial regression coefficients, 
F-values, r2 for ail the independent variables 
taken together and conflict in operating 
philosophy 
Independent variable Dependent variable : 
b F-value* 
Scarcity of physical space 0, 135 1 .890 
Scarcity of personnel -0, ,093 0 .857 
Scarcity of volunteers -0, ,048 0 .146 
Alternative sources of resources -0, ,099 0 .602 
Difference in resources 0, ,167 3 .490 
Social status -0, 091 1, .048 
Formalization: specificity 0, 144 3 .340 
Formalization: referral to rules 0. ,072 0, ,573 
Professionalism -0. ,255 4, .456* 
Goal Difference -0. 219 7, 056* 
Domain consensus -0. 139 2, 726 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0. 034 0, ,153 
Similarity of resource source -0. 033 0, ,141 
Total expert power -0. 367 13, 754* 
Total referent ppwer 0. 033 0. 126 
Total legal power -0. 123 1. 923 
Total reward power -0. 090 0. 737 
Total community power -0. 031 0. 085 
Difference in expert power -0. 012 0. 021 
Difference in referent power -0. 169 3. 080 
Difference in legal power 0. 247 8. 139* 
Difference in reward power 0. 062 0. 406 
Difference in community power -0. 143 2. 885 
R = .636 
= 0.404 
F = 3.302 with 112 and 23 d.f. 
*An F-value of 1.66 is needed for significance at the 
.05 level. 
In Table 21 it may be seen that the relative effects of 
professionalism, goal difference, total expert power, and 
difference in legal power are greater than the effects of 
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the other independent variables, and the F-values indicate 
that the beta weights are significant. In the present dis­
sertation, a high score for professionalism means a great 
difference in professionalism. The findings in Table 21 show 
a negative score between professionalism and conflict. This 
means that most conflict in philosophy occurs between profes­
sionals. This is not the direction that was hypothesized. 
A high score on goal means less difference. The result 
shown in Table 21 support the proposition that the less the 
difference on goals, the less the conflict. Two power 
variables are significantly related to conflict but in the 
opposite direction from that predicted. 
Summary Five tables have been presented which show 
the results of a multiple regression equation using all the 
independent variables together. The reason for doing this 
was that each model, exchange and power, had some merit when 
used alone, but was not sufficient to predict cooperation 
and conflict. When the two models were combined, more 
variance was explained than when either model was used alone. 
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Step-Wise Regression 
Step-wise regression is used when a researcher wishes to 
isolate a subset of available predictor variables that will 
yield an optimal prediction equation with as few terms as 
possible. In this study I am using stepwise regression in 
which forward inclusion is combined with deletion of variables 
that no longer meet the pre-established criterion at each 
successive step. The variable that explains the greatest 
amount of variance unexplained by the variables already in 
the equation enters the equation at each step. One or more 
of the independent variables may never by entered into the 
regression equation if the statistical criteria are not met. 
The step-wise regression analyses test four sets of 
empirical hypotheses. The first set refers to the exchange 
variables which explain the greatest amount of variance with 
respect to cooperation and conflict. The second set refers 
to total power variables; the third to power difference vari­
ables; and the fourth to all the variables together. 
The step-wise regression using exchange variables 
The following four tables discuss the independent variables 
based on the exchange framework which have been entered into 
the regression equation. Two of the tables show the step-wise 
regression analysis for cooperation indicators, and two, for 
conflict indicators. A fifth table, in which resource ex­
change is an indicator of cooperation would have been included 
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if the data had met the pre-established criteria for optimal 
prediction with as few terms as possible, however, none of the 
beta weights for the exchange variables were significant when 
resource exchange was used in a step-wise regression, not even 
the beta weight for the variable entered first in the equation. 
Table 22. Step-wise regression: exchange variables and joint 
programs as a form of cooperation 
Exchange variables b pV 
Formalization - referral to rules 0.258 9.804 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0.202 6.050 
R = 0.318 
= 0.101 
F = 7.527 with 133 and 2 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
From Table 22 it may be seen that with regard to joint 
programs, two variables, formalization, meaning the relative 
frequency with which there is referral to rules, and disparity 
of resources exchanged account for 10 per cent of the variance 
explained. This may be compared with 16 per cent of the 
variance explained when all the exchange variables are 
included in the equation. A high score in formalization and 
in disparity of resources exchanged means a high difference 
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in these items between the organizations in the dyad. Al­
though the results shown here are significant, they are not 
in the direction predicted. It was hypothesized that compar­
able formalization would be positively related to exchange but 
the result is the opposite. Disparity of resources exchanged 
was not hypothesized to be related to cooperation. The data 
suggest that exchanges are typically asymmetrical. The 
2 
multiple R and R values associated with the joint effects of 
the exchange variables are .318 and .101 respectively. The 
F-value (F = 7.527 with 133 and 2 d.f.) indicates that the 
2 R value is significant. 
Table 23. Step-wise regression: exchange variables and writ­
ten agreements as a form of cooperation 
Exchange variables b F* 
Domain consensus 0.180 4.487 
R = 0.180 
R^ = 0.032 
F = 4.487 with 134 and 1 d.f, 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is neede for significance 
at .05. 
In Table 23 it may be seen that domain consensus ac­
counted for three per cent of the variance explained. The 
total amount of variance explained when all the exchange 
variables are included in the equation is 12 per cent. The 
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variables are included in the equation is 12 per cent. The 
total amount of variance explained by all the exchange vari­
ables is not great but domain consensus does account for a 
fourth of the variance explained. This finding provides sup­
port for the hypothesis: "The greater the domain consensus, 
the more likely there will be resource exchange and/or joint 
2 programs as a form of cooperation." The multiple R and R 
values are .180 and .032 respectively. The F-value (F = 4.487 
2 
with 134 and 1 d.f.) indicates that the R value is signifi­
cant . 
In summarizing the two tables, Table 22 and 23, it may 
be seen that three exchange variables are significantly 
associated with cooperation, but only one, domain consensus, 
is in the direction hypothesized. The next two tables 
show the regression analysis for the exchange variables and 
conflict. 
In Table 24 it may be seen that four exchange variables 
explain 22 per cent of the variance in relation to conflict 
disagreement. This may be compared with 25 per cent when all 
of the exchange variables are included in the equation. The 
high scare for formalization provides support for the hypoth­
esis: "The greater the difference in formalization, the 
more likely there will be conflict within the dyad." The 
independent variable "scarcity of personnel" is significant, 
but was not hypothesized to be related to conflict. The high 
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score on social status, while significant as shown by the 
data, means that there would be less difference in social 
status, a situation that was not hypothesized as leading 
to conflict. The negative beta for availability of alterna­
tive sources of resources means that when there are alterna­
tive sources of resources, there is not likely to be conflict. 
No relationship between these two variables was hypothesized. 
In summary, only one of the variables found to be signifi­
cantly related to conflict, using step-wise regression, 
provided support for a sub-hypothesis. The multiple R and 
2 R values are ,468 and .219 respectively. The F-value (F = 
9.191 with 131 and 4 d.f.) indicates that the R^ value is 
Table 24. Step-wise regression: exchange variables and 
conflict disagreement 
Independent variable b pVf 
Formalization - referral to rules 0, 264 10 .311 
Scarcity of personnel 0, ,301 10 .989 
Social status 0. 277 10 .445 
Alternative sources of resources -0. ,341 9 .968 
R = 0.468 
R^ = .219 
F = 9.191 with 131 and 4 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.93 or greater is needed for signif­
icance ' at .05 level 
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significant. The next table discusses conflict of philosophy 
in relation to the exchange variables. 
Table 25. Step-wise regression: exchange variables and 
conflict in philosophy 
Independent variables b F* 
Goal difference 
Domain consensus 
Resource difference 
R = 0.318 
R^ = 0.101 
F = 4.959 with 132 and 3 d.f. 
-0.219 6.775 
-0.190 5.135 
0.171 4.256 
*An F-value of 3.93 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05. 
In Table 25 it may be seen that goal difference, domain 
consensus, and resource difference explain 10 per cent of 
the variance. When all the exchange variables are taken 
together, they explain 16 per cent of the variance. This 
means that when the seven additional variables are added, 
they account for only an additional six per cent of the 
variance. The first of the significant variables, goal 
difference, shows a high negative association with conflict 
in philosophy. As coded, a high score on goal difference 
means little difference. This means that when there is a 
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lack of goal difference, there is more likely to be conflict. 
This provides support for the hypothesis: "The greater the 
similarity of goals, the more likely there will be conflict 
within the dyad." The findings that domain consensus was 
negatively related to conflict, and that resource difference 
is positvely related to conflict mean .'that when there is 
domain consensus, conflict is not likely, and that when there 
is resource difference, which in this case means difference 
in number of paid staff persons, there will be conflict. 
However, neither of these situations was hypothesized; instead, 
domain consensus and resource difference were linked to co-
2 
operation. The multiple R and R values associated with con­
flict in philosophy are .318 and .101 respectively. The 
F-value (F = 4.959 with 132 and 3 d.f.) means that the 
value is significant. 
In summary, the step-wise regression analysis of the 
exchange variables with conflict shows that two hypotheses 
were supported. The first concerns difference in formaliza­
tion as a source of conflict, and the second, similarity of 
goals as a source of conflict. The summary of the exchange 
variables with cooperation showed that only one, domain 
consensus, was associated with cooperation in the direction 
hypothesized. The next section will show the step-wise 
regression using the total power variables. 
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Step-Wise Regression and Total Power Variables 
The following four tables show the step-wise regression 
for the total power variables and cooperation and conflict. 
The first three show the relationship between total power and 
cooperation; the last one, between total power and conflict. 
Table 26. Step-wise regression: Total power and resource 
exchange as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable b F* 
Total reward power .221 6.911 
R = 0.221 
R^ = 0.049 
F = 6.911 with 134 and 1 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.93 or greater is needed for signifi­
cance at .05 level. 
In Table 26 one can see that reward power alone explains 
four per cent of the variance, or almost half of the 
variance explained. When all the total power variables are 
taken together, they explain only nine per cent of the var­
iance. The data provide support for the hypothesis: "Total 
reward power is positively associated with resource exchange 
and/or joint programs as a form of cooperation." This means 
that there is likely to be cooperation when both members of 
the dyad have the power to reward each other to a high degree. 
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2 The R and R values associated with resource exchange are 
.221 and .049 respectively. The F-value (F = 6.911 with 134 
2 
and 1 d.f.) indicates that the R value is significant. 
Table 27. Step-wise regression: Total power and joint 
programs as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable b F* 
Total community power 0.280 11.323 
R = 0.280 
R^ = 0.078 
F = 11.372 
*An F-value of 3.93 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
In Table 27 one can see that total community power alone 
explains eight per cent of the variance. This may be compared 
with the variance of 13 per cent explained when all the total 
power variables are taken together. Data from this table 
support the hypothesis: "Total community power is positively 
associated with resource exchange and/or joint programs as 
p 
a form of cooperation." The multiple R and R values are .280 
and .078 respectively. The F-value (F = 11.372 with 134 and 
2 1 d.f.) indicates that the R value is significant. 
In Table 28 one may see that two of the total power vari­
ables which were associated with the other indicators of 
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Table 28. Step-wise regression: total power and written 
agreements as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable b F* 
Total referent power 0,220 7.408 
Total reward power 0.237 8,829 
Total community power 0.189 5.510 
R = 0.403 
= 0.163 
F = 8.580 with 132 and 3 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.93 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level, 
cooperation, namely total reward power with resource exchange, 
and total community power with joint programs, are also 
found to be significant in this table. A third total power 
variable, total referent power, is also found"to be.signifi­
cant here, and provides support for the hypothesis: "Total 
referent power.is positively associated with resource ex­
change and/or joint programs as a form of cooperation." The 
three total power variables account for 16 per cent of the 
variance explained. This may be compared with 18 per cent, 
or an additional two per cent when the other total power 
2 
variables are added to the equation. The multiple R and R 
values are .403 and .163 respectively. The F-value (F = 8.580 
with 132 and 3 d.f.) indicates that the R^ is significant 
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Table 29. Stepwise regression: total power and conflict in 
philosophy 
Independent variable 
Total expert power 
Total legal power 
R = 0.370 
= 0.136 
F = 10.539 with 133 and 2 d.f. 
b F* 
-0.352 18.767 
-0.169 4.338 
*An F-value of 3.93 or greater is required for signifi­
cance at .05. 
It may be seen in Table 29 that total expert power and 
total legal power are negatively associated with conflict 
in philosophy. These two variables account for 13 per cent 
of the variance explained. By adding the other two total 
power variables, only an additional three per cent of variance 
is explained. While the two variables were found to be 
significant, they are in the opposite direction from the 
hypothesized relationship. The data show that when both 
members of the dyad have little expert power and little total 
legal power, they are not likely to have conflict in philoso­
phy. 
In summary, the three tables. Tables 26, 27, and 28, 
show that three total power variables: total reward power, 
total community power, and total referent power provide 
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support for the hypothesized relationship between total 
power and cooperation. The next table shows the step-wise 
regression for total power and conflict in philosophy. No 
table is shown for total power and disagreement because none 
of the beta weights was significant when total power was used 
in a step-wise regression with total power, not even the beta 
weight for the variable entered first in the equation. The 
next section will discuss the step-wise regression for dif­
ference in power and cooperation and conflict, 
Step-Wise Regression and Power Difference 
The following five tables show the step-wise regression 
for the power difference variables and cooperation and con­
flict. The first three discuss the relationship between 
power difference and cooperation; the last two, between 
power difference and conflict. 
The data in Table 30 show that difference in legal 
power accounts for about 8 per cent of the variance explained 
for resource exchange. The other power difference variables 
when taken together account for only an additional seven per 
cent of the variance. Although the difference in power is 
significant, the relationship is negative. That means that 
cooperation among organizations that are of equal legal power 
is more likely than between those of unequal legal power. 
Therefore, the data do not support the hypothesis: "The 
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Table 30. Step-wise regression: difference in power and 
resource exchange as a form of cooperation 
Independent variables b F* 
Difference in legal power -0.278 11.686 
R = 0.278 
= 0.077 
F = 11.237 with 134 and 1 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.93 or greater is required for signifi­
cance at the .05 level. 
greater the difference in legal power, the more likely there 
will be resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form 
2 
of cooperation." The multiple R and R values associated 
with resource exchange are .278 and .077 respectively. The 
F-value (F = 11.237 with 134 and 1 d.f.) indicates that the 
2 R value is significant. 
The data in Table 31 show that difference in expert 
power accounts for five per cent of the variance explained 
for joint programs. The finding may be compared with seven 
per cent explained when all the power difference variables 
are included in the equation. Although the amount of variance 
explained is small, the effect of power difference in ex­
pertise is significant. It means that one of the organiza­
tions is likely to look to the other for expert help. The 
data support the hypothesis: "The greater the difference 
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Table 31. Step-wise regression: difference in power and 
joint programs as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable b F* 
Difference in expert power 0.228 7.224 
R = 0.226 
= 0.051 
F = 7.224 with 134 and 1 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.93 is required for significance at 
.05 level. 
in expert power as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange and/or joint programs 
p 
as a form of cooperation." The multiple R and R values 
are .226 and .051 respectively. The F-value (F = 134 and 1 
2 d.f.) indicates that the R is significant. 
The data in Table 32 show that difference in referent 
power and difference in reward power are positively associated 
with written agreements. These two variables explain 11 
per cent of the variance. This may be compared to a total 
of 13 per cent variance explained when all of the power 
difference variables are entered into the equation. The data 
provide support for the hypothesis: "The greater the dif­
ference in referent power, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form of coopera­
tion." The multiple R and R^ are .337 and .113 respectively. 
175 
Table 32. Step-wise regression: difference in power and 
written agreements as a form of cooperation 
Independent variable b F* 
Difference in referent power 0.279 11.677 
Difference in reward power 0.181 4.885 
R = 0.337 
= 0.113 
F = 8.527 with 133 and 2 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.39 is required for significance at .05 
level. 
The F-value (F = 8,527 with 133 and 2 d.f.) indicates that the 
2 R value is significant. 
In summary, the three tables, Tables 30, 31, and 32, 
show that difference in power is significantly related to 
cooperation, when it includes legal power, expert power, 
referent pawër^ or reward power. The next table shows the 
step-wise regression of power difference and conflict in 
philosophy. No step-wise regression data is shown for power 
difference and disagreement as a form of conflict because 
none of the beta weights were significant. 
In Table 33 it may be seen that difference in refer ent 
power is negatively related to conflict in philosophy. This 
means that when there is a difference in the degree to which 
one member uses the other as a model, there is less likely 
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Table 33. Step-wise regression: difference in power and 
conflict in philosophy 
Independent variable b F* 
Difference in referent power 
Difference in legal power 
R = 0.261 
= 0.130 
F = 9.975 with 133 and 2 d.f. 
-0.280 11.826 
0.259 10.162 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
to be conflict in philosophy. The data are significant and 
support the hypothesis: "The greater the difference in refer­
ent power, the less likely there will be conflict within the 
dyad." For the other independent variable, difference in 
legal power, the data do not support the hypothesis: "The 
greater the difference in legal power as a basis for legal 
power, the less likely there will be conflict within the 
dyad." The multiple R and R^ values are .361 and .130 
respectively. The F-value (F = 9.975 with 133 and 2 d.f.) 
2 indicates that the R values are significant. The next 
section discusses the step-wise regression for all the 
independent variables. 
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Table 34. Step-wise regression: resource exchange as a form 
of cooperation and all independent variables 
Independent variables b F* 
Difference in legal power -0. 323 17, .764 
Total reward power 0. 258 10, 490 
Social status 0. 300 12, ,907 
Total community power 0. 257 10. 427 
Resource difference 0. 224 8. 206 
Scarcity of volunteers -0. 210 6. 045 
R = 0.551 
R^ = 0.262 
F = 7.624 with 129 and 6 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3,92 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
Step-wise regression for all the independent variables and 
cooperation and conflict 
Because there appears to be some merit for each model 
(exchange and power), but because each is not sufficient 
alone, a step-wise regression was conducted, using all the 
independent variables together. The following five tables 
show the results of the step-wise regression. 
In Table 34 it may be seen that the following variables 
are significantly related to resource exchange: difference 
in legal power, total reward power, social status, total 
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community power, resource difference, and scarcity of volun­
teers. In the earlier analysis of the step-wise regression, 
social status approached significance, but was not significant 
when all the exchange variables were taken together. It is 
interesting to note that it is significant when all the in­
dependent variables are considered. Total reward power was 
the single total power variable that emerged in the results 
shown in Table 26 in relation to resource exchange. Dif­
ference in legal power shows a similar negative relationship 
here as in the step-wise regression presented in Table 30. 
By taking a step-wise regression of all the independent vari­
ables in relation to resource exchange, support was found 
for two additional hypotheses: "The greater the similarity 
of social status of personnel within the organizations, the 
more likely there will be resource exchange and/or joint 
programs as a form of cooperation/" and "The greater the 
resource difference the more likely the organizations will 
enter into resource exchange and/or joint programs as a form 
2 
of cooperation." The R and R values are .551 and ,262 
respectively. The F-value (F = 7.624 with 129 and 6 d.f.) 
2 indicates that the R is significant. 
In Table 35 it may be seen that when all the independent 
variables are placed in a step-wise regression analysis, 
four variables emerged as significant. These are total 
community power, disparity of resources exchanged. 
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Table 35. Step-wise regression: joint programs as a form of 
of cooperation and all independent variables 
Independent variables b F* 
Total Community power 0, ,294 12.918 
Disparity of resources exchanged 0, ,285 12.785 
Formalization: referral to rules 0. ,187 5.612 
Difference in expert power 0. 164 4.328 
R = 0.468 
R^ = 0.219 
F = 9.203 with 131 and 4 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
formalization - referral to rules, and difference in expert 
power. Each of these has been related to cooperation in 
earlier regression analyses in a similar direction as in this 
table. No additional support was found by this step-wise 
regression; however, it provided confirmation of earlier 
findings. The multiple R and values are .468 and .219 
respectively. The F-value (F = 9.203 with 131 and 4 d.f.) 
2 indicate that the R value is significant. 
In Table 36 it may be seen that four variables: dif­
ference in referent power, total reward power, total com­
munity power, and scarcity of personnel account for 20 per 
cent of the variance explained. When all the independent 
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Table 36. Step-wise regression: written agreements as a form 
of cooperation and all independent variables 
Independent variables b F* 
Difference in referent power 0, ,297 13, ,386 
Total reward power 0, ,261 11, 199 
Total community power 0. 193 5, 948 
Scarcity of personnel -0. 164 4. 145 
R = 0.454 
R^ = 0.206 
F = 8.459 with 131 and 4 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
variables are included in the equation, they account for 34 
per cent of the variance, or an additional 14 per cent. 
Each of these variables has been shown in an earlier table, so 
that the step-wise regression has not provided support for 
additional hypotheses. However, it confirms the importance 
of the variables as significant in relation to cooperation. 
2 The multiple R and R are .454 and .206 respectively. The 
F-value (F = 8.489 with 131 and 4 d.f.) shows that the R^ 
value is significant. 
In summary, one can see from Tables 34, 35, and 36 
that the step-wise regression indicates that three exchange 
variables, namely: formalization - referral to rules, social 
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Table 37. Step-wise regression: conflict disagreement and 
all independent variables 
Independent variables b F* 
Formalization, referral to rules 0.261 10 .473 
Scarcity of personnel 0.325 13 .168 
Social status 0.266 9 .974 
Alternative sources of resources -0.328 12 .901 
Total expert power -0.186 5 .728 
R = 0.502 
= 0.252 
F = 8.764 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 or greater is needed for significance 
at .05 level. 
status, and resource difference, are positively associated 
with cooperation, and two exchange variables, scarcity of 
volunteers and scarcity of personnel are negatively related 
to cooperation. It may also be seen that total community 
power, total reward power, difference in expert power, 
difference in legal power, and difference in referent power 
are the power variables that have a significant effect on 
cooperation. Tables 37 and 30 show the effect of the step­
wise regression using all the independent variables, on 
conflict. 
It may be seen in Table 37 that formalization - referral 
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to rules, scarcity of personnel, difference in social status, 
the absence of alternative sources of resources, and the 
absence of total expert power are significantly related to 
conflict disagreement. These five variables taken together 
account for 25 per cent of the variance. When all the vari­
ables are taken together, they add an additional six per cent, 
for a total of 31 per cent of the variance explained. The 
2 
multiple R and R values are .502 and .252 respectively. 
The F-value (F = 10.274 with 130 and 5 d.f.) indicates that 
2 the R value is significant. 
It may be seen in Table 38 that total expert power, goal 
difference, difference in referent power, and total reward 
power are all negatively significant in relation to conflict 
in philosophy, and one difference in legal power, is posi­
tively related to conflict in philosophy. The combined 
effect of all of the variables explains 28 per cent of the 
2 
variance. The R and R values are .532 and .283 respectively. 
The F-value (F = 10.274 with 130 and 5 d.f.) indicates that 
2 the R is significant. 
In summarizing the step-wise regression for all the 
independent variables associated with conflict, it may be 
seen that both exchange variables and power variables appear 
in the equations. The exchange variables: formalization-
referral to rules, scarcity of personnel, and difference 
in social status are positively related to conflict. The 
183 
Table 38. Step-wise regression: conflict in philosophy 
and all independent variables 
Independent variables b F* 
Total expert power -0, .334 18, ,791 
Difference in legal power 0, ,263 12, 297 
Goal difference -0, ,208 7, 439 
Difference in referent power -0. 176 5. 135 
Total reward power -0. 164 4. 869 
R = 0.532 
= .283 
F = 10.274 with 130 and 5 d.f. 
*An F-value of 3.92 is needed for significance at the 
.05 level, 
exchange variables : goal differences and availability of 
alternative sources of resources are negatively related to 
conflict. The power variables, including total expert power, 
difference in referent power, and total reward power are 
negatively related to conflict. Difference in legal power 
is positively related to conflict. 
In summary, in the five tables above which deal with 
the step-wise regression of all the variables in relation to 
cooperation and conflict, it becomes clear that both frame­
works are somewhat useful for the study of cooperation and 
conflict but that the two frameworks, taken together, are 
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more useful than when either is used alone. 
Summary 
This chapter has included a summary of the sub-hypotheses 
derived from the exchange and power frameworks, the evalua­
tion of the data by the use of zero order coefficients of 
correlation to test bivariate relationships, multiple regres­
sion analyses, and step-wise multiple regression analyses. 
The most important evidence pervading all the tables is that 
there is a need to find ways to combine the two frameworks 
in order to explain cooperation and conflict in interorganiza-
tional dyads. This will be discussed in the next chapter, 
which will also discuss the conclusions drawn from the anal­
ysis of data and the implications for the study of interorgan-
izational relations of dyad. 
185 
CHAPTER 5. SUÎIMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the first 
four chapters and to discuss the theoretical, methodological, 
and practical implications of the study. 
Summary 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Interorganizational relations has become an important 
aspect of the delivery of human services because the increas­
ing complexity of contemporary society makes it necessary for 
organizations to develop ties with other organizations in 
order to achieve mutual goals. While some attention has been 
directed to interorganizational networks, relatively little 
attention has been given to the dyad as a unit of analysis. 
As Paulson (1976) noted, the forces which bring an organiza­
tion to interact are not the same as those which determine 
with whom the organization will interact. Paulson, as well 
as Halpert (1974) who helped to introduce the study of dyads 
into organizational literature, took into consideration 
both perceptual and structural dimensions of interorganiza­
tional relations. 
The processes of cooperation and conflict are key 
processes for understanding dyadic relations of organizations. 
Historically, cooperation has been viewed as a desirable 
outcome by social planners who have been trying to provide 
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for the health and welfare of citizens through work of com­
munity organizations. From their perspective, conflict was 
seen as dysfunctional for the system. More recently conflict 
has been viewed as a process that can function to maintain 
society by leading to positive changes in the pattern of 
social organization. The literature has shown that the proc­
esses of cooperation in interorganizational relations may 
occur in three ways; (1) they may occur at the same time in 
relation to different goals, (2) they may occur at different 
times in relation to the same goals, and (3) they may coexist 
in ongoing relations. 
This study asked the question: is there a theoretical 
framework which will help explain the cooperative and conflic­
tuel relations between organizations? Cooperation was de­
fined as an interaction process under which the actors seek 
to achieve a similar issue-outcome. Conflict was defined 
as an interaction process under which the actors seek to 
achieve different issue-outcomes. Four research objectives 
were identified: 
(1) to review and integrate the literature regarding 
cooperation and conflict and the relationship between the 
processes, the theories of exchange and power, and the 
theoretical support for the measurement of the concepts; 
(2) to focus on dyadic relations of organizations, a 
unit of analysis to which relatively little attention has 
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been paid; 
(3) to provide at least a limited evaluation of the 
relative utility of exchange and power theories, and 
(4) to discuss to a limited extent the application for 
practitioners. 
Chapter 2 - Theoretical orientation and development of 
propositions 
Two conceptual frameworks have been used as explanatory 
theories in the study of cooperation and conflict in dyads; 
exchange and power. The use of the exchange framework for 
the study of interorganizational relations began with the 
landmark study of Levine and White (1961) in which they 
explored patterns of relationship among twenty-two health 
and social welfare organizations in one community. Levine 
and White (1961) viewed the health and social welfare organi­
zations studied as an exchange system, with the interdepen­
dence of the parts determined by: (1) the accessibility of 
each organization to necessary elements from sources outside 
the health system; (2) the objectives of the organization and 
particular functions to which it allocates the elements it 
controls, and (3) the degree to which domain consensus exists 
among the various organizations. These three determinants 
have been investigated in studies by other scholars of organ­
izational interaction who showed the continued importance of 
exchange for understanding interorganizational relations. 
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Based on the review of the literature and the analysis of 
results, a general hypothesis was developed for this study, 
with 15 sub-hypotheses, as follows: 
General hypothesis: Exchange is associated with coopera­
tion and conflict in dyadic relations of organizations. 
S.H. 1: The greater the scarcity of resources, 
the greater the resource exchange, ) 
joint programs and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 2: The more the availability of alternative 
sources of resources, the less likely the 
organizations in the dyad will enter into 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or 
written-»agreements. 
S.H. 3: The greater the difference in the supply 
of resources available for exchange by mem­
bers of the dyad, the more likely that the 
organizations, in the dyad will enter into 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 4: The greater the similarity of social 
status of personnel within the organiza­
tions, the more likely there will be 
resource exchange, joint programs and/or 
written agreements. 
S.H. 5: The greater the similarity of formalization 
of the organizations, the more likely there 
will be resource exchange, joint programs 
and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 6: The greater the similarity of professional­
ism of the organizations, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange, joint 
programs and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 7: The greater the difference of goals of the 
organizations in the dyad, the more likely 
there will be resource exchange,, joint • 
programs and/or written agreements. 
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S.H. 8: The greater the domain consensus, the 
more likely there will be resource exchange, 
joint programs and/or written agree-.; . 
ments. 
S.H. 9: The more the organizations perceive a dis­
parity between the amount of resources they 
provide and the resources they get in return, 
the more likely there will be conflict within 
the dyad. 
S.H. 10: The more the organizations view their 
resources as coming from the same source, 
the more likely there will be disagreements 
and/or conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 11: The greater the difference of social status 
of the personnel of the organizations, the 
more likely there will be disagreements 
and/or conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 12: The greater the difference of formalization 
of the organizations, the more likely there 
will be disagreements and/or conflict in 
philosophy. 
S.H. 13: The greater the difference of professional­
ism of the organizations the more likely 
there will be disagreement and/or conflict 
in philosophy. 
S.H. 14: The greater the similarity of goals of the 
organizations, the more likely there will 
be disagreements and/or conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 15: The less the domain consensus, the more 
likely there will be disagreements and/or 
conflict in philosophy. 
The process of power, which is generally considered by 
sociologists to exist in every social relationship, has been 
applied to organizational dyadic relations in two ways. 
Halpert (1974) has analyzed the process of power by focusing 
on the activity involved in a power relationship. He defined 
power activity as an asymmetrical activity in which one 
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organization perceives that its line or lines of action 
toward an objective is (are) being restricted. For an organi­
zation to be able to restrict another organization, the 
former must haye resources upon which to draw. The resources 
which are the bases of power include reward power, legal 
power, expert power, referent power, and community power. 
One way to look at power in dyads is to look at the impact 
of total power. With high total power, ooth members of the 
dyad have power. It is thought that high total power makes 
the frequency of both cooperation and conflict relatively 
high. 
Another way to look at power in dyads is to analyze the 
differences in power between members of the organizational 
dyads. Paulson (1976) and others considered possession of 
resources as a source of power, and they suggest that power 
differences are positively associated with perceived coopera­
tion and negatively associated with conflict. 
A general hypothesis was developed for this study with 
20 sub-hypotheses. Based on the literature sub-hypotheses 
were developed that linked both cooperation and conflict to 
total power. 
General hypothesis: Power is associated with cooperation -
and conflict in dyadic relations of organizations. 
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Total power sub-hypotheses 
S.H. 1: Total expert power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, 
joint programs and written agree­
ments . 
S.H. 2: Total referent power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, 
joint programs and written agreements. 
S.H. 3: Total legal power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, 
joint programs and written agreements. 
S.H. 4: Total reward power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, 
joint programs and written agreements. 
S.H. 5: Total community power is positively 
associated with resource exchange, 
joint programs and written agreements. 
S.H. 6: Total expert power is positively 
associated with disagreements and/or 
conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 7: Total referent power is positively 
associated with disagreements and/or 
conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 8:. Total legal power is positively 
associated with disagreements and/or 
conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 9: Total reward power is positively 
associated with disagreements and/or 
conflict in philosophy. 
S.H. 10: Total community power is positively 
associated with disagreements and/or 
conflict in philosophy. 
Difference in power sub-hypotheses 
S.H. 1: The greater the difference of legal power 
as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, 
joint programs and written agreements. 
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S.H. 2: The greater the difference in referent 
power as a basis for power activity, the 
more likely there will be resource exchange, 
joint programs and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 3: The greater the difference in expert power 
as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be resource exchange, 
joint programs and/or written agreements. 
S.H. 4: The greater the difference in community 
power as a basis for power activity, the 
more likely there will be resource exchange, 
joint programs and/or written agreements. .• 
S.H. 5: The greater the difference of legal power 
as a basis for power activity, the less 
likely there will be disagreements ' and'/or 
conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 6: The greater the difference in referent 
power as a basis for power activity, the 
less likely there will be disagreements 
and/or conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 7: The greater the difference in expert power 
as a basis for power activity, the less 
likely there will be disagreements and/or 
conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 8: The greater the difference in community 
power as a basis for power activity, the 
less likely there will be disagreements • 
and/or conflict in operating philosophy. 
S.H. 9: The greater the difference in reward power 
as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be disagreements and/or 
conflict in operating philosophy. . 
S.H. 10: The greater the difference in reward power 
as a basis for power activity, the more 
likely there will be disagreements and/or 
conflict in operating philosophy. 
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Propositions were presented in this chapter from the 
two conceptional frameworks, exchange and power, as a theoret­
ical orientation for this dissertation as I attempt to under­
stand interorganizational relations of dyada. 
Chapter 3 - Methods 
A network of organizations sharing a common concern for 
problem youth comprise the focus of this study. The seven­
teen organizations in the study included those which have 
been legitimized by society to deal with children who have 
or may have problems which may lead to delinquent behavior. 
These organizations include the following public owned 
agencies: the educational system, the social welfare system, 
and the legal-correctional system; also included in the sot 
is the cluster of agencies operated under religious or other 
private auspices that supplements the public owned institu­
tions . 
All of the organizations were located in a single 
midwestern county. Personal interviews were conducted with 
two persons in each agency, the administrator and the 
"boundary person," who was identified as the person who came 
into most frequent contact with the other organizations. The 
responses of the administrator were used in this analysis 
except in the few cases in which the administrator was not 
familiar with the subject under discussion. This method 
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followed Halpert (1974) who interviewed the administrator 
and selected others in the organization in order to get 
responses to all the questions. 
Interorganizational dyads were derived by arranging the 
organizations in all possible combinations of seventeen 
organizations. Two major dependent variables were used: 
cooperation and conflict. Cooperation was measured by any 
or all of three outcomes: resource exchange, joint programs, 
and written agreements. Conflict was measured by two out­
comes: disagreements and difference in operating philosophy. 
The independent variables taken from the exchange frame­
work included: scarcity of resources, availability of alterna­
tive sources of resources, difference in resource (paid 
personnel), social status, professionalism, comparable 
formalization, goal difference, domain consensus, disparity 
of resources exchanged, and similarity of resources source. 
Scarcity of three other resources was also considered, namely, 
scarcity of personnel, scarcity of physical space, and 
scarcity of volunteers. Formalization included two dimensions: 
specificity of rules and regulations and frequency of referral 
to rules and regulations. 
The independent variables taken from the power frame­
work included: expert power, referent power, legal power 
reward power, and community power. Power differences and 
total power were analyzed. 
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After each sub-hypothesis was presented, questions used 
to elicit responses from persons interviewed were presented. 
The theoretical and actual range for each variable were given, 
as well as the mean and standard deviation. 
Chapter 4 
Analysis of the data was presented in this chapter. The 
methods of analysis included zero order coefficients of cor-
realtion, multiple regression, and step-wise regression. The 
data were presented in tables, with discussion of the signif­
icant findings- in terms of their support or non-support for 
the hypotheses. 
The findings in the zero order coefficients of correlation 
showed a significant correlation (.01) between five of the 
independent variables and one or more measures of both co­
operation and conflict. The five are: scarcity of personnel, 
comparative formalization, total community power, difference., 
in referent power, and difference in legal power, Among the 
five variables, two, namely scarcity of personnel and com­
parative formalization, are included in the exchange frame­
work, and the others, including total community power, 
difference in referent power, and difference in legal power, 
are included in the power framework. 
For the following independent variables there was a 
significant correlation with one or more of the dependent 
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variables associated with cooperation and conflict at the 
.05 level: comparative social status, domain consensus, 
disparity of resources exchanged, total legal power, and 
difference in reward power. Of these, the first three are 
associated with the exchange framework, and the last two, 
with power. Many of the other correlations were in the pre­
dicted direction, but were not significant. 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test four sets 
of empirical hypotheses. The first set referred to the over­
all combined effect of all exchange variables on cooperation 
and conflict. The second set showed the combined effect of 
all variables measuring total power, and the third, the com­
bined effect of all variables measuring difference in power. 
Finally, all the independent variables were utilized to deter­
mine the overall combined effect of all the variables taken 
togehter. For each analysis, the standardized partial 
2 
regression coefficients, F-values, and R was given. 
Step-wise regression was used in order to isolate those 
variables that would yield an optimal prediction equation 
with as few terms as possible. Forward inclusion was combined 
with deletion of variables that no longer met the pre-
established criterion at each successive step. The variable 
that explained the greatest amount of variance unexplained 
by the variables already in the equation was entered into the 
equation at each step. 
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The step-wise regression analyses tested four sets of 
empirical hypotheses. The first set referred to the exchange 
variables which explained the greatest amount of variance 
with respect to cooperation and conflict. The second set 
referred to total power variables; the third to power dif­
ference variables; and the fourth, to all the variables 
together. The variables that contribute significantly in 
the step-wise regression are presnted in Table 39. The 
results of the step-wise regression are presented here in 
order to offer a parsimonious summary of the major findings. 
Implications 
The findings of this study may have theoretical, 
methodological, and applied implications for the field of 
interorganizational relations. For the theoretician, the 
consideration of the two theories has revealed that a more 
general approach that may include elements of exchange and 
power may be useful. For the methodologist, the findings 
may provide additional support for the use of the dyad as a 
unit of analysis, and for the practitioner, there may be 
implications for factors to consider when interacting with 
other organizations concerned with meeting the needs of 
problem youth. 
Table 39. Summary of the independent variables which showed significant effects on 
the dependent variables, showing beta weights and values 
Independent variable Resource Joint Written Conflict Conflict in 
Exchange Programs Agreements Disagreements Philosophy 
I. Exchange variables 
Formalization -
referral to rules .258 .264 
Disparity of re- 202 
sources exchanged r^=~To 
Domain consensus 180 _ 
R^=.03 
Scarcity of Personnel .301 
Social status .277 
Alternative Sources -.341 
of Resources R^=~2^ 
Goal difference -.219 
.171 Resource difference 
II. Total Power variables 
991 
Total reward power —^. .237 
R =.05 
R =. 10 
Total community 
power 
.280 
R^=.08 
Total referent power 
Total expert power 
Total legal power 
III. Power difference variable 
Difference in legal -.278 
P°"er r2=.08 
Difference in expert .226 
power ?rÔ5 
Difference in refer eiRt. 
power 
Difference in reward 
power 
IV. All the variables together 
Difference in legal 
power -.323 
Total reward power .258 
Social status .300 
,189 
.220  
R^=.16 
-.352 
-.169 
R^=.14 
259 M VO VO 
.279 
• 181 
R^=.ll 
-.270 
R^=.13 
261 
.263 
-.164 
.266 
Table 39. (continued) 
Independent variable Resource Joint Written Conflict Conflict in 
Exchange Programs Agreements Disagreements. . Philosophy 
Total community power .257 .294 .193 
Resource difference .224 
Scarcity of volun­
teers -.210 
Disparity of resources ^ 2^ 26 285 
exchanged 
Formalization -
referral to rules .187 .261 
Difference in expert .164 
power R^=~~^ 
Difference in refer­
ent power .297 -.176 
Scarcity of personnel .325 
R =. 21 
Alternative sources 
of resources -.328 
2.86 Total expert power —tt -.334 
B/=.25 
Goal difference .208 
R =.28 
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Theoretical implications 
This study used two conceptual frameworks as explanatory 
theories in the study of cooperation and conflict in organiza­
tional dyads: exchange and power. Three types of cooperation 
were considered, including: (1) resource exchange, which 
involves the smallest amount of commitment; (2) joint programs, 
involving more commitment, and (3) written agreements, which 
are likely to require a firm commitment. Two types of conflict 
measures were used: disagreement and conflict in philosophy. 
The exchange framework has been in use for organizational 
research since 1961, beginning with the study by Levine and 
White, who identified three determinants of exchange. These 
determinants have been used to some extent in empirical re­
search by other scholars who made the determinants more ex­
plicit. Some efforts have been made in recent years to 
identify variables which could be used to test the exchange 
framework. The variables which were developed in the present 
study and which were found to be significantly related 
to cooperation when no power variables were considered 
include: comparative formalization, disparity of resources 
exchanged, and domain consensus (see Table 39). Comparative 
formalization and domain consensus were also associated with 
conflict, as were scarcity of personnel, lack of alterna­
tive sources of resources, similarity of goals, and dif­
ference in resources. It may be concluded that the exchange 
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framework is useful in the study of cooperation and conflict 
in dyads. 
Power theory has been more recently considered a frame­
work for the study of interorganizational relations than is 
the case with exchange theory. For this reason, only a 
small body exists from which to draw independent variables 
for use in the study of cooperation and conflict. Five types 
of power were utilized for this study; expert power, refer­
ent power, legal power, community power, and reward power. 
Variables were constructed to show total power and difference 
in power for the dyads. Total power means the amount of power 
held by the dyad as a whole. For example, a mental health 
center and a school might each have great expert power. The 
two together would be considered a dyad with high total power. 
On the other hand, a mental health center might have high 
expert power and the social services department might have 
little expert power. The result would show a smaller total 
amount of power for the dyad. Difference in power would 
simply show that one organization had more of the power 
variable than the other. 
When the power variables were analyzed in terms of 
significant effects on the dependent variables, cooperation 
and conflict, the following total power variables were 
significantly related to cooperation: total reward power, 
total community power, and total referent power. Differences 
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in reward power and difference in referent power were 
significantly related to cooperation. Additionally, dif­
ference in legal power was negatively related to cooperation 
and positively to conflict. Difference in referent power 
was positively related to cooperation and negatively related 
to conflict. From this, it may be concluded that the power 
framework is useful in considering cooperation and conflict 
in dyads. 
The amount of variance explained for the exchange 
variables considered separately from power ranged from three 
to ten per cent for cooperation, and from 10 to 22 per cent 
for conflict. The amount of variance explained by the power 
variables ranged from 5 per cent to 13 per cent for coopera­
tion, and was 13 per cent for conflict. However, when all 
the variables were included in the equation, combining 
exchange and power variables, the amount of variance explained 
ranged from 21 to 26 per cent, and the amount of variance 
for conflict, from 25 to 28 per cent. It may be seen from 
the findings that more variance is explained when the two 
frameworks are used together than when each is used alone. 
Therefore, it may be useful to combine the two frameworks. 
The suggestion for combining the two frameworks has been made 
by Aldrich (1976) who proposed that a power dependency 
theory be developed as an alternative to exchange. Aldrich 
found that in situations where an external agent controls 
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resources for which no substitute readily exists, and where 
abstinence is not a viable alternative, persons unable to 
do without the resources move into a position of dependency 
on the supplier of those resources. 
Cook (1977) has focused upon power as it affects ex­
change. She has outlined the following steps in a linkage 
between exchange and power: (1) the limitations on the 
availability of resources creates resource dependency; 
(2) in order to reduce uncertainty, organizations attempt 
to create an environment in which they will be able to get 
an adequate and certain flow of resources; (3) this neces­
sitates the formation of exchange relationships; (4) the 
more resources an organization controls, the more likely that 
the other organization in the exchange relationship will be 
dependent; and (5) the more power an organization has, the 
more influence it has to determine the form of the inter­
action and the ratio of exchange. 
Cook (1977) considers power a part of the exchange 
process; she recommends that power consideration should be 
included in the extension and development of exchange theory. 
Schmidt and Kochan (1977) suggest that there needs to be 
an integrated view of exchange and power dependency, with 
propositions developed from both. They noted that in the 
exchange approach, relations form when members of two or 
more organizations perceive benefits or gains from 
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interacting. In the power dependency approach the motivation 
to interact is asymmetrical. One party is motivated to 
interact but the other is not. The interorganizational 
relationship only forms when the motivated party is powerful 
enough to force or induce the other to interact. Schmidt and 
Kochan (1977) argue that no organization is likely to engage 
in only symmetrical exchange relationships with other organi­
zations or only power dependency relationships. Rather, an 
organization is likely to have a mixture of each type 
within its organization set. 
It may be seen that the idea of combining exchange and 
power into a single framework is a relatively recent idea, 
with very few empirical studies actually having been under­
taken to test the usefulness of such a combination. The 
present dissertation provides empirical evidence that the use 
of the two frameworks together accounts for a greater amount 
of explained variance than either of the frameworks used 
alone, and therefore this study may make a contribution to 
theory concerning exchange and power in interorganizational 
relations. 
Another theoretical implication is the fact that both 
cooperation and conflict should be considered in order fully 
to understand the relationship between organizations. Still 
another theoretical implication is that it is useful to 
specify the kind of cooperation being studied because this 
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has shown that the correlates of resource exchange are 
different from those of joint programs and written agreements. 
Methodological implications 
The use of the dyad as the unit of analysis in studying 
interorganizational relations appears to be a useful approach 
to the development of generalizations about these relation­
ships. Dyadic studies of organizations have been used to a 
limited extent, beginning in the early 1970's. Previous to 
that time, studies had been made of single organizations and 
of networks of organizations. A number of scholars have 
argued that organizational theory cannot be fully developed 
unless one takes into consideration not only the organization 
per se, but also the linkage of the organization to other 
organizations. Dyadic analysis, in the few studies that 
exist, has been considered the most elemental systemic unit 
because it focuses on organizational relationships taking 
two organizations at a time. It has been considered a linking 
step and a basic requirement for the building of a general 
theory of interorganizational relationships. By focusing 
on the dyad, the present study adds to the small body of 
literature that is concerned with the dyad as a unit of 
analysis. 
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Practical implications 
The major practical implication that emerges from this 
study is the awareness of potential sources of cooperation 
and conflict. For the practitioner who must interact with 
other organizations, there may be some usefulness in the 
recognition that there are factors which the practitioner 
may not have been aware of, which affect the relations 
between organization. The importance of such a factor as 
the similarity of frequency of referral to rules or compara­
tive formalization, may explain the reason for one organiza­
tion's success in working with another organization, or the 
dissimilarity, the reason they are having difficulty. Organi­
zations may find that some of the factors identified in this 
study as significantly related to cooperation and/or conflict 
may have been overlooked or not recognized as important in 
their own practice. For example, in some of the relations 
between organizations dealing with problem youth, the persons 
interviewed appeared to have an over-reliance on factors of 
human relations, without considering that there may be 
structural factors that help or impede relations. For ex­
ample, in this study it was shown that scarcity of personnel 
is not associated with cooperation, but with conflict. One 
can imagine an organization being concerned about a lack of 
cooperation which they consider being due to a personality 
conflict really being due to the fact that there is not 
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enough personnel in the other organization to permit divert­
ing personnel into a joint program. This is an interesting 
finding in view of the exchange framework's identification of 
scarcity of personnel as a reason for exchange. 
The importance of power in the relationship may also 
have implications for the youth serving organizations. Where 
an organization lacks physical resources, it may be possible 
to build up expertise in serving clients which would bring 
other agencies to recognize it as expert and may increase 
cooperation. For example, a small organization which special­
izes in services to families dealing with problems of alco­
holism may find that a large organization, such as a school, 
would be likely to turn to them for help with problems. While 
these may seem obvious decisions, the fact that they are 
demonstrated in an empirical study may lend support to their 
use. On the other hand, the fact that a particular associa­
tion has been indentified as significant in this dissertation 
must be used with caution, since the study has limitations 
which must be considered. 
Limitations of the study 
In attempting to examine the questions of cooperation 
and conflict in agencies serving youth, it may be argued 
that a direct approach using a questionnaire, is not likely 
to elicit the true information. Agencies may be reluctant 
to express negative feelings to an interviewer, particularly 
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in a relatively small community where respondents do not 
wish to run the risk that their expressed attitudes might 
be shared. Although this is recognized as a limitation, 
my feeling based on the interviews, which extended over a 
period of up to two hours, was that the respondents were 
willing to express negative feelings about other agencies 
with which they had contact. It also may be argued that a 
verbal response concerning behavior is not as good an 
indicator as behavior that is observed. 
Along with this, a more important limitation is that 
this study was done at a single moment in time, and the 
findings might have been different if results were gathered 
at intervals over a long period of time. Perhaps a number 
of return visits to the same respondent would eliminate the 
possible bias incurred by the perception of the situation at 
one time, such as that the administrator was new on the job. 
Perhaps cooperation and conflict are parts of an ongoing 
relationship with shifts in power taking place between organi­
zations. It may be that at one time the police seem to have 
more power than the schools, in dealing with delinquent 
children, and at other times, jurisdiction over the handling 
of children who have been in trouble with the law are 
routinely taken from the jurisdiction of the police and 
placed with the guidance counsellor, depending upon the 
attitude of the judge who is in charge of the juvenile 
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magistrate court at a particular time. 
Another limitation is that the questions may not have 
tapped the dimension that it was identified with, since 
indicators had to be adapted from the literature about other 
units of analysis rather than the dyad. And finally the 
interpretation of results in terms of statistical significance 
may be questioned when the universe examined was not a 
sample of the organizations concerned with problem youth 
in the community, but rather all the organizations so 
involved. 
Recommendations for further research 
Each of the limitations mentioned in the previous 
section may be the stimulus for further research, in order 
to achieve a more definitive understanding of the relations 
between dyads of organizations working with problem youth. 
However, a number of issues have been brought out by the 
data, which may be a basis for further research. Some 
areas for future research include: 
(1) A comparison of relations of dyads which are closely 
related by function, such as schools interacting with each 
other versus schools in interaction with other agencies. 
Is there more conflict between those who are in the same 
relatively narrow area? What are the types of conflict? 
How are the conflicts solved? What is the role of the 
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boundary person in these groups versus in groups whose 
functions are quite different, such as schools and the depart­
ments of social service? 
(2) A study of units which have high total power versus 
those with little total power. For example, the City Council 
and the Juvenile Magistrate Court both have a great amount of 
power. How does that affect their relationship? In contrast, 
the alcoholism agency and the community action organization 
each has little power. How is their interaction different 
from that between high powered organizations? Which exchange 
variables and which power difference variables enter into the 
interaction of groups with high total power? 
(3) The comparison of conflict and cooperation in rela­
tion to frequency of interaction. Does frequency result 
in the elimination of barriers or does it intensify conflict? 
(4) What is the ongoing process of conflict 
solving in dyads? Who initiates the interaction - the one 
with greater need? the one with greater power? What is 
the role of the boundary person in dyadic relationst 
(5) Further study of the situations under which organiza­
tions may have a mixture of symmetrical, or exchange relation­
ships, and assymmetrical, or power dependency relationships. 
(6) Studies of potential power as it affects organiza­
tions, and the strategies organizations may use to reduce 
potential power dependency. 
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Summary 
This dissertation has attempted to provide an empirical 
basis for understanding the interaction of organizations in 
dyads. It has compared and contrasted exchange and power in 
their capacity for predicting cooperation and conflict in 
dyads. It has provided support for the idea of combining 
both frameworks into one, meaning that when used together, 
more variance is explained than when each is used alone. 
Finally, it concluded with implications for theory, methodol­
ogy, and practical applications, with recognition of limi­
tations and recommendations for further research. 
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APPENDIX A. 
NUMERICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE; 
MEAN, STANDARD DEVIATION, RANGE, 
KURTOSIS AND SKEWNESS 
Independent Variable Mean Standard Theo. Actual Kurtosis Skew-
dev. Range Range ness 
Scarcity of Physical Space 5. 051 0. 953 2-6 2-6 -0. 193 0. 729 
Scarcity of Personnel 4. 838 0. 818 2-6 3-6 -0. 321 -0. 350 
Scarcity of Volunteers 4. 684 1. 146 2-6 2-6 -0. 582 -0. 461 
Alternative Sources of Resources 4. 007 1. 151- 2-6 2-6 -0. 693 -0. 015 
Resource Difference 1. 566 1. 269 0-4 0-3 -1. 668 -0. 084 
Social Status 2. 250 0. 786 0-4 0-3 1. 323 -1. 124 
Formalization - sp. 0. 868 0. 686 0-4 0-2 -0. 861 0. 686 
Formalization - ref. 0. 794 0. 761 0-3 0-3 -0. 015 0. 673 
Professionalism 0. 816 0. 983 0-4 0-4 1. 309 1. 281 
Goal Difference 1. 324 0. 470 1-2 1-2 -1. 439 0. 763 
Domain Consensus 1. 713 0. 454 1-2 1-2 -1. 107 -0. 954 
Disparity of Resources Exchanged 1. 544 1. 376 0-4 0-4 -1. 028 0. 382 
Similarity of Resource Source 1. 221 0. 416 1-2 1-2 -0. 145 1. 363 
Total Expert Power 6. 485 1. 525 2-10 2-10 -0. 202 -0. 086 
Total Legal Power 2. 706 1. 300 2-10 2-7 2. 329 2. 000 
Total Reward Power 0. 184 0. 407 1-2 1-2 2. 897 1. 979 
Total Community Power 6. 331 1. 722 2-10 2-10 -0. 500 -0. 287 
Dif. in Legal Power 2. 029 1. 068 0-4 0-4 0. 376 -0. 245 
Dif. in Referent Power 0. 375 0. 981 0-4 0-4 5. 527 2. 579 
Dif. in Expert Power 1. 640 1. 263 0-4 0-4 -1. 047 0. 127 
Dif. in Community Power 0. 926 0. 849 0-4 0-4 0. 604' 0. 805 
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APPENDIX B. ZERO ORDER COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETl'TEEN 
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variables Resource Joint Written Conflict 
Exchange Programs Agreements Disagree­
ment 
RESEX 1.00000 0, 24365 0, 37285 0, 05250 
JOINTP 0.24365 1, 00000 0. 20438 0, 22501 
WRITAGS 0.37285 0, 20438 1. 00000 -0, 07515 
CONFLID 0.05250 0, 22501 -0. 07515 1, 00000 
CONPHIL -0.15430 -0, 19072 -0. 25097 -0, 07382 
SCPS 0.10509 0, 08569 0. 10320 0. ,08135 
SCP 0.02191 0. 23176 -0. 05445 0. ,24347 
SCV -0.01457 -0. 08152 0. 13097 -0. 13109 
ALTRES 0.10493 -0. 01351 0. 03499 -0. 10053 
RESDIF 0.10311 -0. 10278 -0. 11228 0. 10903 
SOCSTA 0,16719 -0. ,09085 0. 06812 0. 10600 
FORMSP -0.12864 0. 01918 -0. 07542 -0. 04351 
FORMREF -0.00246 . 0. 24661 0. 04613 0. 33214 
PROFES 0.09050 -0. 01155 -0. 04374 0. 03172 
GOALDIF -0.08408 0. 00358 0. 12464 0. 07352 
DOMAINC 0.03473 0. 07685 0. 18000 0. 11821 
DISP 0.10467 0. 18831 -0. 03565 0. 03818 
SIMRESS -0.05371 0. 11513 -0. 00108 -0. 01913 
TOTEXP 0.04431 0. 15158 0. 07764 -0. .3360 
TOTLEGP 0.15479 -0. 06379 0. 17312 0. 10032 
TOTREWP 0.22147 0. 16817 0. 25582 -0. 00211 
TOTCOMP 0.15006 0. 27970 0. 23522 -0. 07737 
DIFLEGP -0.27815 -0. 07611 -0. 10710 0. 01658 
DIFREFP 0.10091 0. 08499 0. 28480 0. 14516 
DIFEXP 0.12668 0. 22618 0. 15773 0. 05373 
DIFCP 0.14950 0. 04853 0. 12039 0. 11367 
TOTRFP 0.16275 0. 18057 0. 26345 0. 15739 
DIFRP 0.11314 0. 07820 0. 18933 0. 06463 
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Variables Conflict in Scarcity of Scarcity of Scarcity 
Philosophy Physical 
Space 
Personnel Volunteers 
RESEX -0. 15430 0.10509 0, ,02191 -0, 01457 
JOINT? -0. 19072 0.08569 0, ,23176 -0, 08152 
WRITAGS -0. 25097 0.10320 -0, ,05445 0, ,13097 
CONFLID -0. 07382 0.08135 0. ,24347 -0, ,13109 
CONPHIL 1. 00000 -0.02518 -0, 06247 -0. ,05733 
SCPS -0. 02518 1.00000 0. 16267 -0. 22906 
SCP -0. 06247 0.16267 1. 00000 -0. 04702 
SCV -0. 05733 -0.22906 -0. 04702 1. 00000 
ALTRES -0. 02322 0.19539 0. 34709 0. 48439 
RESDIF 0. 18038 0.04309 0. 05317 -0. 03388 
SOCSTA -0. 07199 -0.07658 -0. 13233 0. 34303 
FORMSP 0. 08019 -0.13669 0. 04071 -0. 04416 
FORMREF -0. 04889 0.26994 0. 30280 -0. 27037 
PROFES -0. 06528 0.28694 -0. 17536 -0. 66341 
GOALDIF -0. 20068 0.19424 -0. 03628 -0. 08378 
DOMAINC -0. 13832 -0.08548 0. 05366 0. 06647 
DISP 0. 01893 0.02367 0. 15762 -0. 12959 
SIMRESS -0. 16710 -0.02884 0. 04029 0. 00753 
TOTEXP -0. 32962 -0.19058 0. 06336 0. 08842 
TOTLEGP -0. 12249 0.21553 0. 13593 0. 01666 
TOTREWP -0. 16133 0.07084 0. 06763 0. 28400 
TOTCOMP -0. 26371 -0.06011 0. 09084 0. 13598 
DIFLEGP 0. 23046 -0.23444 0. 08177 0. 02581 
DIFREFP -0. 25296 0.19314 0. 25143 -0. 11776 
DIFEXP -0. 04630 -0.00294 0. 16533 0. 06399 
DIFCP -0. 11655 0.10543 -0.00659 0. 03683 
TOTRFP : -0. 09216 0.28437 0. 22172 -0. 12837 
DIFRP -0. 08339 0.13420 0. 11742 0. 04827 
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Variables Alternative Resource Social Formalization 
Resources Difference Status - Specificity 
RESEX 0. ,10493 0. ,10311 0, ,16719 -0, 12864 
JOINT? -0. ,01351 -0. ,10278 -0. ,09085 0. ,01918 
WRITAGS 0. ,03499 -0. 11228 0. ,06812 -0. ,07542 
CONFLID -0. ,10053 0. 10903 0. ,10600 -0. ,04351 
CONPHIL -0. 02322 0. 18038 -0. 07199 0. 08019 
SCPS 0. 19539 0. 04309 -0. 07658 -0. 13669 
se? 0.34709 0. 05317 -0. 13233 0. 04071 
scv 0. 48439 -0. 03388 0. 34303 -0. 04416 
ALTRES 1. 00000 -0. 02315 0. 34150 0. 06684 
RESDIF -0. 02315 1. 00000 -0. 07608 -0. 05790 
SOCSTA 0. 34150 -0. 07608 1. 00000 -0. 08918 
FORMSP 0. 06684 -0. 05790 -0. 08918 1. 00000 
FORMREF -0. 04051 0. 08322 -0. 12372 0. 00417 
PROFES -0. 43079 0. 20879 -0. 26593 -0. 01437 
GOALDIF -0. 01813 -0.09835 -0. 04012 0. 01892 
DOMAINC -0. 08097 0. 06534 -0. 00519 -0. 02762 
DISP 0. 20779 -0. 05470 0. 05817 -0. 01729 
SIMRESS 0. 02751 -0. 42056 0. 03395 -0. 05262 
TOTEXP -0. 18343 -0. 08179 -0. 14514 0. 11134 
TOTLEGP 0. 22410 0. 07473 0. 06519 -0. 07713 
TOTREWP 0. 34450 -0. 13117 0. 10982 -0. 01831 
TOTCOMP -0. 13576 -0. 14742 -0. 16003 0. 04360 
DIFLEGP -0. 00018 0. 10243 0. 09704 -0. 03508 
DIFREFP -0. 08772 0. 01860 0. 05041 -0. 09076 
DIFEXP 0. 05786 0. 14208 0. 00186 -0. 06395 
DIFCP 0. 22792 0. 13521 0. 23857 0. 04674 
TOTRFP -0. 10144 0. 04971 "0. 04892 -0. 06753 
DIFRP 0. 17898 -0. 12243 0. 06662 -0. 13021 
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Formalization Profession- Goal Domain 
Reference to alism Difference Consensus 
Rules 
RESEX -0, 00246 0, 09050 -0 .06408 0 .03473 
JOINT? 0. ,24661 -0, 01155 0, .00358 0, .07685 
WRITAGS 0. ,04613 -0, 04374 0, .12464 0, .18000 
CONFLID 0. 33214 0. ,03172 0, .07352 0, .11821 
CONPHIL -0, 04889 -0. ,06528 -0, 20068 -0, 13832 
SPCS 0. ,26994 0, 28694 0, .19424 -0, .08548 
SPC 0. 30280 -0. ,17536 -0, .03628 0, 05366 
SCV -0. 27037 -0. ,66341 -0, 08378 0, 06647 
ALTRES -0. 04051 -0. 43079 -0, 08097 0, 20779 
RESDIF 0. 08322 0. 20879 -0, 09835 0, 06534 
SOCSTA -0. 12372 -0. 26593 -0, 04012 -0. ,04012 
FORMSP 0. 00417 -0. 01437 0. 01893 -0. ,02762 
FORMREF 1. 00000 0. 19655 0. 08411 0. 17086 
PROFES 0. 19655 1. 00000 0. 14588 -0. 05262 
GOALDIF 0. 08411 0. 14588 1. 00000 -0. 18706 
DOMING 0. 17086 -0. 05262 -0. 18706 1. 00000 
DISP -0. 05489 0. 05259 -0. 12541 -0. 12781 
SIMRESS -0. 01925 -0. 20799 0. 23858 -0. 01557 
TOTEXP 0. 04204 -0. 16243 -0. 10709 0. 11692 
TOTLEGP -0. 02421 0. 05012 0. 04782 -0. 01846 
TOTREWP 0. 12294 -0. 17399 -0. 04214 0. 20706 
T0TC0i4P 0. 16541 -0. 17392 -0. 00512 0. 19815 
DIFLEGP 0. 11687 -0. 24188 -0. 03390 0. 07867 
DIFREFP 0. 31250 0. 01825 0. 15280 0. 14350 
DIFCP 0. 25152 0. 02807 -0. 03280 0. 04100 
SUMJOIP 0. 17384 -0. 03774 0. 09076 0. 17207 
SUIICONF 0. 17600 -0. 03489 -0. 12059 -0. 04098 
SUMFORM 0. 75206 0. 13216 0. 08415 0. 09816 
SUÎ4SCAR 0. 11469 -0. 39507 0. 04032 0. 02123 
TOTRFP 0. 30545 0. 08303 0. 12532 0. 11569 
DIFRP 0. 02871 -0.08538 -0. 04416 0. 21697 
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Variables Disparity of Similarity Total Total 
Resources of Resource Expert Legal 
Exchanged Source Power Power 
RESEX 0.10467 -0. 05371 0. ,04431 0, .15479 
JOINTP 0.18831 0. ,11513 0, ,15158 -0, .06379 
WRITAGS -0.03565 -0. 00108 0. ,07764 0, 17312 
CONFLID 0.03818 -0. 01913 -0. 13360 0. ,10032 
CONPHIL 0.01893 -0. 16710 -0. 32962 -0. ,12249 
SCPS 0.02367 -0. 02884 -0. 19058 0, ,21553 
SCP 0.15762 0. 04029 0. 06336 0. ,13593 
SCV -0.12959 0. 00753 0. 08842 0. 01666 
ALTRES 0.20779 0. 02751 -0. 18343 0. 24410 
RESDIF -0.05470 -0. 42056 -0. 08179 0. ,07473 
SOCSTA 0.05817 0. 03395 -0. 14514 0. 06519 
FORMSP -0.01729 -0. 05262 0. 11134 -0. 07713 
FORMREF -0.05489 -0. 01925 0. 04204 -0. 02421 
PROFES 0.05259 -0. 20799 -0. 16243 0. 05012 
GOALDIF -0.12541 0. 28358 -0. 10709 0. 04782 
DOMING -0.12781 -0. 01557 0. 11692 -0. 01846 
DISP 1.00000 -0. 05591 -0. 07733 0. 01558 
SIMRESS -0.05591 1. 00000 0. 12186 -0. 01610 
TOTEXP -0.07733 0. 12186 1. 00000 -0. 13294 
TOTLEGP 0.01558 -0. 01610 -0. 13294 1. 00000 
TOTREWP -0.07402 -0. 02249 -0. 00158 0. 28462 
TOTCOMP -0.25786 0. 18686 0. 59013 0. 02394 
DIFLEGP -0.22269 0.03530 0. 07761 -0. 03641 
DIFREFP -0.05350 0. 17693 0. 21913 -0. 05227 
DIFEXP -0.06962 -0. 10134 0. 06453 -0. 12816 
DIFCP 0.01548 -0. 14247 -0. 07523 0. 08765 
SUMJOIP 0.08230 0. 06506 0. 14194 0. 08675 
SUMCONF 0.03113 -0. 15028 -0. 34696 -0. 03970 
SUMFORM -0.06688 -0. 04141 0. 09978 -0. 07209 
SUMS CAR -0.00638 0. 01129 -0. 01326 0. 20888 
TOTRFP -0.02259 0. 00302 0. 15879 -0. 04074 
DIFRP 0.07471 0. 06800 -0. 01415 0. 37151 
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Variables Total Total Difference Difference 
Reward Community in Legal in referent 
Power Power Power Power 
RESEX 
JOINTP 
WRITAGS 
CONFLID 
CONPHIL 
SCPS 
SCP 
SCV 
ALTRES 
RESDIF 
SOCSTA 
FORMSP 
FORMREF 
PROFES 
GOALDIF 
DOMAINC 
DISP 
SIMRESS 
TOTEXP 
TOTLEGP 
TOTREWP 
TOTCOMP 
DIFLEGP 
DIFREFP 
DIFEXP 
DIFCP 
SUMJOIP 
SUMCONF 
SUMFORM 
SUMSCAR 
TOTRFP 
DIFRP 
0.22147 
0.16817 
0.25582 
-0.00211 
-0.16133 
0.07084 
0.06763 
0.28400 
0.34450 
-0.13117 
0.10982 
-0.01831 
0.12294 
-0.17399 
-0.04214 
0.02706 
-0.07402 
-0.02249 
-0.00158 
0.28462 
1.00000 
0.03937 
-0.02955 
-0.00695 
0.15847 
0.10364 
0.27826 
-0.12131 
0.08461 
0.28244 
0.05154 
0.53339 
0.15006 
0.27970 
0.23522 
-0.07737 
-0.26371 
-0.06011 
0.09084 
0.13598 
-0.13576 
-0.14742 
-0.16003 
0.04360 
0.16541 
-0.17392 
-0.00512 
0.19815 
-0.25786 
0.18686 
0.59013 
0.02394 
0.03937 
1.00000 
0.02288 
0.15847 
0.17447 
-0.02885 
0.32736 
-0.25055 
0.13649 
0.11438 
0.16499 
0.04126 
-0.27815 
-0.07611 
-0.10710 
0.01658 
0.23046 
-0.23444 
0.08177 
0.02581 
-0.00018 
0.10243 
0.09704 
-0.03508 
0.11687 
-0.24188 
-0.03390 
0.07867 
-0.22269 
0.03530 
0.07761 
-0.03641 
-0.02955 
0.02288 
1.00000 
0.10257 
-0.00856 
0.01875 
-0.11975 
0.19705 
0.03622 
-0.08356 
0.00016 
0.07611 
0.10091 
0.08499 
0.28480 
0.14516 
-0.25296 
0.19314 
0.25143 
-0.11776 
-0.08772 
0.01860 
0.05041 
-0.09076 
0.31250 
0.01825 
0.15280 
0.14350 
-0.05350 
0.17693 
0.21913 
-0.05227 
-0.00695 
0.15847 
0.10257 
1.00000 
0.04410 
0.06895 
0.25131 
-0.11606 
0.17485 
0.14695 
0.54554 
0.03157 
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Variables Difference Difference Total Difference 
in Expert in Community Referent in Reward 
Power Power Power Power 
RESEX 0 .12668 0 .14950 0 .16275 0 .11314 
JOINTP 0 .22618 0 .04853 0 .18057 0 .07820 
WRITAGS 0.15773 0.12039 0 .26345 0 .18933 
CONFLID 0 .05373 0 .11367 0 .15739 0 .06463 
CONPHIL -0 .11655 -0 .11655 -0 .14343 -0 .08339 
SCPS -0 .00294 0 .10543 0 .28437 0 .13420 
SCP 0 .16533 -0 .00659 0 .22172 0 .11742 
SCV 0 .06399 0 .03683 -0 .12837 0 .04827 
ALTRES 0 ,05786 0,22792 -0 .10144 0 .17898 
RESDIF 0 .14208 0, .13521 0, .04971 -0 .12243 
SOCSTA 0 .00186 0, .23857 -0, .04892 0 .06662 
FORMSP -0, .06395 0, 04674 -0, 06753 -0, .13021 
FORMREF 0, .16111 0, 25152 0, ,30545 0, 02871 
PROFES 0, 02979 0, 02807 0, ,08303 -0, 08538 
GOALDIF -0, 05180 -0, 03280 0, ,12532 -0. ,04416 
DOMAINC -0, 06527 0. ,04100 0, ,11569 0. ,21697 
DISP -0. ,06962 0. ,01548 -0. ,02259 0.07471 
SIMRESS -0, 10134 -0. 14247 0. 00302 0. 06800 
TOTEXP 0. 06453 -0. 07523 0, 15879 -0. 01415 
TOTLEGP -0. 12816 0. 08765 -0. 04074 0. 37151 
TOTREWP 0. 15847 0. 10364 0. 05154 0. 53339 
TOTCOMP 0. 17447 -0. 02885 0. 16499 0. 04126 
DIFLEGP -0. 00856 0. 01875 0. 00016 0. 07611 
DIFREFP 0. 04410 0. 06895 0. 54554 0. 03157 
DIFEXP 1. 00000 0. 08566 0. 03674 -0. 01497 
DIFCP 0. 08566 1. 00000 0. 11367 0. 10860 
SUMJOIP 0. 24160 0. 11344 0. 29078 0. 17948 
SUMCONF -0. 00036 -0. 01679 -0. 02021 -0. 02988 
SUMFORM 0. 09452 0. 23127 0. 18502 -0. 09515 
SUMSCAR 0. 13106 0. 07999 0. 18197 0. 17684 
TOTRFP 0. 03674 0. 11367 1. 00000 0. 02469 
DIFRP -0. 01497 0. 10860 0. 02469 1. 00000 
